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On behalf of the Lien Centre for Social Innovation, I have great pleasure in introducing what we think is an unprecedented 
publication—one that reviews the growing body of research that leads to the understanding of poverty and socio-economic 
inequality in Singapore. 
We are gratified that there has been increasing recognition and positive actions by government and the civil sector to address the 
challenges faced by low-income Singaporeans—a diverse group of people with a diverse set of needs. Without taking anything 
away from these good efforts, the fact remains that these problems are still poorly understood. We have heard from leaders of 
voluntary welfare organisations, teachers, students, members of the media, government partners and members of the public that 
they wish for a publication that collects, summarises and analyses some of the latest research and debates regarding poverty and 
inequality here in Singapore. I am delighted to say that we now have it.
It is the vision of the Lien Centre for Social Innovation to be a thought leader and catalyst for positive social change in Singapore 
and beyond. We hope this publication is informative and serves as a guide for the on-going discussions and planning for how to-
gether, we can manage these vital issues in Singapore.
Dr Tan Chi Chiu
Chairman
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includes policy-makers, social service organisations, social en-
terprises, journalists, academics, advocates and the community 
at large. In addition to the organisation and classification of the 
analyses and arguments, the handbook also seeks to clarify the 
distinctions between terms such as inequality and poverty, con-
cepts that are sometimes conflated in the literature. Through-
out, the authors have tried to present the arguments neutrally, 
letting the contributions of others stand on their own terms to 
the extent possible. Mere inclusion in the handbook does not 
constitute an endorsement of any argument cited here. Argu-
ments and counter-arguments are presented in order to allow 
the reader to make their own assessment as to the merits of 
each position. The authors’ views on key areas for reform are 
found in the final section of the paper. 
The review of literature in this handbook is organised into five 
parts; the following explains what each of these parts entails.
Part I: The Current Situation
The concepts of inequality, absolute poverty and relative pov-
erty are often misunderstood, or used interchangeably, even 
though they refer to distinct concepts. We understand “ine-
quality” to refer to the gap, either in terms of income or capital, 
that separates different strata of a society.  Income inequality is 
In reviewing and compiling the literature, 
the authors hope to make such research 
more accessible to a wider audience, which 
includes policy-makers, social service 
organisations, social enterprises, journalists, 
academics, advocates and the community at 
large. 
‘
A Handbook on Inequality, Poverty and Unmet Social Needs in 
Singapore reviews existing research on the topic. While it does 
not claim to be a comprehensive compilation, the handbook 
features major writers and important discussions on the subject. 
The authors have chosen not to include analyses of Singapore’s 
economy and economic development, since comprehensive re-
views of this literature are readily available. The handbook also 
deliberately focuses on forms of poverty experienced domesti-
cally, rather than pay attention to global poverty in the context 
of Singapore. 
Although the focus of this handbook is on long-term trends, as 
well as recent debates about social policy, the authors have at-
tempted to provide the most updated and current statistics and 
information available. However, with many issues discussed 
here, the situation is fluid and dynamic. Government policy on 
a range of social issues has been changing rapidly, and therefore 
there might be some specific policies, issues or data that have 
changed since the original sections were written. In such cases, 
we regret that some information might not be as current as we 
might like. We would refer readers to government websites for 
up-to-date information on government policy and the most 
current publicly available statistics.
 
In reviewing and compiling the literature, the authors hope to 
make such research more accessible to a wider audience, which 
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commonly expressed by the Gini coefficient, which is the ratio 
of the highest to lowest incomes in a society, and expressed as a 
number between zero and one.
The Gini coefficient is a helpful method for comparing the 
various levels of inequality in different cities or countries, but 
it does not represent the complete picture; there is no inter-
national standard for its calculation, so international compari-
sons are inexact.  Calculating the Gini coefficient depends upon 
choices such as a) whether to include mandatory savings, such 
as CPF, as part of income; b) whose incomes are included in the 
calculations (e.g., only citizens or all residents of a country); 
and c) which equivalence scale is used (a measure that allows 
for comparison of differently sized households).  
Singapore’s Gini coefficient has risen quite rapidly over the 
last two decades, which has generated much discussion about 
inequality in the city-state:  it has for some time been above 
0.4, the level that the UN-Habitat describes as “the interna-
tional alert line for income inequality.” Debates about Singa-
pore’s Gini coefficient, as well as the level of inequality it repre-
sents, include a range of topics. For one, there has been much 
discussion as to whether Singapore’s Gini coefficient should 
be compared to city Gini coefficients or country Gini coeffi-
cients. Others have debated whether Singapore’s Gini coeffi-
cient should include the non-working population, an addition 
that would certainly make it more substantial, as its inclusion 
would increase the distance from the high to the low end of 
the spectrum.  
There are also several debates concerning the idea of inequal-
ity itself, and its role within a robust economy. The relation-
ship between inequality and growth is understood in various 
ways: one side argues that high levels of growth naturally lead 
to inequality, and the other shows evidence that many countries 
have experienced high growth with far lower levels of inequal-
ity than that of Singapore. Others have debated the relationship 
between inequality and productivity, with some arguing that 
wages are simply a reflection of productivity, and that inequal-
ity is the natural offshoot of this relationship, while others point 
to other factors that affect wages, and argue that they are more 
significant. Finally, there has recently been more discussion 
of whether income or capital inequality poses a more serious 
threat to social cohesion.
Capital inequality
Capital inequality has recently become a vogue topic with the 
publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century. 
Capital inequality refers here to the gap between the capital 
that different strata of society control, as well as the income 
earned from that capital.  Piketty, and many others, have ar-
gued that capital inequality poses a much bigger threat in the 
21st century than income inequality. The central thesis of Capi-
tal is that capital inequality becomes a problem when the rate 
of return on capital (r) exceeds the rate of economic growth (g). 
While the 20th century saw a sustained period of g>r, Piketty 
demonstrates that this relationship was due to several anoma-
lies (the outbreak of and recovery from major wars, combined 
with progressive tax policies) that are unlikely to recur in the 
21st century. Apart from brief periods throughout history, like 
the 20th century, Piketty demonstrates that r>g is the normal 
state of affairs. Based on long trends and recent policies, he ar-
gues that the 21st century is likely to see high rates of capital 
inequality.
Piketty describes four contexts in which the threat of high lev-
els of capital inequality is particularly potent: low demographic 
growth, slowing of economic growth, capital markets becom-
ing more “perfect”, and the absence of estate tax to break up 
inherited wealth. All of these contexts pertain to Singapore to 
some degree, and some have noted that, although the relevant 
statistics are not available for a thorough study, there are signs 
that capital inequality may be a bigger problem than income 
inequality for Singapore. 
Discussions about income and capital inequality are not simply 
academic debates. It has been argued at length in the literature 
that high levels of inequality bring negative repercussions to all 
strata of society. These include heightened levels of violence, 
increased drug use, health problems, erosion of social trust, 
etc. Importantly, the Singapore government has begun to ac-
knowledge the existence of and problems related to inequality, 
and has taken steps to address these issues in Singapore. Over 
the past two years, Singapore’s Gini coefficient has begun to de-
crease, and the government has pledged to continue to curb the 
trend of rising inequality.
Absolute and relative poverty
The state of inequality in Singapore tells us little about the in-
cidence of poverty, and poverty itself is a concept that can be 
interpreted in various ways. Absolute poverty is understood in 
this handbook as income levels low enough to prevent people 
from meeting basic needs. In Singapore, it is generally agreed 
that there is comparatively little incidence of absolute poverty, 
although it is difficult to know exactly where this level is with-
out the existence of a formal way of measuring it. There have 
been discussions in policy circles about adopting a poverty line; 
the Singapore government has come out against the idea, argu-
ing that it is too simplistic a measure to capture the complexity 
of the situation. Others have argued that a poverty line, or a col-
lection of measures, would go a long way towards understand-
ing trends and changes in poverty in Singapore.
x
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Without such a line, interested parties, such as voluntary wel-
fare organisations (VWOs), academics and so on, often use 
measurements based on criteria used by MSF, or data from the 
Singapore Department of Statistics (e.g., the Average House-
hold Expenditure on Basic Needs [AHEBN] measure and the 
Household Expenditure Survey [HES]). To take an example 
of a measurement based on these data sources, former GIC 
chief economist Yeoh Lam Keong has estimated that there are 
110,000 to 140,000 households in Singapore who fit the defini-
tion of absolute poverty, and that these include the “working 
poor,” “unemployed poor” and “poor retiree” households.
 
Besides understanding poverty according to absolute measures, 
most countries also consider the concept of relative poverty. 
This measure provides a different view from that of absolute 
poverty, as it takes into account the standard of living in a soci-
ety as well as social exclusion. Relative poverty is often consid-
ered with respect to the median wage of a society, and an unof-
ficial  “relative poverty line” can be set around 50 or 60 per cent 
of the median wage. In Singapore, it has been estimated that 
around 20 to 35 per cent of households live in relative poverty.
The state of Singapore’s 
middle class
Besides studying the populations in Singapore who are consid-
ered “poor” by one measure or another, it is also important to 
consider how the middle class is faring. Apart from the last two 
years, over which the trend for the middle class has improved, 
Singapore’s middle class has experienced a long period of time 
over which they saw stagnating wages and an increased cost 
of living in Singapore. Various studies, international and local, 
have suggested that Singapore has become increasingly expen-
sive during this period as well, which has added to the pres-
sure on middle-class Singaporeans who are already coping with 
wage stagnation.  While recent improvements for lower- and 
middle-class Singaporeans are promising, it is too soon to tell 
whether the longer term trends have reversed or have merely 
slowed for a time.
Part II: Literature on 
the Causes of Inequality 
and Poverty
The Gini coefficient indicates that Singapore has become an in-
creasingly unequal society, but does not tell the story of how 
this happened. There are several factors that are commonly 
identified as having potentially increased inequality levels in 
Singapore; two of the most common are, broadly, economic 
strategies designed to achieve high rates of growth, and Singa-
pore’s system of meritocracy.
Ambitious growth rates
Since its inception, Singapore has famously experienced long 
periods of impressive growth rates. The Singapore government 
made the most out of Singapore’s strategic location on a major 
sea route, and through strategic economic restructurings, over 
a few decades managed to evolve into one of the financial cen-
tres of Southeast Asia.
 
For decades, the Singapore government focused on upgrad-
ing their economy to keep up with international markets and 
to maintain a competitive edge. This largely involved moving 
to higher value-added manufacturing, eventually shifting to a 
knowledge-based economy in the 1990s. While these upgrades 
undoubtedly contributed to Singapore’s economic success, 
some have suggested that the pace and ambition of these re-
structurings have not necessarily benefited all strata of the local 
population. Many have argued that Singapore’s economy was 
forced to grow more quickly than local workers could upgrade 
their skills (in spite of the efforts the Singapore government 
made to support skills upgrades), and that some were left in a 
state of unemployment because of their outdated skill sets.
The Gini coefficient indicates that Singapore has become an 
increasingly unequal society, but does not tell the story of how this 
happened. There are several factors that are commonly identified 
as having potentially increased inequality levels in Singapore; two 
of the most common are, broadly, economic strategies designed to 
achieve high rates of growth, and Singapore’s system of meritocracy.
‘
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Meanwhile, as Singapore’s economy continued to move up the 
value-added ladder, emerging sectors needed more workers 
with relevant skills. Since much of the local population could 
not supply a labour force appropriate to the economic upgrades, 
businesses had to look internationally. Thus Singapore began to 
see high numbers of foreign workers at both ends of the income 
spectrum: so-called “foreign talents” at the high end, and “low-
skilled foreign workers” to do jobs at the lower end, for which 
many Singaporean workers would have required higher wages.
Although the foreign workforce enabled Singapore to meet its 
economic goals and to sustain its high rates of growth, some 
have claimed that this inflow of high numbers of foreign work-
ers has led to unfortunate externalities. For example, some have 
argued that workers at the lower end of the economic spectrum 
have driven down wages for the local workforce.  Further, there 
are signs that some Singaporeans feel that workers at the high 
end of the economic spectrum have driven up housing prices, 
taken too many spots at local schools, and occupied jobs that 
should be available to Singaporeans. Indeed, on some occasions 
this discontent among segments of Singaporeans has become 
public, such as three protests held in Hong Lim Park during 
2013.
 
The Singapore government has, over the past few years, taken 
steps to cut back Singapore’s reliance on the foreign workforce 
at both ends of the spectrum. These steps include enforcing ex-
isting guidelines and putting in place harsher penalties for em-
ployers who do not adhere to the rules regarding foreign work-
ers, and placing stricter limits on the workforce. The rates of 
foreign workers entering Singapore have begun to ebb although 
there are still jobs to be filled at both ends. This has created fric-
tion, and a balance between the needs of businesses and that of 
Singaporean workers and professionals is being sought.
Tax policies
Besides developing strategic plans to achieve high economic 
growth and remain competitive, the Singapore government 
has also designed their taxation policy to support growth. Tax 
policy in Singapore, broadly, involves low levels of corporate tax 
rates, no capital gains tax and low personal income tax. 
 
Taken on its own, Singapore’s personal income tax is progres-
sive—many employed Singaporeans do not pay any income 
tax, and tax rates increase directly with income. However, when 
personal income tax is considered alongside indirect taxation, 
some have argued that the net result is a regressive tax system. 
Indirect taxation—most notably, the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST)—disproportionately targets lower income groups, as it 
is the same rate for all groups and so takes a larger percentage 
from people at the bottom of the income spectrum.  The argu-
ment that Singapore’s taxation system is regressive is especially 
compelling if one takes Central Provident Fund (CPF) contri-
butions as part of the equation, which some scholars do. While 
not technically a form of taxation, it has been argued that CPF 
contributions function as a tax, as they are withdrawn from in-
come and are not available for household needs.
 
Besides the argument that Singapore’s tax system is inherently 
regressive, others have pointed out that, at the very least, the 
system has become gradually more regressive. For example, 
between the years 2000 and 2007, the highest rate of personal 
income tax decreased from 28 to 20 per cent, at the same time 
as the corporate tax rate fell from 26 to 18 per cent, and is down 
to 17 per cent today. The GST, however, has increased from 3 
per cent, at its introduction in 1994, to 7 per cent today.  
 
On the other side of the argument, the Singapore government 
points out that the GST is offset by permanent GST vouch-
ers, which are means-tested to ensure that Singapore’s lower-
income groups are not overburdened by this regressive tax. 
Furthermore, Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugarat-
nam has argued that the tax system is best considered within 
the framework of taxation and social benefits, in which case 
it begins to appear far more progressive. There have also been 
recent changes that counter the longer trend of increasingly re-
gressive taxation policies.  For one, the cut-off bands for high-
income earners have been lowered. In the 2013 Budget, it was 
announced that the Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) was 
to be expanded, and that a more progressive tax system for 
properties and cars would be put in place. As with the more 
general situations facing the lower- and middle-classes in Sin-
gapore, many have argued that long-term trends have favoured 
the higher income groups, but recent changes in government 
policy appear to be moving in a different direction.
Meritocracy
In addition to Singapore’s growth strategies and economic poli-
cies, it has also been suggested that cultural reasons may have 
influenced the rising levels of inequality in Singapore. Singa-
pore famously values meritocracy, which is understood here as 
the belief that individual merit should determine one’s success 
level. First, several have argued that any meritocratic system 
comes with inherent difficulties. For one, if a meritocracy is to 
be fair, it requires a system of equalising opportunities and cor-
recting for structural inequalities. Otherwise, factors unrelated 
to merit will play a significant part in determining outcomes. 
Secondly, if a society believes in the value of the meritocratic 
system, but has not taken adequate steps to correct unequal 
starting points, then successes and failures of individuals, and 
occasionally of groups of people, may be unjustly ascribed to 
merit rather than to social advantage or disadvantage.
xii
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A meritocratic system naturally relies upon education as a pri-
mary pathway for social mobility. A fair educational system 
should, in theory, allow those with the strongest intellectual 
ability to climb to the top.  Some have suggested, however, that 
there are barriers to this ideal in Singapore’s system. First, some 
have argued that the system of streaming, determined by the 
Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), may be an in-
exact way of identifying merit and deciding a student’s future. 
While the concept of streaming was designed primarily to stem 
the dropout rate in Singapore’s schools, and was quite success-
ful in doing so, it has gone on to play an enormous role in deter-
mining the futures of Singaporean students. Many have pointed 
out that some students may end up in academic streams where 
they do not necessarily belong, particularly as their placement 
is based on one test, which is taken when they are fairly young. 
For this reason, many have argued that the results of streaming 
are too dependent on a single examination.
 
Further, some have made the case that there are “educational 
handicaps” that disadvantage less affluent students. For exam-
ple, wealthier parents can afford to enroll their children in bet-
ter preschools, which means that these children start primary 
schools at an advantage over their peers. Moreover, higher-in-
come parents can afford private tuition for their children, which 
further increases their advantage over their peers. Although the 
government has argued that the benefits of tuition are exagger-
ated, and that they are taking steps to ensure that “every school 
is a good school,” many claim that there is still some distance to 
go in the effort to combat educational handicaps.
 
Some have also expressed doubt as to the opportunities for 
mobility through education. On the one hand, Singaporean 
schools consistently score very well on the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) test, and notably, 
underprivileged students also perform well, relative to their 
counterparts in comparable countries. The Ministry of Educa-
tion (MOE) also points to the number of students of lower eco-
nomic status who go on to attend post-secondary schools. On 
the other hand, studies have demonstrated that social mobility 
is slowing down in Singapore—more and more, the benefits, 
or lack thereof, of one generation are passed down to the next.
 
In sum, it has been argued that Singapore’s commitment to 
meritocracy may have paradoxically contributed to growing 
levels of inequality, insofar as a belief in meritocracy may be 
somewhat at odds with reality. In such a situation, some have 
argued, the poor become stigmatised, and it becomes even 
more difficult for the disadvantaged to find a way out of pover-
ty.  Some groups are more vulnerable to poverty, and the stigma 
associated with it, than others—for this reason, there has been 
much written about intersections between poverty, and gender 
and race. 
Part III: Intersections 
with Poverty
Poverty and gender
Many scholars have argued that women are typically more at 
risk than men of falling into poverty at some point in their 
lives. The specific circumstances that put women at risk differ 
according to society, but they usually have to do with women 
having more caregiving responsibilities than men. This is not 
only the case for full-time homemakers but also for women 
who are employed on a full-time basis—they still spend more 
time on household duties than men.
 
The fact that women are usually held responsible for caregiv-
ing and other household responsibilities means that they have 
less opportunity to build their savings, which leaves them more 
vulnerable to poverty than men. Even if women are married, 
and their husbands’ incomes are sufficient for their families, 
they are merely a divorce or widowhood away from poverty. 
This precarious situation may force women to make dangerous 
decisions, such as staying in an unhealthy relationship to avoid 
poverty.
The two groups who are particularly at risk of falling into pov-
erty are unmarried elderly women and single mothers. For 
one, elderly women usually have less in the way of savings to 
support them in retirement than men have, because they have 
often spent time outside the workforce. Secondly, women typi-
cally live longer than men, so elderly women are likely to have 
their final, most difficult years, on their own. For single moth-
ers, the situation is particularly difficult because they have only 
one income to support themselves and their children, and they 
are solely responsible for the care of their children.
In many respects, the situation for women in Singapore is bet-
ter than in many other countries. Women are well represented 
in the workplace, and enjoy many of the same opportunities 
that men have; there is still a significant wage gap between the 
genders, and women are under-represented in management 
positions.
According to some studies, Singapore’s declining fertility rate 
and the policies that are designed to reverse it affect women in a 
variety of ways. On the one hand, the government offers several 
incentives to women to have children, including the Baby Bo-
nus and various subsidies to help with the costs of child-rearing. 
On the other hand, many of these policies are tied to supporting 
the “traditional family,” so single parents are not always eligible 
for some types of government assistance. Single mothers face 
particular challenges in finding housing, as they do not receive 
the housing benefits for which married couples are eligible, yet 
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they need a stable home to maintain a career and to keep some 
consistency in their children’s education.
 
Single elderly women also face some challenges in Singapore, 
as some scholars suggest. Many single elderly women have low 
CPF balances or none at all, and therefore must rely on their 
families to cover many of their needs. Because retirement cov-
erage is tied to employment in Singapore, many elderly women 
arrive at this stage of life with little in the way of savings, and no 
CPF to sustain them.
 
The Singapore government has made changes over the past 
few years that have improved the situation for women in Sin-
gapore.  With the recent introduction of the Pioneer Genera-
tion Package (PGP), for example, many single elderly women 
now have their healthcare payments covered by the govern-
ment for life. Further, the government has begun to encour-
age businesses to allow flexible work schedules, so that em-
ployed women might have an easier time balancing family and 
work. The government has also allowed more time for working 
women to take off work to care for sick children, enjoy longer 
maternity leave, and they continue to make childcare more af-
fordable.
Poverty and race
Since Singapore’s founding, the government has taken steps to 
achieve harmony among the races in the city-state.  These at-
tempts have largely involved forming ethnic self-help groups, 
assigning quotas to various types of housing provided by the 
Housing and Development Board (HDB), and offering the 
same educational opportunities to people of all races.  
Singapore’s ethnic self-help groups are set up in such a way that 
each group is funded by members of their own ethnicity, via 
CPF contributions, as well as by matched donations from the 
government. While this system was designed to allow each eth-
nic group to be responsible for its own well-being, some have 
argued that self-funding may actually be perpetuating inequal-
ity among the groups. For example, the Chinese Development 
Assistance Council (CDAC) has a large number of high-income 
earners whose CPF contributions are higher than average, and 
so CDAC ends up with more money and greater resources to 
help their community than the other ethnic self-help groups. 
In this sense, it has been argued that the populations who start-
ed out in the lead are able to maintain that advantage through 
the current system.
 
While the ethnic self-help groups have contributed greatly to 
each group’s success in Singapore, there is still some debate as 
to whether this is the best system. Some have suggested that 
Singapore abandon the ethnic self-help group model and move 
towards a more racially unified Singapore. Similarly, it has 
been argued that, even if the self-help groups are successful in 
improving the lives of their members, they are doing little to 
achieve greater equality, and greater unity, among different eth-
nicities. 
Part IV: Existing policies 
Singapore’s social system is based on the ideal of “many help-
ing hands.”  In brief, “many helping hands” stresses individual 
responsibility; if further assistance is needed, the individual’s 
family will be first to help, then the greater community, and 
finally the government. This philosophy is evolving, however, 
... the government has acknowledged 
over the past few years that greater 
support is needed, and that there is a 
greater role for the government to play. 
‘
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and the government has acknowledged over the past few years 
that greater support is needed, and that there is a greater role for 
them to play. As it stands now, however, the following are some 
of the primary avenues for social support in Singapore. Rather 
than provide lengthy descriptions of each scheme, which are 
found in the body of this paper, brief descriptions of the debates 
and discussions about the schemes are listed below:
Central Provident Fund 
•	 Does CPF provide adequate support in retirement?
•	 Is CPF’s link to home purchases beneficial or harmful, as 
this depletes retirement savings and was not CPF’s original 
purpose?
•	 Is CPF’s link to employment the best policy for all Singa-
poreans, as many groups are excluded from CPF partici-
pation entirely, and are therefore excluded from various 
facets of life in Singapore?
Housing and Development Board
•	 Does the incidence of poverty go unnoticed because 
disadvantaged Singaporeans are mingled with affluent 
Singaporeans in HDB developments?
•	 Is monetizing HDB flats an efficient way to finance 
retirement?
•	 Are HDB flats becoming less affordable?
•	 Should HDB flats be included in prime area housing 
developments, such as Marina South and Kampong Bugis?
Health financing
•	 Should there be more risk-pooling?
•	 Is Medisave adequate to pay for medical needs?
Workfare Income Supplement 
(WIS) Scheme
•	 Does WIS have the unintended side effect of keeping 
wages low?
Tax incentives
•	 Do such policies disproportionately benefit the wealthy?
Non-profit organisations (NPOs)
•	 Does government involvement stifle innovation?
•	 Are resources used efficiently by NPOs, given the amount 
of bureaucracy involved in their management?
•	 Is the current model the best way to provide assistance to 
the disadvantaged in Singapore?
Part V: Suggested 
avenues for reform
Many of the policy experts and social commentators discussed 
in this handbook have proposed policy changes that might help 
to lower the incidence of poverty in Singapore, and/or combat 
growing inequality. These potential policy changes range from 
minor adjustments to the existing system to a significant over-
haul of Singapore’s approach to social policy: 
•	 Move to an opt-out system of assistance.
•	 Expand CPF, including unemployment insurance and/
or wage insurance, and permission to women who have 
worked as homemakers to access their husbands’ CPF ac-
counts.
•	 Change the tax system to include an earned income tax 
credit, or develop a “means based tax” system.
•	 Make adjustments to wages: wage shock therapy, mini-
mum wage, higher wages for certain low-wage industries.
•	 Increase WIS.
•	 Further limit the number of foreign workers in Singapore.
•	 Reform the education system, particularly with respect to 
the significance of the PSLE.
By producing this publication, we aim to play a 
constructive role in supporting government, society 
and the business community to understand and 
address Singapore’s key new social challenges. 
‘
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Executive Summary

Introduction
The story of Singapore’s triumphant rise from an underdevel-
oped to a developed economy in the space of a few decades is 
well known and appropriately lauded.  As Singapore has settled 
into its position amongst the world’s wealthy countries, it now 
faces new economic and social challenges. 
Foremost among these are issues related to inequality, poverty, 
and unmet social needs. Much has been written on these is-
sues—yet to date, there has been no thorough review of con-
tributions to the discussion by the academic and policy com-
munities. Moreover, it is clear that such a review is necessary. 
Organisations at the coalface of social service provision in 
Singapore have little time to review and digest the huge pile 
of research that has been conducted so far. Yet, these are the 
very people that such literature can help as they design, refine 
and implement programs intended to deal with the challenges 
facing Singaporeans today. A compilation of recent research on 
poverty, inequality and unmet social needs in Singapore can 
also help clarify the debate currently taking place within pol-
icy-making circles and in the public domain. It can spur more 
useful and productive discussion—and action—on what can be 
done better or differently.
The Lien Centre for Social Innovation (LCSI), a partnership 
between the Lien Foundation and Singapore Management Uni-
versity (SMU), undertakes research and capacity-building pro-
jects that catalyse positive social change in Singapore and be-
yond. From our position as a Centre within SMU, and through 
our strong connections with the social sector, LCSI is a bridge 
between the academic, policy-making, and social service are-
nas. By producing this publication, we aim to play a construc-
tive role in supporting government, society and the business 
community to understand and address Singapore’s key new 
social challenges. 
  1
How to Read this Handbook
A Handbook for Inequality, Poverty and Unmet Social Needs 
in Singapore has been designed to engage audiences with 
different backgrounds and experiences. Readers unfamil-
iar with either this topic or with the debates regarding the 
definitions of poverty and inequality can read it sequentially 
so as to receive an overview of the entire debate, including 
pointers to additional material and detailed background on 
important issues through graphics and boxes throughout the 
text.  
Experts on the subject matter are invited to focus on sec-
tions most relevant to their interests. Each of the sections in 
the handbook has been written as a standalone paper, and as 
such can be read independently.  

Part I 
The Current Situation
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4Section A: Defining 
terms and relationships 
between concepts
A review of the literature on inequality, poverty and unmet so-
cial needs in Singapore has to start with a discussion of defini-
tions and of the complex relationship between inequality and 
poverty. These definitions are not clear-cut; even in the aca-
demic literature, these terms are sometimes used interchange-
ably. 
•	 Inequality is understood in this handbook as the income 
gap between people at different strata of society, though 
this definition is much more complex than this simple 
explanation. Inequality is often measured by the Gini co-
efficient, which calculates the gap between incomes. All 
societies have inequality, and to a certain extent, some in-
equality is necessary and considered by some to be desir-
able, in that it might promote competition. However there 
are many consequences associated with high levels of in-
equality. This has led the United Nations (UN), and oth-
ers, to develop measures that indicate the point at which 
inequality becomes a threat to society. The negative effects 
of inequality are discussed further below.
 
•	 Absolute	poverty is the inability to access resources suf-
ficient to meet basic needs. This is usually measured by 
calculating a poverty line. In developing countries, the 
poverty line of USD 1.25 per person per day (adjusted for 
purchasing power) is accepted as a rule of thumb poverty 
line. This is not applicable to developed countries, such as 
Singapore, where the cost of meeting basic needs is much 
higher.1 Thus, countries such as the United States have de-
vised other measures of domestic absolute poverty. The 
absolute poverty lines adopted in many developed coun-
tries—while higher than those in developing countries—
nevertheless are attempts to quantify and measure the 
same issue: an individual’s financial ability to attain basic 
human needs.
 
•	 Relative	 poverty is the inability to access sufficient re-
sources to meet needs that a particular society regards as 
necessary. Many developed countries have designated a 
poverty line based on a measure of relative poverty.  For in-
stance, many countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) define as “poor” 
those people with incomes below 50 per cent of median 
income.
•	 Unmet	social	needs	refers to other social needs that could 
be related to, but are distinct from, poverty. For instance, 
many social service organisations are concerned with so-
cial isolation among the elderly, mental health among sin-
gle parents, access to health care, equitable education op-
portunities, good public transportation, etc. While these 
issues often relate in some way to poverty, they are also dis-
tinct. That is, it is possible to experience one or more un-
met needs, while not being “poor” in the traditional sense.
As this discussion demonstrates, the relationships between 
these terms can be complex. For example, it is theoretically pos-
sible for a society to experience high levels of inequality with no 
absolute poverty, and it is possible to have a perfectly equal so-
ciety where everyone, by traditional standards of absolute pov-
erty, is poor.  The relationship between inequality and relative 
poverty, however, is somewhat closer.  Relative poverty refers 
to a measurement of poverty in the context of existing living 
standards and incomes in a specific society, and provides much 
more context regarding which needs define what it means to be 
“poor” in that society.   
Discussions of relative poverty also focus on its implications for 
social inclusion.  While people who are identified as “relatively 
poor” within a society may not experience extreme deprivation, 
they are nonetheless affected in significant ways.  As the Nobel 
Prize winning economist Amartya Sen argues, wealthy coun-
tries have higher “commodity requirements” for social par-
ticipation than poorer countries.  That is, experiencing relative 
deprivation compared to others in a wealthier society can have 
important effects on one’s ability to participate in that society, 
particularly if one experiences some degree of exclusion from 
the education system, political process, or civic or cultural or-
ganisations.2  Sen illustrates this idea with the following exam-
ple: “While the rural Indian may have little problem in appear-
ing in public without shame with relatively modest clothing and 
can take part in the life of the community without a telephone 
or television, the commodity requirements of these general 
functioning are much more demanding in a country where 
people standardly use a bigger basket of diverse commodities.”3
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Section A:  Inequality
The Gini coefficient can be understood by using the Lorenz 
curve. As the Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS) explains, 
“The Lorenz curve is a plot of the cumulative percentage of 
households in ascending order of income and the cumulative 
shares of the income of the households.”4 Looking at Figure 1.1, 
the straight, diagonal line represents perfect equality: that is, if in-
come were distributed equally among all households, such a sce-
nario would be represented by that line. The curved line in this 
type of graph represents the way income is actually distributed 
among households; the more unequally income is distributed, 
the further the curved line will move from the straight, diagonal 
line. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area contained within 
the two lines (area A) to the area under the straight line (area A 
plus area B).5  Looking at the illustration, it becomes clear that, 
in a case of near-to-perfect equality, the ratio would approach 
zero, whereas in a situation of greater inequality, the ratio would 
approach one.
Equivalence scale
There is no international standard for calculating the Gini coef-
ficient. One of the most significant differences among the ap-
proaches is the equivalence scale that is used for the calculation. 
An equivalence scale is a means that allows for the comparison 
of households of different sizes; for example, in order to com-
pare households consisting of one adult to those comprising two 
Figure 1.1 The Lorenz Curve
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The Gini Coefficient 
Measure of Inequality
adults and four children, there must be a scale that makes these 
equivalent for the purposes of comparison.  
As with the general computation of the Gini coefficient, there is 
no internationally accepted equivalence scale.  One equivalence 
approach involves merely dividing the household income by the 
number of people in the household, so that one ends up com-
paring income on a per household member basis; Hong Kong 
and Japan use this method.6 Slightly more complicated is the 
modified OECD scale, which is used by Eurostat, the UK, Australia 
and others.7 According to this scale, the first adult in a house-
hold is assigned a weight of one point, each additional adult is 
assigned a weight of 0.5 points, and each child is allocated 0.3 
points. Following which, the total household income is divided by 
the sum of the points allocated to household members.
The DOS does not release the equivalence scale used for calcu-
lating Singapore’s Gini coefficient, but does calculate what Sin-
gapore’s figure would be according to other scales, such as the 
modified OECD.
What and whom to include
Beyond choosing or developing an equivalence scale to measure 
a country’s Gini, there is also the question of what components 
of income, and which people, to include in the computation. For 
example, if a part of a person’s income is set aside for mandatory 
savings or a pension, is this still considered income for the pur-
poses of inclusions within the calculations? In Singapore’s case, 
this question translates to whether CPF should be included in 
the Gini coefficient.
Secondly, whom should it include? Only citizens of a country, 
or also permanent residents (PRs)? What about migrant work-
ers or people with temporary residence permits? Finally, should 
citizens, PRs, and others who are outside the work force still be 
included?
These questions and others are considered when determin-
ing the methodology for computing a Gini coefficient, and the 
answers can have significant effects on the degree to which 
inequality is represented in a society. The exclusion of a large 
group of people at one or the other end of the income distribu-
tion would clearly have a significant bearing on the appearance 
of inequality in a society.
Area A
Area B
The Current Situation
Measuring the extent of 
inequality in Singapore
Much of the research on Singapore focuses on inequality rather 
than absolute poverty. Authors do this for a number of reasons, 
the most significant being that the incidence of absolute pov-
erty in Singapore is relatively low (and indeed there are some 
that deny Singapore has any poverty at all in an absolute sense, 
which is discussed further below) when compared to most oth-
er Asian countries. There is no doubt, however, that inequality 
has risen rapidly in Singapore since the year 2000.
The increase of inequality in Singapore since 2000 is evident 
across all measures, including those that focus on wage dispar-
ity and the Gini coefficient. The disparity in wages between 
those in the 90th percentile of Singapore’s workforce and those 
in the 10th percentile is one of the highest in developed coun-
tries (see Figure 1.2). The ratio of distribution in wages from 
the 90th percentile to the 10th has risen from 6.1 in 2000 to 7.8 
in 2012.  
Singapore’s Gini coefficient has seen a comparable increase. 
As explained (see page 5), the Gini coefficient is a ratio of 
the highest to the lowest incomes in a given society and is 
expressed as a number between zero and one; the closer the 
coefficient is to one, the higher the level of income inequality 
in a society.
Before taking into account government transfers and taxes, Sin-
gapore’s Gini coefficient rose quite rapidly from 0.43 in 2000 to 
0.478 in 2012.8 While Singapore is just one of many countries 
around the world that have experienced rapidly rising inequal-
ity in recent years, its experience is exceptional for two reasons: 
the level it has reached, and the speed at which it has attained 
that level of inequality.9  Figure 1.3 shows the change in Gini 
coefficients in selected countries from the mid-1980s through 
the mid-2000s. The average increase of their Gini coefficients 
over this 20-year period was 0.02, which is the same increase 
that Singapore experienced within a mere decade, rising from 
0.430 in 2000 to 0.452 in 2010.10 
Not only is Singapore’s inequality high relative to other coun-
tries, it has, at times, reached problematic levels, according to 
international indicators. UN-Habitat, the United Nations pro-
gramme for human settlements, sets 0.4 as the “international 
alert line for income inequality;” Singapore is currently well 
above this line. Further, UN-Habitat defines Gini coefficients 
between 0.45 to 0.49, a range that Singapore’s Gini coefficient 
has occasionally entered, as follows:
Inequality approaching dangerously high levels. If no re-
medial actions are taken, could discourage investment and 
lead to sporadic protests and riots. Often denotes weak 
functioning of labour markets or inadequate investment in 
public services and lack of pro-poor social programmes.11 
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Figure 1.2: International Comparison of Wage Disparity
Source: Hui W. T., “Working Poor in Singapore,” FASS Forum on Building an 
Inclusive Society: Understanding and Empowering the Poor in Singapore.
A Handbook on Inequality, Poverty and Unmet Social Needs in Singapore  
Recent decrease in Singapore’s 
Gini coefficient
In 2013, Singapore’s Gini coefficient fell significantly from 
0.478 in 2012 to 0.463, according to the 2013 Key Household In-
come Trends report.  After accounting for government transfers 
and taxes, the Gini coefficient declined from 0.434 in 2012 to 
0.412 for 2013.12 The DOS reports that enhanced government 
schemes and transfers explain most of this drop. As the report 
noted, “the provision of the government’s various schemes im-
proved the income situation of households, with households 
staying in smaller types of dwelling receiving more Govern-
ment transfers. This reduced household income disparities, 
reflected by a lower Gini coefficient after adjusting for Gov-
ernment transfers and taxes.”13 These programmes will be dis-
cussed in Part IV of this handbook. The lower Gini coefficient 
in 2013 should be viewed within the context of other economic 
improvements.  
While this number is sharply lower than in the past, it is still 
within the range considered to be “approaching dangerously 
high levels” of inequality by the UN-Habitat. It is also well 
above this UN programme’s “international alert line” or in-
equality threshold of 0.40.14 The decline in the Gini coefficient 
is a good sign regarding inequality in Singapore.
Pre- and post-transfer 
Gini coefficients
Another factor to be considered in relation to this discussion 
is the difference between the Gini coefficient before taxes and 
transfers, and the figure after these are taken into account. 
Comparing these coefficients provides a measure of the impact 
of government policy in reducing income inequality. The dif-
ference between these two coefficients in Singapore is the low-
est when compared to other developed countries. For example, 
Singapore typically lowers its Gini coefficient by 8 per cent to 
12 per cent through taxes and transfers.  The post-transfer Gini 
coefficient is 30 per cent lower that the pre-transfer figure in 
northern Europe, and 15 per cent lower in the US. This indi-
cates that changes to taxes and transfers could be effectively 
used to reduce income inequality in Singapore.
7
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Figure 1.3:  Changes in Gini coefficient in selected countries, mid 1980s to mid 2000s
Source: M. Bhaskaran, et al., Background Paper: Inequality and the Need for a New Social Compact. 
Singapore, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy:	5, (2012).
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City vs. country Gini coefficient 
comparisons
The Singapore government has suggested that Singapore’s Gini 
coefficient appears less severe when compared with that of 
other cities rather than countries. The former Acting Minis-
ter of Culture, Community and Youth Lawrence Wong noted 
that Singapore’s Gini coefficient is “not high for a city, which we 
are.”  He added, “If you look at cities… the Gini in New York is 
higher than the Gini for America.”15  
This is a useful point to consider: cities tend to have much 
higher Gini coefficients than entire countries. Large groups of 
people from both ends of the income spectrums tend to live in 
urban centres—the wealthiest in societies often live in cities, 
as do the least advantaged. Singapore is in the unique situa-
tion of being a city-state, which lacks the hinterland that most 
countries have. The level of inequality in a country’s less urban 
areas is much lower, and so tends to reduce a country’s over-
all Gini coefficient. The argument, then, is that Singapore’s level 
of inequality should be compared to that of New York or Hong 
Kong, which are similar urban centres. It is then often argued 
that, since Singapore’s Gini coefficient is below those of cities 
such as these, the incidence of inequality in Singapore is actually 
not the crisis that some claim it to be.
The counterview is that while Singapore’s Gini coefficient is 
lower than some other large cities, it does not necessarily fol-
low that inequality is not as big a problem as the measurement 
suggests it is. First, if Singapore’s Gini coefficient is to be com-
pared to those of other cities, then the calculation of the coef-
ficient should include the same groups of people as these cities 
do. Much of the reason that New York and Hong Kong have such 
high Gini coefficients is because their calculations include their 
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entire populations.  Singapore excludes large parts of both ends 
of the income spectrum in its Gini coefficient calculations:  the 
domestic calculation includes citizens and PRs, but excludes 
the 1.6 million non-resident population of Singapore, includ-
ing migrant workers at the low end of the economic scale and 
so-called “foreign talents” at the high end.  As the Gini coef-
ficient measures inequality in incomes, these incomes would 
surely increase Singapore’s Gini coefficient significantly. Other 
cities, such as New York and Hong Kong, do incorporate these 
segments of the populations in their Gini calculations. 
 
The typical arrangement of households in a city also affects Gini 
coefficients. To take an extreme example, in an imaginary city 
where all families live together in large households, and the av-
erage family includes four adults (two parents, two grandpar-
ents) and four children, there will be fewer “poor” households, 
because individuals with less income (the grandparents) are 
incorporated into households that have stable incomes from 
other adults.  If such a city were compared to another imagi-
nary city with the same population, but where all elderly poor 
lived separately from their children, these two cities would end 
up with dramatically different Gini coefficients.  
The critics of the “Singapore qua city” argument say that it ob-
scures the reality that the central issue is not the Gini coefficient 
itself, but rather the inequality that it represents. The fact that 
Singapore lacks a middle-class hinterland is not only an issue 
that affects the computation of the Gini coefficient, it is an actu-
al problem that affects the less advantaged of society. Whereas 
in a city such as Hong Kong or New York, low-income residents 
have the option of moving outside the city to an area where 
the cost of living would be significantly lower, there is no such 
options for Singaporeans. As is discussed further in Part I Sec-
tion D (page 17), the cost of living has increased dramatically in 
Singapore in recent years, and this increase disproportionately 
affects low-income Singaporeans, who have no hinterland to 
which they might escape.
Exclusion of non-working 
population
In addition to excluding the non-resident population from the 
calculation of the Gini coefficient, the Singapore government 
also excludes the non-working population.  Due to this exclu-
sion, Tan Khay Boon argues that while 2012 reported Gini co-
efficient—at 0.478 before taxes and transfers—was quite high 
according to UN-Habitat alert levels, it may still have underrep-
resented the income gap. In Global-is-Asian, the journal by the 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Tan K. B. writes:
The reported Gini is also derived using data from house-
holds with at least one working individual.  In Singapore, 
9.2 per cent [of] households are not in the labour market 
and are excluded from calculation. They cover the spec-
trum from households dependent on working adult chil-
dren, transfers from the government or their pension pay-
outs to those who enjoy accrued savings from capital, rental 
or other non-labour incomes. The unexplained omission 
of both non-labour and households with no labour force 
participation and non-labour income presents a less than 
representative picture.  Intuition suggests that the Gini co-
efficient may, in fact, be larger than what was reported. 16
A further critical view often raised is that the Singapore gov-
ernment chooses to calculate the Gini coefficient with CPF 
employer contributions included. The argument in favour of 
including CPF as income is a valid one: employer CPF contri-
butions make up a part of income, a portion that people will not 
have access to until they retire. Still, incorporating CPF contri-
butions serves to narrow the Gini coefficient. This is because 
CPF contributions are capped, and therefore are higher at the 
low end and lower at the high end. This narrows the gap be-
tween income levels by increasing wages at the bottom by more 
than it increases them at the top.
Value to the debate of the 
Gini coefficient: Conclusion
Many decisions go into the calculation of a country’s Gini 
coefficient and, as discussed in the beginning of this section, 
there is no international standard.  Choices such as which seg-
ments of the population are included, what part of income is 
included, and many other variables can have a significant im-
pact on the outcome of Gini calculations.  Singapore’s Gini 
coefficient, therefore, when used in debates about Singapore’s 
level of inequality, should be considered carefully in the con-
text of the choices that went into its calculations, as well as 
the choices made in the countries or cities to which it is being 
compared.
Common debates 
surrounding inequality
In debating the severity of income inequality, its potential ef-
fects on society, and responses to it, some arguments are fre-
quently raised that bear discussion in the context of Singapore. 
These include the relationship between inequality and econom-
ic growth; whether inequality is just or unjust (i.e. do the poor 
deserve to be poor?); if inequality matters, apart from its rela-
tionship with poverty; and so on.  This section introduces a few 
of the most common debates in this vein, but, in keeping with 
the goal of this handbook as an introduction to key debates of 
relevance to the domestic context, it does not attempt to cover 
all arguments comprehensively.
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Inequality and growth
The relationship between inequality and growth is a vexed one, 
and the mainstream view is that inequality will result naturally 
from periods of rapid growth before lessening.  Others counter 
that international evidence suggests this is not necessarily the 
case. 
According to the economist, Simon Kuznets’s classic thesis,17 
inequality can be expected to increase rapidly for a time, be-
fore decreasing as wealth spreads throughout a population. 
More recently, however, Kuznets’s thesis has been called into 
question as his inverted “U” pattern has failed to materialise 
in modern economies.18 Just as former World Bank econo-
mist Ravi Kanbur finds little empirical support for the thesis 
in other countries;19 likewise Pundarik Mukhopadhaya notes 
that Singapore’s case does not seem to adhere to Kuznets’s pre-
dictions.20 This suggests that wealth has not begun to spread 
throughout all sectors during later stages of economic growth, 
and inequality does not appear to be correcting itself naturally. 
Countering the expectation that growth leads to inequality, 
Donald Low points out that the northern European coun-
tries have managed to sustain periods of impressive economic 
growth while keeping inequality in check. He argues that the 
belief in the relationship between growth and inequality is far 
from proven.21 
Another widely held view in economic policy circles globally is 
that economic growth is important to helping the less advan-
taged in a society, and that even unequal growth benefits the 
poor, although less so than the wealthy. In short, supply-side 
economics is a macroeconomic theory that supports minimis-
ing barriers to economic activity; this usually involves cutting 
taxes and reducing government regulation. 
According to adherents of supply-side economics (also known 
as the Washington Consensus) the wealthy help to generate 
jobs, investment and growth—promoting economic condi-
tions that will ultimately help the less advantaged.22 
Martin Ravillion of the World Bank has looked at several stud-
ies conducted in a variety of countries investigating empiri-
cal evidence concerning the relationship between economic 
growth and inequality. He has found that there is little evidence 
that growth naturally brings with it a redistributive effect in 
favour of poor populations within these countries.23 Low also 
argues there is little evidence that this dynamic works, and sug-
gests that in Singapore there is much evidence that the poor 
have not reaped the benefits of supply-side policies of the last 
several decades.24
Inequality as a reflection 
of productivity
It is not uncommon to hear the argument that inequality in a 
society is merely the reflection of different people deserving dif-
ferent levels of wages, based on their relative productivity and 
skills.  Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank 
and Nobel Prize winner for Economics, is a strong proponent 
of the counter-view that “inequality at the top can’t be justified 
as ‘just deserts’ for the large contributions that these individuals 
have made.”25 Low similarly argues that productivity on its own 
does not dictate wages, and proceeds to reference other factors 
that have affected wage levels at both the top and bottom end of 
the wage-spectrum in Singapore. At the bottom end of the spec-
trum, Low further argues that the inflow of low-skilled foreign 
workers has caused a depression in wages across the board for 
low-skilled workers; at the other end, high-wage earners benefit 
from living in a country whose technologies and infrastructure 
allow these high-wage earners to flourish. On this point, Low 
quotes Warren Buffet: “If you stick me down in the middle of 
Bangladesh or Peru or someplace, you’ll find out how much this 
talent is going to produce in the wrong kind of soil… I work in 
a market system that happens to reward what I do very well – 
disproportionately well.”26 In short, Low’s position is that wages 
are a poor reflection of talent, effort, motivation or productivity.
Inequality and absolute poverty
Many have also argued that inequality does not matter so long 
as there is very little absolute poverty in a society.27 However, 
high levels of inequality have been demonstrated to be corre-
lated with an increase in a wide array of social problems that af-
fect people at all levels of society, including rising crime, mental 
health problems, drug use, teenage child-bearing, levels of vio-
lence, levels of incarceration, and reductions in life expectancy, 
educational performance, and social mobility.28   
International literature also indicates that the erosion of trust is 
a serious impact of rising inequality. Countries with high lev-
els of inequality have correspondingly low levels of social trust. 
Since the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, it has been gener-
ally accepted that civic engagement and social trust are nec-
essary for a democratic society to function effectively. Robert 
Putnam’s much more recent work, Bowling Alone, underscores 
the ways in which society becomes less safe and less happy as 
civic bonds begin to disintegrate, and social cohesion begins to 
unravel, as he argues is the case in America.
Figure 1.5 shows levels of inequality charted against the belief 
that “most people can be trusted.” Note Singapore’s position, 
10
A Handbook on Inequality, Poverty and Unmet Social Needs in Singapore  
indicating high levels of inequality and correspondingly low 
levels of social trust.
Low and Vadaketh emphasise that while a lack of trust in any 
society is certainly unfavourable (e.g., people feel less secure, are 
less likely to help one another, and fare far worse in times of 
national crises), it is even more detrimental to a country such as 
Singapore, for the following reasons.30 First, social welfare relies 
on a certain level of trust. One of the five pillars of Singapore’s 
Total Defence strategy is “living harmoniously and looking out 
for one another.”31 If inequality leads to an erosion of social trust, 
this might begin to undermine the social capital on which To-
tal Defence relies. As former Minister of Foreign Affairs George 
Yeo noted, “A tsunami can destroy buildings, an earthquake can 
kill people, but social capital—if we have it—is indestructible.”32 
In other words, high levels of inequality and the erosion of so-
cial trust may pose significant problems in the Singapore con-
text, particularly in key areas that require a high degree of social 
cohesion, such as national identity, resilience in crisis, or Total 
Defence. So far, it does not appear that Singaporeans’ trust in 
the government has eroded dramatically. The Edelman “Trust 
Barometer,” an annual online survey that measured degrees of 
trust in 27 countries in 2014, demonstrated that the level of 
trust in Singapore’s government had decreased from 82 per cent 
to 75 per cent. This is not particularly worrying, as Singapore 
still ranks third among the 27 countries surveyed. Nevertheless, 
the relative decrease in trust of both government and business 
is still meaningful in a country that relies heavily on both insti-
tutions to play major roles.33 
Besides, high levels of inequality could undermine people’s 
faith in meritocracy, which is one of the driving ideologies in 
Singapore, and indeed erode the actual functioning of the meri-
tocratic system. A Credit Suisse study published in late 2013 
showed that Singapore’s levels of wealth inequality are among 
the highest in the developed world.34 In fact, the wealthiest 1 
per cent hold over 25 per cent of Singapore’s wealth.35 As Robin 
Chan, Assistant Political Editor for The Straits Times, writes, 
“….an increase in wealth, unlike incomes, is not necessarily di-
rectly a result of work. This raises questions about how truly 
meritocratic Singapore can be.”36 The issues surrounding Sin-
gapore’s commitment to meritocracy are discussed at greater 
length in Part II of this paper.
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Figure 1.5: Relationship between levels of income inequality and the belief that “most people can be trusted”
Source: European and World Values Survey as referenced in The Spirit Level, Figure 4.1.29
The Current Situation
Capital inequality
The discussion so far has largely involved income inequality, 
and indeed most studies of inequality have focused on dispari-
ties in income, because that is where it is easiest to find available 
data. Capital, however, is always distributed less equally than 
labour, and so capital inequality is arguably a more significant 
problem than income inequality.37 Capital inequality refers 
broadly to the difference in the value of capital as well as the 
income derived from that capital.38
The recent publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st 
Century has dramatically changed the way inequality is under-
stood and raised important new issues for Singaporeans to con-
sider. While Piketty addresses income inequality in the book, 
and makes the traditional arguments concerning its negative ef-
fects, his major contribution—and what is new in his work—are 
his theses concerning wealth inequality. Piketty’s central thesis 
is that capital inequality is a problem when the rate of return on 
capital, known as r, is greater than the speed at which an econ-
omy is growing, often known as g.39 While the rate of economic 
growth exceeded the rate of return on capital in the 20th cen-
tury, there are many reasons to think that such a state of affairs 
is unlikely to happen again; these are discussed further below.
 
Piketty argues that it is not a case of logical necessity, that r 
should naturally be greater than g. It is certainly possible to en-
vision a situation where that is not the case, but Piketty demon-
strates that r has been greater than g throughout most of human 
history.  He attempts to show that, for the most part, the return 
on investment in land is between 4 and 5 per cent, and the rate 
of growth of an economy is around 0.1 to 0.2 per cent.40 
Many of Piketty’s arguments concerning inequality, and the 
ways in which people’s perceptions of it are mistaken, are re-
lated to the specific conditions of the 20th century. As noted 
above, it was once thought that as societies matured, inequal-
ity would also begin to even out to levels that were accepta-
ble.  Indeed the 20th century saw very low levels of inequality, 
leading many to assume that inequality would naturally stay 
manageable. According to Piketty, however, the 20th century 
was an aberration, and that it was the first time in history that 
economic growth exceeded return on capital. He ascribes this 
situation to the following circumstances: wartime destruction, 
progressive tax policies, and unusually high growth following 
World War II.41 
Much of Piketty’s work focuses on predicting the situation re-
garding wealth inequality in the 21st century.  In his view, the 
21st century will be unlikely to see the specific circumstances 
that drove economic growth in the 20th century, and that the 
rising levels of inequality could lead to too much political influ-
ence being held in the hands of the wealthy few.  Piketty admits 
that the simple equation of r>g is subject to many variables, par-
ticularly when it comes to the gap between the rate of return 
on capital and economic growth. He lists various factors that 
contribute to the width of this gap:
•	 Low demographic growth: In a situation in which demo-
graphic growth is negative, the rate of economic growth 
could plummet to below 19th-century rates, which would 
“give unprecedented importance to inherited wealth.”42 
•	 Slowing of economic growth: In countries where econom-
ic growth has begun to slow, the importance of inherited 
wealth overshadows the importance of savings. As Piketty 
puts it, “the past tends to devour the future.”43 
•	 Capital markets becoming more “perfect” in the sense that 
return on capital has little to do with the owner of the capi-
tal, undoing a meritocratic system.44
•	 The absence of an estate tax to break up inherited wealth.45
It is important to note that Singapore meets all of these criteria: 
While the economy is still growing impressively, average annual 
growth has decreased from the levels experienced previously 
(see Fig. 2.1 on page 23);46 Singapore’s Total Fertility Rate is well 
below replacement levels;47 Singapore’s tax policies allow large 
estates to remain largely intact (See Part II Section B) and, while 
data on Singapore’s return on capital is not released for public 
consumption,48 returns on it are unrelated to the merit or efforts 
of its owner.
 
Many have argued that wealth inequality, rather than income 
inequality, is the greater threat in the 21st century.49 Famous-
ly, Oxfam released a paper in January 2014 claiming that the 
world’s wealthiest 85 individuals hold the same amount of 
wealth as the poorest half of the population.50 Further, given 
the high levels of wealth contained within some estates, it is not 
possible for individual incomes to be high enough to allow for 
an acceptable level of social mobility for the vast majority of 
people.51
Piketty makes the case that income inequality and capital in-
equality complement each other in problematic ways.  Quite 
unlike the Belle Epoque of France, an age the Piketty describes 
at length in his book, people today are not clearly divided into 
the categories of either labourers and rentiers. Rather, it is per-
fectly acceptable to enjoy huge quantities of wealth in the form 
of capital at the same time as continuing to add to one’s fortune 
through being a “supermanager.”52
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Piketty’s work, of course, has its critics. One branch of criticism, 
launched most notably by The Economist magazine, holds that 
Piketty stretched his evidence too far and drew conclusions that 
reached beyond the evidence he has.53 Tyler Cowen, writing for 
Foreign Affairs, suggests that Piketty overlooks the role of risk-
taking behaviour.54 Another line of criticism holds that Piketty 
underestimates growth and overestimates the return on capi-
tal.55 The debate about Piketty’s arguments will likely continue 
to rage for some time. Piketty has actually encouraged this de-
bate by releasing his data and publicly inviting debate on the 
basis that he aims to begin, rather than conclude, a discussion 
about the future of global wealth inequality.56 For the purposes 
of this handbook, Piketty’s central argument, regarding the 
dangers inherent to a situation where return on capital exceeds 
the rate of economic growth, as well as his arguments about the 
contexts where wealth inequality is most dangerous, are most 
relevant. While it may be difficult to quantify the degree that 
wealth inequality could reach, or the speed at which it might 
hit such levels, it is important to note that Singapore meets the 
criteria described by Piketty as alarming with respect to wealth 
inequality.
Government response to 
Singapore’s rising level of 
inequality
In a 2013 opinion piece, Stiglitz praised the Singapore govern-
ment’s efforts to curb inequality.  He argued that “Singapore has 
had the distinction of having prioritised social and economic 
equity while achieving very high rates of growth over the past 
30 years—an example par excellence that inequality is not just 
a matter of social justice but of economic performance.”57 The 
piece was criticised by many Singaporean writers and organisa-
tions as lacking insight into the reality of the way government 
policies operate in practice,58 though it serves to highlight the 
bona fide intention of the government to acknowledge and ad-
dress the issue of inequality. 
Indeed, the Singapore government has acknowledged the need 
to reduce income inequality.  In the 2012 budget speech, Min-
ister for Finance and Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shan-
mugaratnam59 addressed rising inequality in Singapore and 
pledged significant budgetary changes to address this issue. 
Then in March of 2014, Minister for Culture, Community, and 
Youth Lawrence Wong pointed to the recent decrease in Sin-
gapore’s Gini coefficient as evidence that the government has 
indeed been successful in beginning to rein in the rising in-
equality level in Singapore.  
The government acknowledges 
inequality in Singapore.“We are seeing our society stratifying, which means that children of successful people are doing better while the children of less successful people are doing less well.” 
– Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 
201160
“Before, I think [the government] were emphasising that we do have mobility. Now, I think there’s recognition that mobility is limited for the people at the bottom.”  
– Member of Parliament Irene Ng 
P.H, also Assistant Professor at 
the Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (ISEAS), 201161
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Section B: Absolute poverty
As noted above, knowing that there is a high level of income 
inequality in Singapore tells us very little about the incidence 
of poverty in the city-state. If absolute poverty is defined as the 
level of income below which a person is incapable of meeting 
basic needs then it is possible for an economy to have no poor, 
despite highly unequal income levels. Indeed, it is theoretically 
possible to have high levels of inequality with relatively low in-
cidence of absolute poverty.  It has been suggested that this pos-
sibility in fact describes Singapore’s situation, though as noted 
in “A Growing Acknowledgement” on page 16, this view is less 
prevalent today.  At the same time, when compared to the levels 
of absolute poverty experienced in the poorest countries in the 
world, it is clear why PM Lee commented in an interview at 
the World Economic Forum at Davos in 2012 that the poor in 
Singapore are ‘’less badly off ’’ than those in other countries.62 
Speaking to reporters at the Commonwealth Heads of Gov-
ernment Meeting (CHOGM) in Colombo in 2013, the Prime 
Minister also noted that Singapore had moved past the point 
of “extreme poverty” as it is defined by the UN (SGD 1.90 per 
day).63  The question for Singapore is whether comparisons to 
absolute poverty in poor developing countries is the most effec-
tive way of assessing absolute poverty in Singapore.  
The debate over a poverty line
At the same time, absolute poverty is difficult to analyse and 
measure in Singapore’s context, as there is no official poverty 
line and the government does not measure or report trends in 
poverty reduction. Furthermore, the Singapore government 
rejects the notion of a poverty line due to fear of the “cliff ef-
fect,” by which those just above such a line might not receive 
the assistance they require.64 PM Lee added at the CHOGM 
that he believed it was more helpful to embrace an approach 
that took into account the various levels and types of needs 
of Singaporean citizens.65 This approach to addressing unmet 
needs in Singapore is discussed at length in Part IV of this 
handbook; briefly, Minister for Social and Family Development 
Chan Chun Sing has termed Singapore’s multi-faceted strategy 
for poverty alleviation “kuih lapis,” which is a traditional Malay 
cake known for its many layers.66  
Some have suggested, by contrast, that a poverty line is nec-
essary.  In 2013, Non-constituency Member of Parliament 
(NCMP) Yee Jenn Jong (Workers’ Party) directed a question 
to Minister Chan Chun Sing, asking whether Singapore might 
adopt an official poverty line.67 The NCMP argued that an offi-
cial poverty line would help “to identify at-risk households and 
to measure the performance of governmental and non-govern-
mental efforts in helping them leave the poverty cycle.”68 When 
Minister Chan rejected the idea, citing the “cliff effect,” some 
Singaporeans on social media pointed out that a poverty line 
is just one of many tools that might be used to understand and 
address poverty in Singapore.69 Nominated Member of Parlia-
ment (NMP) Laurence Lien was also in favour of the govern-
ment reconsidering its stance on adopting a poverty line70, and 
he noted that “we should also recognise that poverty is a com-
plex issue. Different poverty thresholds for households with dif-
ferent circumstances would be needed.”71
Additionally, an article written by scholars and staff from the 
LCSI at SMU argued that there are reasons to “define and meas-
ure poverty.” The report listed numerous ways to do this and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each approach—includ-
ing both monetary and non-monetary poverty lines.72 More 
recently, Radha Basu a reporter for The Sunday Times discussed 
various approaches to measuring poverty without a single line, 
as part of her coverage of the most recent Household Expendi-
ture Survey (HES); her piece is discussed in more detail in the 
conclusion to this handbook (see page 60).73
Current estimates of absolute 
poverty, and their implications74
The DOS only gathers household income and expenditure 
information for resident households headed by Singaporean 
citizens or PRs. As such, these indicators and measures, and 
the literature review presented in this handbook, do not reflect 
the overall picture of poverty in Singapore, but are confined to 
poverty among these resident households only. Information on 
poverty among foreign workers in Singapore, including close 
to a million foreign domestic workers (FDWs) and construc-
tion workers,75 can be found in materials produced by various 
civil society organisations and academic institutions.76 Later 
sections of this handbook discuss the relationship between im-
migration policy and poverty in Singapore.  
MSF measurements
In the absence of an official absolute poverty line, there have 
been a few attempts to identify potential measures of poverty 
and unmet needs, which may give some indication of Singa-
pore’s situation in relation to people who cannot adequately 
meet basic needs.  First, the Ministry of Social and Family De-
velopment (MSF) cites the number of families who benefit from 
the long-term Public Assistance Scheme as an indicator of Sin-
gapore’s most disadvantaged.  This number is quite low, usually 
numbering about 3,000.77
Jacqueline Loh, former Director of the Lien Centre for Social 
Innovation, developed another way of estimating the incidence 
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of absolute poverty in Singapore based on the policies of the 
then Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports (MCYS), the 
predecessor of MSF. In her article, “Bottom Fifth in Singapore,” 
in 2011, the eligibility criteria for many of the support schemes 
was a household income of less than SGD 1,500 per month. Loh 
used the 2007/2008 HES to estimate that around 12 per cent to 
14 per cent of all Singapore households exist under this poverty 
line.78  She noted that since a household income of SGD 1,500 
per month was a conservative measure of poverty, this estimate 
must also be considered conservative.
AHEBN Measure
The Average Household Expenditure on Basic Needs (AHEBN) 
is a figure calculated by the DOS. This is a measure of minimum 
household expenditure on essential needs such as food, cloth-
ing, and shelter for a household in a one- or two-room HDB 
rental flat. The resulting figure is then multiplied by 1.25 to ac-
count for other household needs (e.g., transport, education). 
The most recent available79 AHEBN estimate, as of this writing, 
is from 2011, and calculated to be SGD 1,250 per month for a 
four-person household.80
Yeoh Lam Keong, former chief economist of the Government 
of Singapore Investment Corporation (now known as GIC Pri-
vate Limited), argues, based on internal reviews of the AHEBN 
measure, that the measure provides a conservative estimate of 
absolute poverty.81 According to him, the costs are not explic-
itly accounted for by the AHEBN measure, but are included in 
the multiplier of 1.25 (e.g., transport, education, medical costs). 
They tend not only to increase more quickly than the expendi-
tures on food, clothing and shelter, but are also necessary for 
work, school and social activities. Take for instance the mobile 
phone: it is a very helpful item to have when seeking employ-
ment, but such an expenditure is only one of many for which 
the multiplier of 1.25 is meant to account.  Furthermore, Yeoh 
points out that actual transport and medical costs are taken into 
account for similar measurements in countries such as Hong 
Kong and Canada, indicating that there are precedents for their 
inclusion.82
He discusses other problems in Singapore’s AHEBN calcu-
lation. First, it does not take into account costs related to in-
vestments in human capital, in that there are no out-of-pocket 
education expenditures, or costs related to continuing educa-
tion, training, and access to information and communication 
technologies.83  Such educational endeavors are necessary for 
minimal social mobility and so have a significant bearing on 
poverty. For example, if people lack the means to increase their 
levels of education, because they cannot afford the costs of edu-
cation itself, or the related costs of transport, materials, etc., it 
is far more difficult to climb out of the poverty trap. Finally, by 
only including families in one- or two-room flats, the AHEBN 
calculation does not account for those families living in three- 
or four-room flats who are receiving social assistance. Overall, 
according to Yeoh,84 the AHEBN calculation likely accounts for 
only a fraction of those Singaporean families living in poverty.
Yeoh used the AHEBN range of SGD 1,250 to 1,500 per month, 
applied it to the 2011 DOS Key Household Characteristics and 
Household Income Trends 2011 report, and found that there 
were approximately 110,000 to 140,000 resident households 
that have great difficulty meeting basic needs.85
According to Yeoh, if the AHEBN calculation were adjusted to 
include the costs of transport, education, health care, and the 
training necessary for social inclusion, it would likely reveal 
that the bottom 10 to 20 per cent of working households are 
struggling to make ends meet in a way that could be defined 
as a form of absolute poverty. The bottom 20 to 30 per cent 
of working households, according to Yeoh, are probably barely 
able to meet basic consumption and human capital investment 
needs but have little in the way of retirement savings, leaving 
them vulnerable to falling into poverty in their lifetime.86
2014 HES
The HES is conducted every five years, and is more compre-
hensive than the annual Key Household and Income Trends re-
port; the HES includes all resident households, whereas the Key 
Household and Income Trends report only includes employed 
households.87
Using the 2014 HES to fill in details, Yeoh estimates that the 
110,000 to 140,000 resident households mentioned above most 
likely consist of the following groups:
•	 Approximately 70,000 to 90,000 households with at least one 
fully employed member. These could be described as the 
“working poor;” they are households in which the wage of 
the full-time worker is insufficient to meet the basic needs 
of the household without financial assistance. 
•	 Approximately 20,000 households without employment. 
These could be described as the “unemployed poor.”
•	 Approximately 20,000 to 30,000 “poor retiree” households. 
These are households in which the residents are older than 
60, have low incomes, and are likely facing serious finan-
cial hardship. This group of elderly poor is growing quickly 
in Singapore, and is addressed by the Pioneer Generation 
Package, discussed further in Part IV.88
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 A GROWING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
For years, many observers had argued that Singapore does 
not have absolute poverty. For instance Kishore Mahbubani, 
formerly Singapore’s Ambassador to the United Nations and 
current Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 
wrote in 2001, “There are no homeless, destitute or starv-
ing people in Singapore.  Poverty has been eradicated, not 
through an entitlements programme (there are virtually 
none) but through a unique partnership between the gov-
ernment, corporate citizens, self-help groups and voluntary 
initiatives.”89 Views on this topic have changed over the past 
decade, as is represented in greater social spending.  First, 
according to Singapore’s 2013 Budget, 46 per cent of the 
Budget went towards social development.90 Secondly, it is 
now not unusual to hear government officials openly ac-
knowledge the presence of poverty in Singapore as well as to 
announce strategies to address it.
“You can be poor from one generation but you must not be poor in every generation... We 
are not talking about a one-year or two-year problem. These are the people that require 
five to 10 years of assistance to get them out of the dark valleys.” 
– Minister for Social and Family Development Chan Chun Sing, 2013.91
“Inevitably, you have people who say, my case is unique, and you need good men and 
women to sit down with good sense to assess, say, ‘We give temporary support here’, or 
‘No, I can’t do this one, you sort it out’. On that approach, we can help to address what we 
broadly call the problem of poverty, and we can make sure that we, in Singapore, if you 
are needy, in difficulty, you will get the right help. I think that is feasible.” 
– Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 2013.92
“What we used to do we will continue to do, to provide core public services, housing, 
education, health care. But at the same time we will make three important shifts in our 
approach. First, we will do more to give every citizen a fair share in the nation’s success, 
raise the incomes and the wealth of the low-income Singaporeans.” 
– Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, National Day Rally, 2013.93
 “We must... help those who, due to personal circumstances or through no fault of their 
own, are unable to help themselves...” 
–  Former Minister of State for Community Development, 
Youth and Sports Halimah Yacob, August 2012.94
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Section C: Relative poverty 
While measurements such as AHEBN and the estimates based 
on low-income wages provide valuable insight into the experi-
ence of the lowest wage earners and the unemployed, they do 
not take into account the incidence of “relative poverty” in Sin-
gapore. Most developed countries measure poverty using not 
only absolute measures, such as those discussed above, but also 
relative measures. These take into account the standards of liv-
ing of the country they are measuring as well as those factors 
that influence social inclusion in that society.95 A comprehen-
sive review of literature on social exclusion conducted by the 
University of Bristol recommended the following definition: 
Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional pro-
cess. It involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, 
goods and services, and the inability to participate in the 
normal relationships and activities, available to the major-
ity of people in a society, whether in economic, social, cul-
tural or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life 
of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a 
whole.96
As such, relative measures of poverty take into account an in-
dividual’s relative position in society.  As Sen noted in Develop-
ment as Freedom, “relative deprivation can mean absolute dep-
rivation, if it means that an individual is unable to participate 
in society.”97 In sum, relative poverty reflects social exclusion 
which has significant bearing on an individual’s experience of 
poverty and opportunities to escape it.
While it is no doubt true that the poor in Singapore are “less 
badly off ” than those in other countries, this does not account 
for the impact of relative poverty.98 For example, access to edu-
cation in a way that is socially inclusive is very dependent on 
context. To take an example, socially inclusive access to educa-
tion in India might be met simply through access to a place in a 
local school.  For access to education to meet a social inclusion 
level in Singapore, it might involve a place in a local school, 
sufficient money for books, transportation to and from school, 
additional tuition, and so on. (The relationship between ine-
quality and Singapore’s education system is discussed at greater 
length in Part II, page 27.)  In other words, it is important to 
look at “relative deprivation” in the Singapore context as well as 
absolute poverty.
Levels of relative poverty can be estimated in various ways. A 
common way of estimating the incidence of relative poverty in-
volves using the median wage as a benchmark, and those whose 
income is less than half the median wage are considered poor 
in the relative sense.99 Irene Ng suggests that using this meas-
ure to estimate relative poverty in Singapore is difficult, because 
income distribution is reported in deciles.100 Nevertheless, Ng 
proceeds by assuming that the reported mean incomes fall at 
the midpoint of each decile, and estimates that around 20 per 
cent of Singaporean households are poor by these standards.101
Hui Weng Tat provides a different estimate of households liv-
ing in relative poverty in Singapore, using a similar way of 
measuring it. Hui understands this relative poverty line to be 
set at 60 per cent of the national median equivalised income.102 
According to his measure, the incidence of relative poverty is 
around 35 per cent in Singapore. Both Hui and Ng argue that 
the number of Singaporeans living in poverty, according to rel-
ative measures, is in general increasing. However, some of this 
trend may be currently reversing, with the introduction of the 
Progressive Wage Model, which is discussed in both Parts IV 
and V of the handbook.
Section D: The squeezed 
middle class   
So far, we have looked at absolute poverty, which concerns 
the least advantaged in Singapore, and relative poverty, which 
concerns this group’s relationship to the more advantaged. The 
trend discussed in those sections also, more or less, apply to 
Singapore’s middle class. We define the middle class here as 
those earning approximately the median wage. Like the least 
advantaged Singaporeans, the middle class saw a lengthy de-
crease in wages followed by a very recent reversal of this trend. 
Although Singapore’s economy continued to grow at the same 
pace that it had for decades (averaging 7.3 per cent per year in 
the 1990s and 5.1 per cent in the 2000s), median wages slowed, 
and in some recent years reversed, after the year 2000.103  From 
2000 to 2010, taking inflation into account, wages grew only 
1.3 per cent per year, rather than the average rate of growth of 
seven or nine per cent in previous decades.104  In mid-2013, it 
was reported that, when inflation was taken into account, wage 
levels actually decreased in 2012.105   
Second, as economic restructuring moved to higher value-add-
ed industries, lay-offs have begun to affect professionals, man-
agers, executives, and technicians (PMETs) at higher rates than 
low-skilled workers. The Straits Times reported that PMETs 
made up more than half of the workers who lost their jobs in 
2013, at 56 per cent. This is a significant increase from the 35 
per cent of PMET job-losses in 2010.106 In addition, the manu-
facturing and construction sectors also laid off more workers in 
2013 than in 2012, while the service sector let go fewer workers 
in 2013 than in 2012.107 Again, this suggests that the situation 
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began to improve for the lowest deciles before the trend affected 
the middle class.  
Finally, two recent studies suggest that the backdrop for 
Singapore’s high Gini coefficient and lengthy period of wage 
stagnation is a city that is becoming increasingly less affordable. 
The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked Singapore as the 
world’s most expensive city in 2013.108 Singapore was positioned 
sixth in the previous year, but its appreciating dollar has since 
pushed it to number one in the world. The EIU report looks at 
the prices of various goods and services in different countries 
(e.g., food, clothing, and transport) and uses New York City as a 
baseline. Around the same time that the EIU released its report, 
the National University of Singapore (NUS) economics don, 
Tilak Abeysinghe, published a study and extrapolated from 
data from the DOS, which found that 30 per cent of Singapore’s 
households have had to cut back on “flexible expenditures,” 
based most likely on the rising costs of big ticket items such as 
housing and health care.109 His study, quoted in Today, suggests 
that the bottom 30 per cent of households require “extra 
attention in the government’s welfare programmes.”
The Singapore government has responded to both of these 
reports with skepticism. Regarding the EIU ranking, DPM 
Tharman stated that the study had little relevance for locals, 
as expatriates in Singapore were far more affected by exchange 
rates. DPM Tharman explained that when Singapore’s currency 
is strong, the city becomes far less affordable for expatriates, 
but the economic situation for locals does not change dramati-
cally.110 Further, the EIU ranking largely concerned expendi-
tures that are frequently more relevant to expatriates than to 
locals.111
In response to Abeysinghe’s study, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) took issue with two methodological points.  Firstly, the 
MOF points out that retirees are co-mingled with other popula-
tions in the bottom 30 per cent of households, and that since re-
tirees typically rely more on savings and assets than on income, 
it is a reality that this group spends more than it receives in 
income.112 According to MOF, housing expenditures are actu-
ally “far lower” than the imputed rentals that Abeysinghe uses 
in his study to determine spending, as the study does not take 
into account the government grants that support mortgage pay-
ments.113
While there have been improvements over the years for the 
lower and middle classes, it is as yet unclear whether the longer 
trends have really reversed, or whether we are seeing an anom-
aly. Even if the trends are reversing, are the changes sufficient 
to undo the lengthy period of stagnation and wage decreases?  
Conclusion
In Part I, we have looked at Singapore’s high level of income 
inequality and potential levels of poverty, both on an absolute 
and relative basis. Moreover, we have reviewed research on the 
squeezing of the middle class, and increasing costs of living, as 
well as material that contests the views presented by different 
sources.  It is clear that the debates on whether or how to define 
poverty, the actual impact of inequality, and the general bench-
mark for a standard of living appropriate to the Singaporean 
context are far from over. In Part II, the discussion shifts to the 
possible causes of current levels of inequality and poverty in 
Singapore.
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Part II
Literature on the
Causes of Inequality 
and Poverty
No less hotly debated than the levels and impact of inequal-
ity are the causes of poverty and inequality in Singapore. 
This situation has clearly been influenced by historical and 
contextual factors; there is no consensus as to its primary 
causes. While the debate on causes is complex and nu-
anced, the explanations presented by various authors can 
be broadly categorised into three sets of factors: Singapore’s 
economic history, Singapore’s tax policies, and the merito-
cratic system and political culture of Singapore.  The follow-
ing section reviews each of these points and provides analy-
sis of the arguments that have been advanced on how each 
of these factors has contributed to or reinforced poverty and 
inequality in Singapore..  
8
Section A:  Tracing the 
roots of inequality and 
poverty in Singapore
The Singapore Story
Over the last several decades, Singapore has become a model 
example of development due to its rapid growth, its rapid shift 
from a developing to developed nation, and its very low levels 
of official corruption and crime. Against all odds, and with few 
natural or agricultural resources, the city-state evolved from a 
trading port at the time of its independence in 1965, to the ma-
jor international hub that it is today.1 
Much of this was accomplished by exploiting Singapore’s pri-
mary resource—its geographical position on the Straits of Ma-
lacca—and by developing and upgrading trade and economic 
strategies to remain competitive on the international playing 
field.2 The development of a well-educated, competitive popu-
lation, endowed with values of diligence and quality work be-
came one of the foundations of its successful growth.   
Over the past several decades, Singapore has experienced im-
pressive economic growth; the GDP averaged 12.9 per cent 
growth from 1965 to 1970, 9 per cent in the 1970s, 7.3 per cent 
in the 1980s and 7.8 per cent in the 1990s.3 In addition to its 
economic success, the country has earned international acclaim 
for many of its political, social and environmental policies. Sin-
gapore has become a model for countries around the world to 
emulate.4 
To achieve its remarkable rate of economic growth, Singapore 
embraced state-led, market-based economic policies based on 
export-focused industrialisation.5 Economist Linda Lim broad-
ly describes Singapore’s growth strategy as being based initially 
on exports of more labour-intensive manufactured goods and 
over time shifting focus towards higher value-added indus-
tries.6  
As Singapore developed, the government strived actively to 
shift up the global production chain. The leadership was under 
pressure to do so with the emergence of countries such as Chi-
na and Mexico that could compete for manufacturing jobs by 
producing goods faster and at a lower cost. As low-skilled man-
ufacturing jobs shifted to other nations, Singapore aspired to 
attract higher-tech manufacturing by retraining workers, and 
designing the education system to develop a workforce with 
strong technical skills. While this helped the nation maintain a 
high level of economic growth, it also meant that the economy 
became increasingly capital-intensive, which often reduced the 
need for low-skilled labour in certain sectors. In this section, 
we describe the various economic upgrades in greater detail, 
as well as what effects these had on employment and wages.7 
In this way, following independence, the Singapore govern-
ment focused on growing its economy as quickly as possible.8 
A number of scholars suggest that this aggressive focus on 
growth might have overshadowed other concerns and led to 
Singapore’s strategy being widely referred to—sometimes de-
risively—as “growth at all costs.”9  Pang Eng Fong, for example, 
argues that “single-minded devotion to growth has resulted 
in a relative neglect of the distributional aspects of develop-
ment.”10 Similarly, Lim points out that “[f]ocusing on ‘how 
much’ does not necessarily tell us ‘how good’ or ‘for whom,’” 
and suggests that Singapore’s rapid growth has left some seg-
ments of the population behind.11 
In addition, Pang suggests that Singapore’s emphasis on growth 
over equitable distribution was a conscious choice on the part 
of the government. He cites then Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew, stating in 1974 that “growth must come before sharing;”12 
in other words, it was acknowledged that Singapore’s particu-
lar model of economic growth included few measures to avoid 
inequality, but that inequality could be addressed at later stages 
of development.  This was a strategy pursued by many develop-
ing countries in Asia.13 Tan Meng Wah, like Pang, argues that 
the Singapore government chose to focus on absolute growth 
rather than on equitable growth in order to achieve full em-
ployment.  He explains:
Singapore’s government actions all along appear to have 
been guided more by the absolute definition of inclusive 
growth… Instead of worrying about bringing down the 
[Gini coefficient], the government should focus on pro-
viding everybody with a job.  Opting for slower growth for 
the sake of achieving equality would have ended up hitting 
those at the bottom the hardest.  In contrast, by allowing 
the economy to grow beyond its potential for a few years 
when external environment permits, everybody benefits 
although those in the higher income groups benefit more.14
According to Tan M. W., the government placed its focus on 
achieving full employment without giving adequate attention 
to the growing disparity in wages, which has contributed to a 
widening income gap.  
Regular recalibration 
of the economy
As the global economic situation was frequently changing, and 
as new challenges faced Singapore, the government met these 
by upgrading its economy to remain competitive. Tan M. W. 
20
A Handbook on Inequality, Poverty and Unmet Social Needs in Singapore  
characterises this as an “Incessant Upgrading of Singapore’s 
Economy since the 1970s”.15 See Figure 2.1 (page 23) catalogu-
ing the details of Singapore’s economic transitions since its in-
dependence.
Shift to knowledge-based economy
Concerted efforts to shift Singapore from basic manufacturing 
to higher value-added manufacturing and services were also 
successful. The 1998 Report of the Committee on Singapore’s 
Competitiveness and the Economic Development Board’s In-
dustry 21 Master Plan includes among its goals that Singapore 
re-focus certain sectors to shift towards a knowledge-based 
economy. Following the Asian Financial Crisis, the goal has 
been to move Singapore towards a knowledge-based economy 
with the two primary engines of growth continuing to be ser-
vices and high-value-added manufacturing.16   
There is no doubt that the strategy of frequent upgrades con-
tributed to Singapore’s impressive economic growth figures. 
However, Tan M. W. and Yap Mui Teng argue that these up-
grading efforts, combined with forces of globalisation, have led 
to two segments of Singapore’s labour force finding themselves 
with an obsolete skill set. They argue that because of the rapid 
pace at which the transition to the knowledge-based economy 
occurred, older and middle-aged workers with modest formal 
education have been left with neither the opportunity nor time 
to adapt to the changing economic situation.17  
Tan M. W. further argues that, with Singapore’s ageing popu-
lation, many companies have chosen to hire “foreign talents,” 
discussed further below, rather than upgrade the skills of Sin-
gaporean workers. This has occurred in spite of the many pro-
grammes that the Singapore government offered for retraining 
of workers.18  Thus, middle-aged Singaporeans with below sec-
ondary education,19 and older workers20 have found it harder to 
maintain steady employment due to their lack of relevant skill 
sets.
Globalisation: Trade and Technology  
Beyond the deliberate strategies that the Singapore government 
has employed to direct the economy, external forces have af-
fected both wages and employment opportunities.  The expan-
sion of international trade has reduced costs by international-
ising the production of goods and services. Yet, as Bhaskaran 
et al. argue, in highly developed countries such as Singapore, 
the benefits of globalisation and trade are distributed across 
the economy, while the disadvantages are felt predominantly by 
low-skilled workers with limited earning capacity.21 The global 
labour supply has increased by approximately 70 per cent as a 
result of the entry of Chinese and Indian workers alone.22 These 
lower-cost workers predominantly compete for work current-
ly conducted by the lower end of the wage scale in developed 
economies.23
At the same time, technological change has led to the polarisa-
tion of job opportunities.24 Since the late 1980s, job opportu-
nities have expanded in the US and parts of the EU25 in both 
high wage high-education professional, technical and manage-
rial occupations as well as in low-wage low-education occupa-
tions in areas such as food service, personal care and protective 
services. At the same time, however, job opportunities have 
declined in middle-skill, white-collar clerical, administrative, 
and sales occupations as well as in middle skill, blue-collar pro-
duction, craft and operative occupations. This shift could be 
explained by the impact of technology on employer demand. 
Ruby Toh and Hui Weng Tat have argued that automation and 
outsourcing have replaced routine middle-skill jobs, but not 
those that require personal interaction or abstract thinking.26 
In sum, the last two decades have seen job opportunities shrink 
for the middle-skill workforce due to automation and the shift 
of low-skilled manufacturing jobs.
Inflow of foreign labour
The previous section has covered arguments that the changing 
economic situation in recent decades has led to a mismatch be-
tween Singapore’s economic needs and segments of its work-
force, with focus on the effects of this mismatch on the local 
workforce. The demand for foreign labour is both a matter of 
quantity and quality.27 Recently, this demand has been driven 
by a combination of the changing global economy and the skills 
of Singapore’s domestic workforce—specific types of workers 
are needed at different rungs of the economic ladder. Many 
are demanded at lower-levels of skills (quantity), while a much 
smaller, though still substantial, number are needed with the 
highest-levels of skills.  
As discussed above, due to its previous focus on labour-inten-
sive manufacturing, Singapore lacks the necessary number of 
professionals who have the skills and experience for knowl-
edge-intensive industries.28 (See Figure 2.1 from Tan M. W. 
for the time frame of various economic upgrades.) Singapore’s 
government has encouraged employers to upgrade the skills 
of their employees through various programmes, such as the 
Productivity and Innovation Credit programme, which offers 
various credits and/or bonuses for training employees.29 While 
programmes such as these attempt to keep more Singaporeans 
in these roles, Tan M. W. argues that many companies have opt-
ed to take the easier route of employing foreign workers.  The 
Singapore government has adopted a flexible approach to the 
hiring of high-skilled foreign workers to allow companies to 
adapt quickly to new conditions, as well as to enable economic 
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restructuring to happen as quickly as possible to remain inter-
nationally competitive.30
Meanwhile, immigration policy also enabled a significant num-
ber of low-cost foreign labour to be brought in to do jobs that, 
Tan argues, are often shunned by the less educated Singapore-
ans.31 Ishita Dhamini points out that the wage level for these 
jobs in Singapore, while low, is still much higher than what low-
skilled foreign labour could expect in their home countries; 
they therefore have more incentive and ability than Singapo-
reans to accept these jobs, and consequently, Singaporeans are 
priced out of these roles.32
It has been well-documented that the increase in foreign labour 
at both ends of the economic spectrum has been substantial 
over the last few decades.33 According to Dhamini, the number 
of foreign workers on all rungs of the economic ladder in Sin-
gapore has tripled between 1990 and 2005 to comprise almost 
30 per cent of the labour force. Further, Hui notes that between 
1998 and 2010, the number of non-resident workers in Singa-
pore increased by 494,000; these workers filled 47 per cent of 
the jobs created during that period.34  
Impact of the low-skilled migration
This inflow of foreign labour has had both positive and negative 
consequences.  On one hand, as Tan M. W. has argued, foreign 
labour provides the support Singapore needs to remain eco-
nomically competitive on a global scale, in that it has helped the 
state to maintain its impressive pace of growth and to upgrade 
its economy when the situation allowed. Further, low-skilled 
foreign labour has contributed to a lower cost of living for many 
higher-income Singaporeans.35 On the other hand, the combi-
nation of the changing economic situation and the inflow of 
foreign labour has had negative effects on wages in the lower 
and middle deciles. 
Hui argues that lower wages at the bottom of the economic lad-
der, driven down by the inflow of foreign workers, have likely 
dissuaded many local workers from seeking full-time employ-
ment.36 Data from 1999 and 2010 demonstrate that the number 
of Singaporeans of working age who did not participate full-
time in labour market activities increased over that period from 
167,400 to 1,044,300, making up to 33.8 per cent of the work-
ing-age population.37 Further, the bottom quintile in the wage 
distribution of resident workers saw a decrease in real wages 
between 1998 and 2010.38 As discussed in Part V (see page 56), 
the government has recently begun to focus on scaling back the 
annual increase in foreign workers.
As discussed in the introduction, middle-income workers 
have started to be affected as well. Recently, there have been 
signs that wages among these workers have stagnated. Like 
the decrease in wages among the bottom deciles, this has been 
attributed, at least in part, to the presence of high numbers of 
foreign employees.39  
Tan M. W. and Hui argue that the high number of foreign work-
ers in Singapore, in addition to affecting employment opportu-
nities and wages, has also led to a growing sense of discontent 
among Singaporeans.40 This has become a more significant is-
sue, as there is evidence that in addition to occupying jobs at the 
top and bottom rungs of Singapore’s economic ladder, foreign-
ers are now competing with Singaporeans for jobs in the middle 
rungs as well.41 K. P. Tan argues that middle-income Singapore-
ans feel frustrated that they are losing economic opportunities 
to foreigners whom they deem “second-rate.”42 Further, Tan M. 
W. suggests that Singaporeans are also growing increasingly ag-
gravated by non-Singaporeans working in the country, exerting 
pressure on Singapore’s infrastructure, particularly in the areas 
of housing and public transport, as well as taking some of the 
limited spaces in Singapore’s public schools. 
Regarding the high levels of immigration, Tan M. W. notes that 
the “voices of discontent” have begun to grow.  He says that Sin-
gaporeans are increasingly blaming foreigners for taking jobs, 
occupying places in schools, pushing up housing prices, and for 
a variety of other perceived problems. These issues have been 
widely covered in popular publications as well. The Economist 
acknowledged this tension in a 2009 piece entitled, “Singapore 
and immigration: a PR problem,” in which they argue that the 
growing number of foreign workers in Singapore had led to 
increasing feelings of discontent among locals. According to 
the article, some of this frustration is due to the fact that “anti-
immigrant sentiment cannot easily gain a strong political voice” 
because of the political dominance of the PAP.43  
Nonetheless, Singaporeans have been finding opportunities to 
make their voices heard on this issue. For example, the Singa-
pore government released the Population White Paper in Janu-
ary 2013, which, as part of its immigration policy, projected a 
population of between 6.5 and 6.9 million by 2030, of which 
only between 3.6 and 3.8 million will be citizens.44 This an-
nouncement caused some disquiet amongst members of the 
population who were concerned about overcrowding and the 
protection of Singapore’s identity. Three protests were held at 
Hong Lim Park, in February, May and October of 2013.  As 
Tan M. W. notes, between the importance of remaining globally 
competitive and the importance of employing the local popula-
tion, “There is no simple solution.”45 
In the last few years, the government has taken steps to reduce 
reliance on foreign manpower and to ensure that Singapore-
ans remain the foundation of the workforce. For example, in 
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2012, Parliament passed amendments to the Employment 
of Foreign Manpower Act, which attempts to deter employ-
ers from hiring foreign workers outside the work pass frame-
work by imposing new penalties.46 In early 2014, the Ministry 
of Manpower (MOM) released a report on the labour market 
from 2013, showing that employment rates of foreign workers 
had continued to slow, growing only 2.3 per cent in 2013, down 
from 4.6 per cent in 2012 (excluding  FDWs and construction 
workers).47 It reads, “The Ministry of Manpower will monitor 
the impact of previously announced foreign workforce policy 
measures on employment, productivity, and incomes, and con-
tinue to take progressive steps to moderate foreign workforce 
growth to more sustainable levels.”48
Section B: Tax policies 
to support growth 
It is widely agreed that Singapore’s taxation policies, particu-
larly reflected in the trends over the last two decades, are largely 
designed to support its economic strategy of rapid growth.49 For 
example, the government has steadily reduced the corporate in-
come tax, from over 40 per cent in the 1960s to 17 per cent 
today.50  This low rate encourages corporations to locate in Sin-
gapore. Further, Singapore has no capital gains tax; this policy 
encourages the wealthy to keep their wealth in Singapore rather 
than transfer it to other countries.51 Although Singapore is able 
to boast low rates of personal income tax across the board, 
many have argued that Singapore’s taxation system—including 
direct and indirect taxation, as well as the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) scheme—benefits the higher income brackets dis-
proportionately, and has heavily contributed to Singapore’s ris-
ing level of inequality.
Broad overview
Those who debate Singapore’s tax policies largely focus on cat-
egories of taxation that affect the complex relationship between 
taxation and inequality.52 First, there is the direct income tax, 
which has generally been praised for being among the lowest 
in the world among developed economies. Secondly, there is 
indirect taxation, which includes the Goods and Services Tax 
(GST), property taxes, stamp taxes, Electronic Road Pricing 
(ERP) or tolls that relate to Singapore’s traffic management 
scheme, and so on. Finally, Mukul Asher, among others, argues 
that the CPF system should be included in a discussion of taxa-
tion. CPF is a social security system, not a tax; however, Asher 
argues that the CPF also functions as a tax insofar as the system 
has an impact on both wages and purchasing power, and af-
fects Singaporeans in the higher and lower income groups in 
different ways.53 Further, Asher argues, “… if the distinguishing 
characteristic of a tax is the use of compulsory powers of the 
state to finance an activity, then they should appropriately be 
regarded as taxes.”54 
Direct and indirect taxes
A number of economists have noted that since the year 2000, 
direct taxation has been decreased in most categories.55 The top 
rate of personal income tax has fallen from 28 per cent in 2000 
to 20 per cent in 2007, which is quite low with respect to com-
parable countries or regions (see Table 2.1).56 Over the same 
period, the corporate tax rate has fallen from 26 to 18 per cent, 
and it is currently 17 per cent.57 Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, Singapore has never taxed capital gains and, as of 2008, 
it abolished the estate duty.58 These changes have made the tax 
system more regressive than it was, as the reduced tax burden 
affects the wealthy more than the less advantaged. As discussed 
in the section on wealth inequality, the absence of the estate 
tax and capital gains tax also serves to reinforce the existing 
social hierarchy, as each generation can transfer wealth to the 
following.
Source: KPMG (http://www.kpmg.com/GLOBAL/EN/
SERVICES/TAX/TAX-TOOLS-AND-RESOURCES/Pages/
individual-income-tax-rates-table.aspx) 
Table 2.1: Top personal income tax rates in several comparable 
countries or regions. All figures are from 2014, unless otherwise 
stated.
COUNTRY TOP INCOME TAX
Hong Kong SAR 15 per cent
Singapore 20 per cent
Asia Average 27.57 per cent
Canada 29 per cent
South Korea 38 per cent
United States 39.6 per cent
Taiwan 40 per cent
OECD Average 41.59 per cent
United Kingdom 45 per cent
Australia 45 per cent
France (2011) 45 per cent
Japan 50.84 per cent
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As government leaders have stated on several occasions, the 
Singapore government strives to have low income tax rates in 
order to stay competitive with other countries or regions59 and 
in order to retain top talent.60 Singapore’s highest personal in-
come tax rate is indeed five percentage points higher than Hong 
Kong’s. On the other hand, it is lower than most other wealthy, 
comparable countries. Table 2.1 compares the rates among sev-
eral relevant countries or regions. 
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At the same time as direct taxation rates have decreased, indi-
rect taxation rates have risen, a burden that, according to Ishita 
Dhamani, those Singaporeans with lower income dispropor-
tionately bear. The GST, the most common form of indirect 
taxation, has risen from the rate of 3 per cent when it was intro-
duced in 1994 to its current rate of 7 per cent.61  Since the GST 
is an across-the-board consumption tax, it is by nature regres-
sive, a point which the Singapore government acknowledges as 
well.62 All levels of society pay the same rate, and this rate hits 
the lowest income groups the hardest as they have less dispos-
able income. Some of this burden is offset by GST vouchers 
offered by the government to low-income households.63 DPM 
Tharman argues that the regressive nature of the GST should 
be considered within the framework of the larger system of 
taxes and benefits, in which social assistance is given to the less 
advantaged: “The GST Voucher is one part of the permanent 
offsets for the GST. It is part of a larger system of means-tested 
benefits that ensures that our lower-income group gets back far 
more benefits than the taxes they pay.”64
Over the past few years, the Singapore government has begun 
to move in the direction of making the tax system more pro-
gressive. In addition to lowering the cut-off rates for tax bands 
among high-income earners, there were also several changes 
announced in Budget 2013 that moved the tax system in a pro-
gressive direction; for example, the DPM announced an expan-
sion of the Workfare Income Supplement (WIS) as well as a 
more progressive tax system for properties and cars.65 These 
changes may be a sign of things to come in future budgets, as 
many have suggested.66 This has the potential to balance the in-
creases in income inequality that has, as Dhamani and others 
have argued, been propelled in part by the current tax system.67 
CPF
The CPF is a government policy designed to ensure retirement 
income, among other uses. This is discussed in detail in Part IV 
which underscores the various benefits of CPF, most notably 
its role in providing for retirement and housing. This section 
deals with the argument that CPF also functions as a form of 
taxation. 
Mukul Asher argues that CPF can be seen as a form of taxa-
tion because these contributions impact the amount of money 
people can retain from their wages, and have an effect on wage 
levels themselves. CPF contributions affect low-income earn-
ers much more than high-income earners. First, while everyone 
parts with the same percentage of their income in CPF contri-
butions, those on lower incomes are left with less disposable 
income to meet the fixed cost of necessities than higher wage 
earners. Further, CPF contributions are capped at SGD 5,000, 
so the highest income earners end up paying a far lower per-
centage of their incomes into it. Asher acknowledges, however, 
that CPF contributions are not considered a tax according to 
“conventional international practice.”68
Conclusion: Taxation and 
the lowest income earners
A number of scholars argue that when Singapore’s various in-
direct taxes are added to direct taxes, there is still a significant 
burden on the lowest-income earners.69 While Singapore has a 
low rate of personal income tax—in some cases none at all—in-
direct taxes make up a large portion of Singapore’s taxation sys-
tem, and these taxes are applied across the board equally. Some 
scholars conclude that combined with CPF contributions, these 
taxes can make it difficult for low-income families to meet ba-
sic expenses. The range and rules of social assistance schemes, 
such as GST vouchers offered to low-income families, make it 
difficult to estimate the extent to which this tax burden is offset.
25
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Section C: Meritocracy
Many scholars have discussed the ways in which the goal of 
creating a meritocratic society has informed Singapore’s devel-
opment policies, how it has had an important impact on the 
way society is structured, and how it has helped to shape the 
way that various populations view one another and society as 
a whole. As such, the ideal of meritocracy has impacted sig-
nificantly on economic policy, the structure of the education 
system and the expectations of the citizenry.71
Broadly speaking, meritocracy is the idea that individual merit 
will determine one’s level of success, whether in terms of educa-
tion, career, mobility, recognition or prestige.72 It is an ideology 
that many believe ensures equal opportunities for individuals 
coming from all levels of society, as it suggests that the inher-
ently deserving and hardworking are rewarded accordingly.73 
However, several scholars have indicated that Singapore’s 
meritocratic structure has crippled some segments of society, 
whether because the concept itself is flawed or because it has 
not been implemented in Singapore in an effective way.74
K. P. Tan, for example, has argued that the concept of meritoc-
racy has internal contradictions.75 He contends that meritocra-
cy has two mutually contradictory goals in its definition: elitism 
and egalitarianism. On the one hand, a meritocratic system is 
meant to provide equal opportunities to all citizens; on the oth-
er, it naturally favours members of the elite, who are destined, 
as a result of wealth and status in society, to arrive at the top of 
the ladder. This tension within the concept of meritocracy leads 
to a competition between elitism and egalitarianism that can be 
difficult for any society to reconcile.76
“Meritocracy has 
to remain the 
fundamental organising 
principle in our 
society. We have to 
recognise people for 
their contributions and 
effort, not backgrounds 
or status or wealth or 
connections.” 
– PM Lee Hsien Loong, 
National Day Rally 201370 
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In addition to pointing out its internal contradictions, Tan also 
argues that meritocracy, particularly in Singapore, faces barriers 
to effective implementation: namely, meritocracy is only “fair” if 
everyone in a society begins at the same starting point. That is, 
for a society to be structured according to “fair” meritocracy, all 
races, ages, sexualities, genders and so on, must begin to climb 
the social and economic ladder from an equal starting place.77 
As much as any government might try to level the playing 
field—and, as discussed at length below, Singapore has social 
schemes in place to do this—K. P. Tan suggests that it is simply 
not possible to undo generations of structural inequalities.
Economist R. Quinn Moore offers similar observations about 
possible failings of meritocratic systems. He distinguishes be-
tween a “fair” and “cruel” meritocracy. A “fair” meritocracy 
is one that attempts to compensate for “inherited advantages 
or disadvantages.”78 Employing a meritocratic system without 
considering the advantages of the privileged groups in a society 
will lead to what some have called a  “cruel” meritocracy, which 
Moore describes as not accurately representing talents and hard 
work of individuals, particularly those who are held back by 
systemic inequality. While Moore applauds Singapore’s attempt 
at a pragmatic application of a “fair” meritocracy, he argues that 
“ethnic favouritism and entrenched social advantage” impede 
this attempt.79
In spite of the government’s efforts to create equality of oppor-
tunity for all Singaporeans, some have argued that the culture 
of meritocracy has contributed to growing inequality and the 
increased vulnerability of certain populations within the city-
state. In “Meritocracy and Elitism in a Global City,” K. P. Tan 
fleshes out how inequality is exacerbated in a meritocratic sys-
tem:
Meritocracy, in trying to “isolate” merit by treating people 
with fundamentally unequal background as superficially 
the same, can be a practice that ignores and even conceals 
the real advantages and disadvantages that are unevenly 
distributed to different segments of an inherently unequal 
society, a practice that in fact perpetuates this fundamen-
tal inequality. In this way, those who are picked by meri-
tocracy as having merit may already have enjoyed unfair 
advantages from the very beginning, ignored according to 
the principle of nondiscrimination.80
In other words, if a society believes that the meritocratic sys-
tem is the great determiner of who attains success, the result 
is that achievements or failures may be incorrectly ascribed to 
the merit or work ethic of a group. According to K. P. Tan and 
Moore, however, successes that are ascribed to merit may in re-
ality be largely due to social advantage; this effect is discussed 
further.81 
Goals of meritocracy
K. P. Tan, Moore and others have framed the discussion of mer-
itocracy in terms of its effect on the way that society interprets 
the success of individuals—namely, meritocratic societies often 
ascribe success to merit rather than to privilege or advantages 
that might have contributed to one’s success. Low frames the 
discussion of meritocracy in terms of who in a society benefits 
the most, as well as what the goals of the meritocratic system 
appear to be.82 He identifies two types of meritocracy, “trickle-
up” and “trickle-down.” Low explains that the world view of a 
“trickle-up” meritocracy “sees government redistribution and 
fair outcomes as necessary corollaries to market-friendly, pro-
capital policies and the meritocratic system.”83 “Trickle-down” 
meritocracy, according to Low, is interested in developing a 
national elite, because only the “best and brightest” in a soci-
ety will be the key to economic success and general develop-
ment, which will then “trickle down” to the rest. Such a society 
is more concerned with investing in and opening opportunities 
for its elite, and far less concerned about social equity and how 
its benefits are distributed.  
The assumption is that “the poor are best served by providing 
the best and brightest with maximum opportunities to succeed 
as they are the ones who create jobs for the rest.”84 Low sug-
gests that Singapore is very likely such a society, as the goal of 
Singapore’s meritocratic system appears to be to develop a na-
tional elite.  Similarly, Dhamani argues that Singapore “strongly 
upholds meritocracy, and only provides education and growth 
opportunities to its deserving citizens so that they achieve 
greater goals for the society”.85 The following section looks at ar-
guments regarding how Singapore’s education system upholds 
its meritocratic system without necessarily levelling the playing 
field in a sufficiently fair way.
Meritocracy, streaming and 
Singapore’s education system
Education is often considered to be one of the primary paths 
available for social mobility. It has been widely noted that Sin-
gapore places a strong emphasis on educational attainment, as 
it ties in well with the ideas of meritocracy: education should 
allow those with greater intellectual merit to find their way to 
the top, regardless of where they started.86  However, while Sin-
gapore’s education system is touted as being designed to allow 
anyone with intellectual merit to succeed,87 many have argued 
that there are various barriers that hinder certain populations 
from attaining this success.88
Singapore’s education system was designed with the specific 
goal of creating a competitive workforce. Therefore, the educa-
tion system has been structured in such a way as to identify 
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the best and brightest students and to provide them with the 
resources and faculty attention to make the most of their abili-
ties, i.e., “cultivating an elite.”89 This is accomplished through 
streaming, a process by which students are periodically tested, 
first with the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), and 
secondly with the qualifying exams for the Gifted Education 
Programme (GEP), and then placed in certain academic tracks, 
or streams, according to their abilities. The most significant of 
these tests is the PSLE, which is administered to students at the 
end of their sixth year of primary school.
The streaming system was developed under the former Minister 
of Education, Goh Keng Swee, and the ideas behind it made up 
part of the seminal “Goh Report” in 1979.90 Streaming was de-
veloped largely to slow the high dropout rate at the time and to 
allow students to learn at their own pace.91 The Singapore gov-
ernment acknowledged that not every student was destined for 
university, and early streaming would help to identify students 
who are more vocationally inclined. The system of streaming 
was successful in dramatically reducing the dropout rate from 
19 per cent in 1980 to 4.4 per cent in 1997.92  The potential fail-
ing of such a system is, of course, is that the testing might not 
identify students accurately.
Making room to allow a society’s best and brightest to excel is 
undoubtedly an important goal if a country wishes to remain 
economically competitive in an increasingly globalised world. 
Streaming may help to achieve this goal, as certain students 
are identified as being particularly gifted, and they can then be 
placed in an academic stream where they can get the resources 
and attention they need. However, it has been noted that this 
system is far from ideal. For example, Low has suggested that 
the PSLE tests are an imperfect way of measuring merit, inso-
far as they are administered when individuals are quite young, 
and the tests are not proven to measure ability accurately.93 At 
the same time, however, the PSLE is given an important role 
in determining the future of these students. Low argues that 
these consequences are too great for tests that may not be ac-
curate indicators of talent, and that this benefits neither society 
nor the individuals taking the test. For one, Singapore’s goal 
of identifying the most talented may not be met; many gifted 
students may not have excelled on the test, after which they 
may not be noticed. On an individual level, it is also not fair to 
students who end up in a stream where they may not belong, 
particularly as their placement is based on only one examina-
tion.94
Moore points out that the practice of streaming also furthers 
inequality by channelling resources to the elite. Once students 
are streamed, and the best and brightest among them have been 
identified, the state is then able to provide greater funding for 
the higher achieving students. As Moore illustrates, “Elite-
oriented funding continues at all levels of the system and is 
particularly concentrated on tertiary education, which is, for 
practical purposes, only available to those initially channelled 
to the high streams.”95 The system of streaming then, accord-
ing to Moore, allows the state to provide more funding to some 
students than to others, which runs counter to the egalitarian 
goals of meritocracy.
In the National Day speech of 2013, PM Lee Hsien Loong an-
nounced that the government planned to make changes to 
PSLE.  First, rather than giving precise numerical scores for the 
test, students will be given letter grades. The intention behind 
this shift is to remove the pressure that students often experi-
ence to fight for every point on the test so that they might attain 
the highest relative position. Further, the results of the PSLEs 
will place students into “wider bands,” like those following the 
Ordinary (‘O’) and Advanced (‘A’) level examinations, and stu-
dents in the various streams will be offered a wider range of 
courses than under the current system.96 Both of these changes 
will lessen the overwhelming significance of students’ PSLE re-
sults.
Advantaging the affluent
This literature review identifies another group of scholars who 
argue that Singapore’s education system is set up in a way that 
benefits the affluent. Maryam Binte Mohamed Mokhtar et al., 
for example, suggest that an “educational handicap” begins in 
early education with parents who can afford opting to send 
their children to private pre-schools, which are the dominant 
providers of early education.97  
Those from the lower income group have to struggle to edu-
cate their children before they are enrolled in primary school 
in order to bring them to the same starting line. As a result, 
children coming from parents of different income groups have 
a different level of educational development and capability by 
the time they enter formal education. Carl Trocki argues that 
“by [the year] 2000, it was necessary for a toddler to enter the 
right preschool, so that they could be prepared for kindergar-
ten, gain entrance into the right primary school and thereby 
qualify for the best secondary school.”98 In other words, once 
the educational advantage is set in motion in preschool, it tends 
to continue into the later stages of education. Further, alumni 
of certain schools are given priority for spaces in these schools, 
which reinforces the status quo rather than allowing the system 
of meritocracy to determine who may attend which school.
Moore also points to the importance of private tuition in Singa-
pore; since the education system is so competitive, and in many 
ways structured as a zero-sum game, parents are prepared to 
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invest in extra tuition to give their children whatever advantage 
they can.99  Wealthy Singaporeans have both the means to enrol 
their children in extra tuition and the ability to spend a greater 
amount of time helping to prepare them for exams; less advan-
taged Singaporeans tend to struggle more on both fronts. In ad-
dition, Low points out that the concentration of good schools 
in well-to-do neighbourhoods, alongside the ability to afford 
higher tuition programmes, offers the rich a two-fold edge over 
the less wealthy.100  
The Singapore government has responded to criticisms per-
taining to the advantages gained from attending neighbour-
hood schools and private tuition. In June 2012, Minister for 
Education Heng Swee Keat outlined the government’s intention 
of providing support to schools to ensure that, one day soon, 
every school will be a “good” school.101 He elaborated on the 
four-prong approach to make this a reality, which involves “giv-
ing schools resources to offer customised programmes that best 
fit their students’ needs; raising teachers’ professional stand-
ards; encouraging learning and innovation across schools; and 
promoting partnerships between the schools and communi-
ty.”102  As far as private tuition is concerned, the government has 
pointed out that, understandably, they cannot regulate this type 
of “shadow education.”103  In a parliamentary reply, Minister 
Heng also argued that the advantages gained through tuition 
are overstated, and that such an approach can actually lead to 
negative consequences, such as too much stress for students.104
Mobility through education
Education is traditionally believed to be an important avenue 
for intergenerational social and economic mobility. The extent 
to which it continues to function this way in Singapore is a topic 
of some debate.  
The Ministry of Education (MOE) points to evidence that 
Singapore’s education system plays an important role in lift-
ing families out of poverty.  For instance, the 2009 Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) test, which is ad-
ministered to students in 65 countries, showed that Singapore’s 
less advantaged students were performing better in the reading 
category than would otherwise be expected. Specifically, about 
half the students in the bottom socio-economic quarter earned 
higher scores in reading than would be expected given their 
background.105 The MOE press release ascribes this result to 
Singapore’s meritocratic system.106
The MOE also points to the high levels of post-secondary at-
tendance among less advantaged Singaporeans as evidence of 
social mobility through education.  About half of students who 
grew up in one- to three-room HDB flats, a typical marker of 
a lower economic status, ended up attending either publicly 
funded universities or polytechnics.107 The MOE, in a 2011 
press release, pointed out that this rate had remained consistent 
over the last decade.108 The data cited by them certainly indi-
cates that a significant number of less advantaged students are 
able, through Singapore’s education system, to move beyond 
their economic background with respect to educational out-
comes.
Despite the statistics presented, it is less clear how well these 
students are performing with respect to their more advantaged 
peers, or what impact their educational attainment has on 
their future income prospects. Many scholars have suggested 
that there are significant mediating factors limiting the effect 
of education on intergenerational mobility. While there was 
greater opportunity for intergenerational mobility during the 
period of Singapore’s faster growth, there is also evidence that 
this mobility has slowed down more recently.109 Irene Ng Y. H. 
analysed the results of a 2002 youth survey in order to meas-
ure the odds of someone moving to a different income group 
from his or her parents’. She found that Singapore had an “in-
tergenerational income elasticity” of 58 per cent. Tan Hui Yee, a 
correspondent from The Straits Times explains that this means 
that “58 per cent of the income advantage of parents was being 
handed down to their children,” which suggests that Singapore’s 
income mobility is close to that of the USA, which is considered 
rather low.110
Yip Chun Seng has also conducted a study of intergenerational 
mobility in Singapore, but his findings differ from Ng’s. Yip’s 
study suggests that Singapore’s level of intergenerational mo-
bility is better than that of other countries with high levels of 
inequality, particularly the United States.111 His study suggests 
that there is a low correlation between the income of “Genera-
tion X” (individuals between the ages of 30 and 39 years old in 
the year 2008) and that of their fathers. The correlations of his 
groups are between 0.22 and 0.30, with 0 being no correlation 
between incomes and 1 being identical incomes.112 However, 
Yip has acknowledged that his study is not representative. He 
compares only first-born sons to their fathers, and takes in-
comes from the beginning of the sons’ careers (when incomes 
are likely to be at their lowest) and compares them to incomes 
from the ends of the fathers’ careers (when incomes are likely to 
be at their highest).113
In terms of how well children of lower-income families perform 
with respect to their peers, Ho Kong Weng argues that paren-
tal background greatly influences the quality of education that 
children receive, which in turn affects the children’s opportu-
nities post-education.114 Similarly, Ng describes the findings of 
recent studies, “Those [children] whose parents were less edu-
cated were more likely to be less educated relative to their peers, 
while those whose parents were more educated were more 
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likely to remain the most highly educated of their peers.”115 It 
has also been suggested that children of high-achieving parents 
have better opportunities than children of low-achieving par-
ents, in no small part because these parents have the extra time 
and resources to devote to their children’s education.116 
Post education
According to Miriam Ee, the advantages of an elite background 
continue post-education, through employment and into old 
age.117  Since employment opportunities are tied to educational 
attainment, students that have “less merit,” as determined by 
the education system, will have fewer employment options in 
the future.  Less advantaged Singaporeans can also rely on less 
help from their parents as they begin their careers. Ee, based 
on her study of elderly Singaporeans, states that parents from 
upper class families often support their children in a variety 
of ways even after they have started working.118  For example, 
wealthier parents are in a position to provide their children 
with money or assets to get them started on their careers.  On 
the other hand, children from less advantaged families have to 
accumulate their assets from scratch, as their parents can rarely 
afford to supply them. 	
Ee also points out that the repayment of student loans is more 
likely to affect less advantaged students, and further increases 
their unequal starting points post-education.  Economic differ-
ences and preferential treatment such as these that start from a 
young age and accumulate over a lifetime are almost certain to 
create different experiences of old age between elite and non-
elite, as CPF balances, personal savings, etc., are naturally af-
fected by these opportunities.119 
Stratification and 
reduced social mobility 
Some authors have argued that if a meritocratic system permits 
the creation of an elite class, then it is difficult to overcome the 
class divisions that are in place. K. P. Tan, citing Klitgaard, de-
scribes succinctly how this happens:
Elitism sets in when the elite class develops an exagger-
ated “in-group” sense of superiority, a dismissive attitude 
toward the abilities of those who are excluded from this in-
group, a heroic sense of responsibility for the well-being of 
what the in-group “laments” as the “foolish” and “danger-
ous” masses, and a repertoire of self-congratulatory public 
gestures to maintain what is sometimes merely a delusion 
of superiority.  So “winners” will go on winning, and “los-
ers”… go on losing.  All the while, the egalitarian aspects of 
meritocracy are further obscured.120
K. P. Tan argues that the discourse of meritocracy permits the 
“winners” to remain in power. Firstly, the wealthy are able to 
claim that they ascended to the top of a fair, meritocratic sys-
tem because of their innately superior abilities, and are there-
fore entitled to their status. Next, there is no incentive for them 
to acknowledge that the system may be flawed, as to do so 
would mean risking both their status and that of their children. 
Finally, if they are the meritocratic “winners,” this has implica-
tions for the “losers.”
Blaming the victim 
Ee argues that Singapore’s meritocratic system also leads to 
a “high tolerance for social inequality.”121 She points out that 
if a “fair” meritocratic system is in place, as many believe is 
the case, then it is assumed everyone deserves the status they 
manage to attain. This not only goes for the elite, with indi-
viduals who are able to claim that they deserve their status by 
virtue of their superior merit, but can also be applied to the 
lower classes as a way of blaming the disadvantaged for their 
situation.
Many have argued that this “blame the victim” attitude results 
in a culture that sees poverty as a problem with the individual 
rather than one that is structural.122  The result is a stigma at-
tached to those who are less affluent. As William Lee puts it, 
“Some even think that the poor only have themselves to blame. 
They think that the poor are poor because of laziness and other 
personal defects…”123 It has also been suggested that struggling 
segments of the population also end up internalising this per-
spective. Local playwright Alfian Sa’at argues that meritocracy 
in Singapore “is so glorified, people don’t see the poverty as 
something which is systematic. They don’t blame the institu-
tion, they blame themselves.”124 
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Part III
Intersections 
with Poverty
Any discussion of unmet needs, poverty and inequality must 
include the various ways that these concepts intersect with 
gender and race. These intersections will be different within 
every society, depending upon variables such as social norms, 
legislation, historical context, etc.  This section provides a brief 
overview of the literature and debates surrounding gender and 
poverty, and race and poverty, in Singapore, as well as the 
contexts that produce and influence these intersections.  
8
Section A: Gender
Singapore is far from unique in facing concerns at the inter-
section of gender and poverty. There is ample international 
literature on the issues that push women into poverty in vari-
ous cultures, often having to do with caregiving expectations 
and responsibilities, which are discussed further below.1  Al-
though female Singaporean citizens and PRs experience few 
official barriers to education and work, there are still social 
norms which prevent women from enjoying the same eco-
nomic privileges as men. This section canvasses international 
literature, presenting reasons why it is necessary to consider 
the specific needs of women experiencing poverty and unmet 
social needs. It then presents literature and commentary on 
gender and poverty in Singapore, and views on how existing 
social assistance policies and practices impact women and 
men differently. 
Women do more caregiving
Women’s roles within the family have traditionally had a nega-
tive impact on their ability to participate in the workforce and 
to become economically independent. Women are typically re-
sponsible for more household duties than men; this is the case 
whether or not women are engaged in the workforce.2 Welfare 
commentator, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, estimates that women 
in the UK, Italy, Sweden, Germany and the US, who are em-
ployed on a full-time basis, still spend from 1.7 to 3.6 times 
as much time as their partners on household tasks.3 Further, 
caregiving duties fall to women more frequently than to men; 
these duties involve both the care of children in the family as 
well as the care of elderly relatives. Women are also far more 
likely than men to take time outside the workforce to care for 
children, which can have a significant impact on their career 
advancement opportunities;4 that is, whether they are perceived 
within their work environment as “management material,” or 
imagined to be on the “mommy track.” As Mayra Buvinic et 
al. argue, “In sum, women make large non-monetary contribu-
tions to their families, but are in turn more dependent on them 
for support.”5
Although caregiving serves an important role in society, it is 
traditionally under-respected and vastly under-rewarded.6 Di-
one Elson has argued that caregiving is “vital in developing and 
maintaining the health and skills of the labour force; and in de-
veloping and maintaining the social framework; the sense of 
community; of civic responsibility; the rules, norms and values 
that maintain trust, goodwill and social order.”7  In spite of this 
enormous impact, however, caregiving is rarely paid when it is 
done within the family, and is typically not highly paid when it 
is performed by someone outside the family.8
Scholars have argued that treating caregiving in this way has 
myriad negative effects.  For one, when the government assigns 
caregiving responsibilities to the realm of the family and out-
side of formal social policy, this tends to reify women’s roles 
as caregivers and thereby reinforce “traditional” divisions of la-
bour.9  That is, women end up with more responsibility within 
the home than men in the home have, even when these women 
are working outside the home.  
Next, in situations where women continue to bear undue bur-
den in the home at the same time as they are participating in the 
workforce, Elson contends that this will lead to negative effects 
on productivity and costs in the commodity and public service 
economies.10 This is partly because women will miss work more 
frequently because of caregiving responsibilities, and partly be-
cause they are more likely to experience poor mental and physi-
cal health due to the same responsibilities.  
Lastly, as women’s time and health are increasingly stressed 
between home and work, there will be greater need to ad-
dress these problems through social workers, policing, private 
spending on insurance, and so on.11 In short, there are very real 
effects to be felt from keeping the care economy as a private 
matter. 
Lower lifetime earnings 
and savings
Beyond household commitments affecting women’s levels of 
participation in the workforce, there are significant monetary 
effects as well.  First, the time spent outside the workforce limits 
the amount of a woman’s lifetime earnings.  This has an effect 
on her personal savings as well as on any pension available to 
her in her retirement years,12 which is discussed further in the 
section “Singapore context.” (See page 33.)  
Secondly, women’s wages are typically lower than men’s, even 
when women participate in the workforce on a comparable 
level to men. Measuring the pensions of women who have had 
a full working life against those of men who worked for a com-
parable amount of time, women’s are 35 per cent less.13
Finally, because of women’s disproportionate amount of respon-
sibility as caregivers, they often take on part-time work rather 
than full-time employment.14 Working in a part-time rather 
than a full-time capacity limits earnings in a number of ways. 
Most obviously, of course, one works fewer hours. Secondly, the 
salaries from part-time jobs are often a fraction of those from 
full-time employment.15  Finally, there is less opportunity for 
skill-development and advancement, both of which affect earn-
ings.16 Again, because women disproportionately take on part-
time work to enable them to act as primary caregivers within 
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their families, women are also disproportionately affected by 
the limited savings and skill building that come with this type 
of employment.
Particularly vulnerable 
groups of women
Given these issues, some groups of women are particularly vul-
nerable: namely, unmarried female elderly, and single moth-
ers.17  Unmarried female elderly face unique challenges because 
of the scenarios described above: they often have little in the 
way of savings, their pensions are limited due to the nature of 
their participation in the workforce over their lifetimes, and 
they do not have a husband in the household whose pension 
might supplement their own.18 
Demographics also work against elderly women. Women are 
expected to live longer than men, and therefore will spend a 
greater amount of time in a period of life when their needs will 
be greater and they will have less financial support to meet those 
needs.19 In the case of elderly married women, this means that 
they are likely to outlive their husbands, who are likely a source 
of support in both financial and other aspects, and spend the 
final period of their lives with less access to assistance. As Daly 
and Rake argue, “sex differences in longevity mean that it is 
women who are affected most by the income risks associated 
with the loss of a partner.”20
 
Single mothers also face unique challenges. All too apparent, 
they are raising children with only one income to support their 
family. They are doubly burdened by being the primary care-
givers for their children at the same time as having to provide 
all financial support for their families. Therefore, the level of 
poverty experienced by a single mother depends very much 
on her ability to find affordable childcare.21 In countries where 
childcare tends to be more expensive, or at least tends to cost 
more than a single mother’s potential earnings, it often makes 
more financial sense for single mothers to remain outside the 
workforce and care for their children themselves.22 Withdrawal 
from the workforce has long-term implications, as it means 
that they will amass little or no savings, have no opportunity 
to improve skills to improve their employability at a later date, 
and they have no way to contribute to pensions if they live in 
a country where pensions are employment-dependent rather 
than citizenship-dependent. Finally, in addition to the finan-
cial challenges that single mothers face, they frequently experi-
ence social stigma, particularly in more traditional societies, or 
those where social programmes are designed in such a way as to 
mark out single mothers as “immoral and parasitic.”23
 
While unmarried female elderly and single mothers are argu-
ably the most vulnerable classes of women, the “potential poor” 
should not be overlooked.  These are women who are married 
and remain outside the workforce—that is, they depend upon 
their husbands’ incomes for financial stability for both them-
selves and their children. While these women are not living in 
poverty, they are merely a divorce or widowhood away from 
it.24  This precarious situation has serious implications for their 
decisions: Women may feel pressure, for example, to remain 
in an unstable or dangerous relationship due to fear of the fi-
nancial ruin that may result from a divorce.  Further, women 
in this situation are more likely to find themselves among the 
elderly poor later in life, as they do not have their own savings 
or social security to fall back on.
Women in the Singapore context
By some measures, women in Singapore are doing quite well, 
particularly in terms of employment: There are more women in 
the workforce in Singapore than there are in other Asian coun-
tries.25 A study entitled “Women, Power, and Economic Growth 
in Asia,” conducted by Mastercard, indicates that Singapore is 
performing best in the region in terms of women in the work-
place making the best use of their high levels of education.26  
However, while women are well represented in the workplace 
and are capitalising on Singapore’s education system, they do 
not enjoy high-level positions to the same degree as women 
in other countries. The Grant Thornton International Busi-
ness Report demonstrated that the representation of women 
in senior roles dropped from 27 per cent in 2012 to 23 per cent 
in 2013.27  This level is not only slightly below the global aver-
age of 24 per cent, but it also leaves Singapore trailing behind 
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia.28 This is a signifi-
cant gap, as one of the major issues concerning women in the 
workforce is that women are too often confined to lower-level 
positions due to perceptions that they may need to take time 
out for caregiving responsibilities.29 
There is also still a significant gender gap in wages in Singapore. 
In 2011, the MOM estimated that, in blue-collar industries, 
men out-earn their female colleagues by around 30 per cent. 
Further, this gap widens with age.30 The gender gap also appears 
to continue as new generations of workers enter the workforce. 
Chia and Tsui’s 2013 study, discussed in Part IV (page 45), ar-
gues that, of recent entrants to the Singaporean workforce who 
are earning in the median range, males should be able to re-
place 70 per cent of their wages when they enter retirement, 
and women should be able to replace only 64 per cent.31
Like women’s employment opportunities in Singapore, there 
are also contrasting reviews on the experience of motherhood 
in Singapore.  In 2014, Save the Children Foundation ranked 
Singapore the best country in Asia to be a mother, and the 15th 
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best country overall.32  Their rankings were based on statistics 
concerning women’s health, child’s well-being, women’s eco-
nomic status and women’s political status.  For mothers to rank 
so well in these important issues is a clear endorsement of Sin-
gapore’s approach to certain factors concerning gender equality. 
In one of the discussions of this study published in The Straits 
Times, however, it was pointed out that, in spite of some broad 
indicators of well-being, there was still too little data concern-
ing specific issues facing mothers and women in the workplace. 
For example, Radha Basu points out that “there is no data on 
the proportion of working mothers here, for instance, although 
there is an imperfect proxy. Around 61 per cent of married 
women here work.  But it is not known how many of them have 
children.”33  This type of more specific data would go a great dis-
tance to understanding both the experience of motherhood in 
Singapore as well as the experience of women in the workplace.
Fertility
Work-life balance is a central concern with respect to anoth-
er gender issue that is unique in its importance to Singapore: 
namely a woman’s choice to have children.  The Singapore gov-
ernment has been clear that it is attempting to boost fertility 
rates through social policy. In this attempt, the government is 
investigating ways to make women’s participation in the labour 
force fairer and with less of an opportunity cost. As PM Lee 
said in a Dialogue with Women Professionals in 2009, “we must 
persevere to make adjustments in our society to persuade or-
ganisations to adopt flexi-work schemes so that it is easier on 
the employees and women employees, to encourage the men 
to share the responsibility for housework and responsibility for 
bringing up the kids in the next generation and progressively to 
move to a truly shared parenting arrangement and a more posi-
tive environment for families to have more children, because 
we would like you to have to take good care of your kids but we 
also like you, by which I mean both the men and the women, 
to have more kids.”34 In other words, the Singapore government 
is encouraging changes in the workforce that attempt to help 
women balance work and family life, in the hope that women 
will continue to be productive workers at the same time as they 
begin to build larger families.
The Singapore government also provides benefits to defray 
some of the costs of child-rearing.  To start with, there is the 
Baby Bonus, which is a payment that a couple receives when 
they have a child, spread out through three payments through-
out the child’s first year of life.35 This bonus is dependent upon 
how many children the couple already has, offering SGD 6,000 
for the first and second child and SGD 8,000 for the third and 
fourth.36 Designing it this way speaks to the government’s in-
terest in encouraging couples to procreate, preferably having 
multiple children, but not more than they can afford without 
assistance. However, only married couples are eligible for the 
Baby Bonus, which again reflects the government’s interest in 
encouraging the “traditional” family unit.  
In addition to the Baby Bonus, there are opportunities for subsi-
dised childcare, often through the labour of a foreign domestic 
worker, as well as subsidised preschool.37 All of these measures 
are intended to encourage people to have more children, and 
the latter schemes are designed to encourage women to stay in 
the workplace by taking advantage of affordable childcare.  
Social assistance in Singapore
Singapore’s approach to social assistance is discussed at length 
in Part IV.  For now, let it suffice to say that Singaporeans are 
expected to rely on themselves and their family as their first 
line of support, and then to make use of government schemes 
when necessary.  
While there are schemes available to meet the needs of vulner-
able populations, the social protection index (SPI) in Singapore 
differs dramatically by gender compared to other countries. 
The SPI was developed from 2003-2006 to enable countries 
in Asia and the Pacific to record and compare social expendi-
tures, as well as distribution and impact, through a database.38 
Since 2010, the Asian Development Bank has been updating 
and improving the database to make it more effective in policy 
analysis and development.39 The SPI for Singaporean men is 
0.095, whereas for Singaporean women, it is 0.074.40 As a point 
of reference, Indonesia’s SPIs for men and women are 0.024 and 
0.020 respectively, and the SPIs in the Philippines are 0.045 for 
men and 0.040 for women.  
Although women in Singapore are better off with respect to so-
cial protection than those in neighboring countries, this is to be 
expected given the wide development gap. In a context where 
Singapore is able to achieve an SPI of 0.095 for men, the gender 
gap in social protection spending in Singapore is significant, 
and is of concern to groups that advocate for gender equality.41
In addition, the fact that social assistance is often determined 
by household units tends to disadvantage women. Whereas 
means-testing for individuals equally assesses the needs of 
women and men, household means-testing creates a situation 
where no assistance is granted so long as the men in the house-
hold are earning adequate income. This again places the fam-
ily as the first means of support and leaves women vulnerable 
to the vagaries of the working lives of other family members.42 
Individual means-testing would go further to address the needs 
of women than household means-testing, and would leave few-
er women vulnerable in their retirement years.  
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In their proposals for Budget 2014, AWARE recommends that 
the Singapore government move to individual means-testing, 
citing the practice of the Ministry of Law’s Legal Aid Bureau 
(LAB).43	 	 As AWARE argues in AWARE Recommendations 
for Budget 2014, “Means testing should be done only for the 
individuals applying for public assistance, as with the Minis-
try of Law’s LAB. Focus must be on their disposable income 
and disposable capital, not on the financial resources of the 
households where they live. Because family members living in 
the same household may not be supporting the individual con-
cerned, their income and assets are irrelevant to the individual’s 
application.”44
Vulnerable populations
Single mothers
Policies concerning single parents are best understood within 
the framework of the Singapore government’s goal of encour-
aging the formation of “traditional” families, and that this is an 
important consideration in formulating policy is no secret. This 
policy goal was espoused by both Minister for Social and Fam-
ily Development Chan Chun Sing and Second Minister for For-
eign Affairs Grace Fu in the Parliamentary Debate on the Child 
Development Co-Savings (Amendment) Bill: 
“On the one hand, we do not want to send the wrong signal 
on the kind of values we hold in society towards marriage 
and the institution of the family. On the other hand, what-
ever else has happened, we want to be able to take care of 
all children amongst us, and I think we can all agree on 
that.”45 	–	Minister	Chan	Chun	Sing
“The Government believes that a stable, intact fam-
ily structure provides a more conducive environment to 
raise a child.”46	 	 –	 Second	Minister	 for	 Foreign	 Affairs	
Grace	Fu	Hai	Yien
Central to Singapore’s efforts to encourage the formation of tra-
ditional families and childbearing is the Marriage and Parent-
hood Package (M&P).47 This package covers a broad spectrum 
of “pro-family” policies, ranging from education, to health care, 
to reproductive assistance, etc.  
While the M&P package has evolved over the years to in-
clude more benefits to single-parent households—notably, in 
2013, single parents were given maternity leave and childcare 
leave48—there are still areas in which single parents are ex-
cluded from some of the benefits to which married parents 
are entitled. Single mothers are only entitled to eight weeks 
of paid maternity leave and four weeks of unpaid maternity 
leave rather than the 16 paid weeks to which married moth-
ers are entitled.49 They are not eligible for the Baby Bonus, as 
mentioned above; neither are they entitled to the parenthood 
tax rebate which married mothers enjoy, nor relief for disabled 
children, working mothers, and grandparent caregivers.50 In a 
written answer from the MSF, it is explained that such benefits 
are intended to support marriages and births within the context 
of traditional families.51
Perhaps the most significant area in which single mothers lack 
the support given to their married counterparts is housing.  Sin-
gle-parent households are not eligible for the “housing grant to 
families” or for the “housing priority to families.”52 This places 
both the mother and the child[ren] at greater risk of homeless-
ness, particularly given their financial disadvantages. 
Moving frequently between temporary homes, because a more 
permanent home cannot be obtained, likely makes it difficult 
for the single mother to maintain steady employment and for 
children to attend school without significant interruption. In 
November 2013, Speaker of Parliament Mdm Halimah Yacob, 
giving a talk at NUS, spoke in favour of providing housing for 
single mothers, largely in the interest of their children.  She ar-
gued that in cases where single mothers are forced to wait until 
they are 35 years old to purchase an HDB flat (and even then, 
can only purchase it on the resale market), their children are 
unfairly victimised.53
Mdm Halimah’s argument applies equally well to the other 
types of support that are not offered to single mothers, dis-
cussed above. As she suggests, allowing these children to be-
gin life at an unequal starting point with their peers is not in 
keeping with Singapore’s meritocratic system, which strives for 
equality in opportunities.
Due to Singapore’s commitment to maintaining its “traditional” 
values, the government is reluctant to provide special support 
for single mothers; even support that is available to married 
mothers. And, as Mdm Halimah acknowledged in her plea on 
behalf of single mothers, the government can only move as far 
as the Singaporean citizenry are prepared to go.54 Nonetheless, 
there is clearly a risk of perpetuation of poverty in families led 
by single mothers, particularly given the relative disadvantages 
at which their children start their lives.
Single elderly women
Single elderly women make up another vulnerable population 
that faces specific problems in Singapore. As discussed in Part 
IV, Section A (page 42), the Singapore government closely ties 
social support to participation in the workforce. For the reasons 
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described above, a portion of Singapore’s elderly women either 
have not participated in the workforce because they were occu-
pied by caregiving responsibilities, or they participated so little 
and/or at lower incomes and thus have very little in the way of 
savings.  Because Singapore’s pension scheme is tied wholly to 
employment, this leaves elderly women at a distinct disadvan-
tage.  
 
The CPF, discussed at length in Part IV Section B (page 44), 
is designed to be a significant means of support for elderly 
Singaporeans. Throughout an individual’s working life, both 
employee and employer make contributions into the fund, 
which can then be used to purchase a home, to pay for 
education, and to provide income for one’s retirement.  There is 
some debate as to whether CPF provides retirement adequacy, 
and that debate is covered in Part IV, but for now it is clear that 
the CPF system cannot provide adequate support for people 
who have had little or no participation in the workforce, as that 
is not part of its purpose. Some elderly women, then, reach 
their golden years with no CPF account to support them.55
Further, the CPF Life scheme, CPF’s only risk-pooling sub-
part, is set up in a way that places a high burden on women. 
CPF Life’s premiums charged for the annuity are based on both 
age and gender. As women tend to live longer than men,56 they 
pay a higher premium on average.57 This is doubly burdensome 
when one considers the point made above, that they have lower 
balances to begin with. 
One might argue that many of these women have the support 
of their husbands, who are likely to have some CPF savings, 
as well as their children, who are able to top up their parents’ 
accounts using their own. However, the life expectancy of a 
Singaporean woman is 84.6 years, as of 2013, as compared to 
a man’s expected 80.2 years,58 so elderly women are likely to 
spend some portion of their lives without the support of their 
husbands. Further, depending on their children for support 
does not necessarily address all of their issues. After all, their 
children are also responsible for their own finances and for 
those of any children they might have, and may not be able to 
provide adequate support for aged parents.
Elderly women also face challenges in their pre-retirement 
years. The retirement age in Singapore is going up at the same 
time as life expectancy is rising. It is currently being raised from 
62 to 65 years old under the Retirement and Re-employment 
Act,59 and it is likely that there will be further extensions of the 
retirement age as life expectancy continues to increase. With-
out accompanying changes to the pension system, retraining 
schemes, or other structures that disproportionately affect the 
quality of life of ageing low-wage workers, this group will also 
become increasingly vulnerable.60
Government efforts related to 
gender and poverty 
Singapore has taken important steps to address the needs of 
certain groups of women. In an attempt to increase fertility, 
the government has sought to improve the work-life balance 
for working mothers. For example, policies encourage employ-
ers to adopt flexible work schedules to benefit women in their 
attempt to balance work and their private lives.61 Furthermore, 
in response to the rise in costs of infant care centres (ages 0-18 
months) and childcare centres (18 months and above), the Sin-
gapore government offers a range of subsidies to working moth-
ers to help defray these costs.62 Families with a monthly house-
hold income of SGD 2,500 or below will now receive a subsidy 
of up to SGD 740 per month.63 When one considers that the 
median cost of a childcare centre is SGD 750 per month, this 
makes childcare quite affordable at SGD 10 per month.64 How-
ever, as this discussion has demonstrated, there are other ways 
in which the costs of childbearing and child-rearing could be 
balanced more equally between men and women. 
 
The government has also made improvements in the area of 
maternity benefits. So long as mothers have worked a total of 
90 days in the calendar year up to when their child is born, they 
will receive the government-paid portion of maternity leave.65 
The government has also been increasing the number of days 
for childcare leave to which parents are entitled.66
For elderly women, the government has taken steps to make 
it easier to remain employed for a longer part of their lives. 
Limits on foreign workers have encouraged employers to in-
vest in equipment to enable older workers to perform jobs that 
might otherwise be physically taxing.67 This helps to address 
some of the issues created by the later retirement age, insofar 
as at least some of the “young elderly” will be able to fill these 
roles.  There is also the Pioneer Generation Package, discussed 
in Part IV (page 49), which has taken a significant part of the 
financial burden out of old age by covering healthcare costs 
for a large section of the population.  While these are all im-
portant changes, and will go far to help various populations in 
Singapore, there is still some distance to go to support the least 
advantaged women cope with the expenses of child-rearing 
and old age.
Potential reforms
There has been much work done internationally on policies that 
improve the lives of women.  Such work often includes general 
policies that are intended to alleviate poverty, and were not de-
signed to be gender specific.68  For instance, an increase in the 
minimum wage not only helps the poor, but also improves the 
situation of women who are more likely to be working at mini-
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mum wage jobs.69 Likewise, an increase in the minimum wage 
gives assistance to the elderly, who are also more likely to be 
working in these professions; policies such as full employment, 
on the other hand, end up helping women disproportionately, 
as women are more likely to be unemployed than men.70
 
Laws that specifically help women include those that seek to 
achieve wage equity and forbid gender discrimination.71 Buvin-
ic et al. point to Brazil and South America as successfully reduc-
ing poverty in old age by using non-contributory pensions—
this removes the bias towards those who have spent more time 
participating in the workforce, and who therefore have more 
savings and less need for support from their pensions.72 In 
general, greater state support has tended to benefit women. 
As Sainsbury and Morissens argue, “Citizenship or residence 
as the basis of social entitlement has been to the advantage of 
women.”73 In the case of Singapore, this suggests that dissociat-
ing CPF from employment, and providing HDB subsidies on 
the basis of citizenship, would both be to the benefit of women. 
Goldberg et al. also argue that policies directed at single mothers 
have important implications for women in general.  Sainsbury 
and Morissens write, “Mothers in two-parent families have in-
creasingly become earners but still assume more caring respon-
sibilities than fathers, so that their contribution to family income 
is generally lower. In this way policies supporting solo mothers 
have implications for equality within the family.”74 In the case 
of Singapore, as discussed above, there are no such policies de-
signed to help single mothers specifically. On the contrary, they 
are often excluded from policies that are designed to encourage 
traditional family structures. Nonetheless, policies that other 
states have designed to benefit single mothers, such as state-pro-
vided childcare, substantial maternity leave, etc., would likely 
benefit all women in the Singapore context, single or married. 
Changes to fertility strategies
Buvinic et al. argue that it is easiest to increase fertility levels 
when there are policies in place that help women to remain in 
the labour force when they have children.75  They cite public 
investment in childcare and pre-school education as examples 
of this. In Singapore, however, these are not universal rights, 
and the subsidies for them are based on need. Buvinic et al. 
also points out that public funding for maternity leave is often 
more effective than simply legally requiring employers to pro-
vide adequate leave—the latter approach leaves the door open 
to employers to avoid hiring women.76  
International experience has demonstrated that reducing the 
overall financial burden of raising children, not just a one-time 
cash offering when babies are born, but steady levels of support, 
actually does improve fertility rates.  
Figure 3.1 demonstrates a clear correlation between public 
spending on children and fertility rates. Such spending includes 
substantial maternity and paternity leave, affordable childcare 
services, low costs of education etc.77 When such support is 
provided by the government, couples often do make the deci-
sion to expand their family size, as the lifetime burden of rais-
ing children is heavily reduced.78 
Women and gender: Conclusion
The preceding literature suggests that increased and targeted 
state support would improve the situation for women in Sin-
gapore. Cultural norms related to the role of women as car-
egivers have an impact on women’s savings, both personal and 
CPF, and thus their retirement adequacy in the context of self-
funding retirement schemes. Furthermore, these norms, when 
combined with gender equality in the workplace, creates an un-
sustainable burden on women’s time and abilities. This combi-
nation also inevitably leaves women at a financial disadvantage 
which is perpetuated over time, reinforcing gender inequalities 
and the cycle of poverty.79 
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2009 2009 2008 2008
Mid-late
2000s 2008 2009 % GDP, 2007
OECD 
average
(intervals)
1.74 
(+/– 0.183)
59.6 
(+/– 5.52)
73 
(+/– 6.5)
16
(+/– 4.1)
12.7
(+/– 3.06)
54.7
(+/– 7.38)
494
(+/– 11.4)
2.2
(+/– 0.46)
Nordic 
Europe
Denmark 1.84 73.1 83.5 12 3.7 78.6 495 3.7
Finland 1.86 67.9 80 21 4.2 51 536 2.7
Iceland 2.22 77.2 - 13 8.3 74.9 500 3.5
Norway 1.98 74.4 72.5 9 5.5 72.8 503 2.9
Sweden 1.94 70.2 84.2 15 7 68.4 497 3.1
Continental 
Europe
Austria 1.39 66.4 73.9 21 6.2 44.3 - 3.1
Belgium 1.83 56 54.7 10 10 73.6 506 3.1
France 1.99 60 77.8 12 8 70.8 496 3.7
Germany 1.36 65.2 56.9 25 8.3 60.2 497 2.8
Luxembourg 1.59 57 90.5 - 12.4 62.4 472 3
Netherlands 1.79 70.6 76.2 17 9.6 61.3 508 2.9
Anglophone 
countries
Australia 1.9 66.2 47.9 12 11.8 39.6 515 2.7
Canada 1.66 69.1 79.8 20 14.8 40.4 524 1.4
Ireland 2.07 57.8 54.7 16 16.3 40.1 496 2.6
New Zealand 2.14 67.4 64.9 8 12.2 65 521 2.3
Switzerland 1.5 73.8 85.7 20 9.4 - 501 1.4
UK 1.94 65.6 47.7 21 10.1 64.4 494 3.6
USA 2.01 63.4 80.1 20 21.6 45.2 500 1.2
Eastern 
Europe
Czech Rep 1.49 56.7 64.4 21 10.3 40.4 478 2.4
Hungary 1.33 49.9 69.5 2 7.2 48 494 3.3
Poland 1.4 52.8 63.5 14 21.5 26 500 1.5
Slovak Rep 1.41 52.8 - - 10.9 37.3 477 2.2
South Europe  
and Asia
Greece 1.53 48.9 86.5 10 13.2 30.2 483 1.3
Italy 1.41 46.4 86.5 1 15.3 63.6 486 1.4
Portugal 1.32 61.6 88.7 16 16.6 63.4 489 1.3
Spain 1.4 53.5 81.8 12 17.3 66.9 481 1.6
Japan 1.37 59.8 86 31 14.2 59.4 520 1.3
Korea 1.15 52.2 69 39 10.3 59.3 539 0.6
Total 
Fertility 
Rate
Employment 
to 
population 
ratio
(Women 
15-64)
Employment 
rates of sole 
parents
Gender 
pay gap
Public 
spending 
on family 
benefits
Child
poverty
PISA 
reading 
scores
Childcare 
enrolment 
(aged <6)
Above the 
OECD average
Around the 
OECD average 
(or no data)
Below the 
OECD average
Figure 3.1: Countries’ performance relative to OECD average
Source: Reconciling Work, Family and Child Outcomes: What Implications for 
Family Support Policies? Olivier Thevenon and Angela Luci
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Section B: Race
Singapore has faced a number of challenges in its attempt to 
achieve racial harmony. At the time of Singapore’s independ-
ence, the government opted not to adopt a policy of affirma-
tive action to address the racial economic inequalities that 
existed, as this would have been at odds with its meritocratic 
system.80  Instead, the government pursued other ways to cre-
ate and achieve equality of opportunity. This process largely fo-
cused on three strategies: first, the formation of ethnic self-help 
groups; second, mandating through quotas that people of vari-
ous races live together in public housing; and third, offering the 
same broad educational opportunities to everyone regardless 
of race.81  The philosophy was that these strategies would level 
the playing field sufficiently to allow the meritocratic system to 
work.
 
The ethnic self-help groups were set up in such a way so as to 
encourage each ethnic group to be responsible for its own suc-
cess, and to encourage self-reliance.82 These groups were found-
ed on the belief that each racial group would be best aware of 
the problems facing its community and best able to address 
them.  The first of these groups was set up in the 1980s; the 
1980 census revealed that there were significant income gaps 
among the races, and the government decided to take action 
by forming MENDAKI, the Malay self-help group.83 Originally, 
this group was designed to reach Malay children and instill val-
ues in them that would allow them to achieve success in Singa-
pore; MENDAKI’s activities were mostly focused on education 
and tuition.84
 
By the end of the 1980s, both the education and economic per-
formance of the Malay community had improved to the de-
gree that the government decided that the design of the ethnic 
self-help group might be applied to other races.85 As a result, 
the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) was 
formed in 1990; the Chinese Development Assistance Council 
(CDAC) was developed in 1992; and the Eurasian Association 
(EA), founded in 1919, was officially granted “Self-Help Group” 
status in 1994.86  
The funding from these groups primarily comes from their 
own communities via individual CPF donations. These dona-
tions vary according to income levels, with those earning the 
lowest income donating the least, and higher-income earners 
donating more.  It is possible for workers to opt out of these 
contributions, and it is also possible to contribute more than 
the minimum required.87 CDAC, Sinda, and the Eurasian As-
sociation have all announced that they will be raising their do-
nation rates in 2015.  MENDAKI is not following suit. As Min-
ister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs Yaacob Ibrahim explained, 
MENDAKI had last raised rates in 2009, and did not feel it was 
appropriate to ask more of the community only a few years 
later.88 The government also contributes to these groups, with 
capped matching donations, which they have also announced 
will be raised in 2015.89
 
While the funding system for ethnic self-help groups encour-
ages ethnic groups to provide support for their own communi-
ties, R. Quinn Moore has argued that it may actually perpetuate 
inequality among the various groups.90 Since funding is de-
pendent upon CPF contributions from community members 
according to ethnicity, whatever communities start out in the 
lead might actually increase their advantage by virtue of having 
more to give.91 This is already the case in some ways: CDAC has 
expanded into new and better services since its inception, and 
provides greater extent and variety of activities to its commu-
nity than the other groups are able to do.92 
Although the situation for Singaporean Malays has improved 
significantly since MENDAKI was formed in the 1980s, there is 
still some disparity of wealth among the various ethnic popula-
tions.  
According to the Census of Population 2010: Statistical Release 
2 – Households and Housing, the median income of Singapore-
an Malays, SGD 3,844 is well below the national average of SGD 
5,000 SGD, and below that of Chinese and Indian Singapore-
ans, whose median incomes were SGD 7,432 and SGD 5,370 
respectively.93 Further, Singaporean Malay-headed households 
are underrepresented at the high end of the income spectrum. 
While just over 10 per cent of all Singaporeans and PR house-
holds have monthly incomes of SGD 15,000 and over, under 
two per cent of Singaporean Malay headed households earn 
such incomes. This is compared to approximately 11 per cent 
of Singaporean Chinese headed households and 11 per cent of 
Singaporean Indian headed households.94
PM Lee has recently affirmed the government’s view that ethnic 
self-help groups have an important role to play in Singapore’s 
multicultural society.95 However, it has been suggested that Sin-
gapore abandon the model of ethnic self-help groups in favour 
of a more cohesive, non-ethnicity-based model.  For example, 
Presidential candidate Dr Tan Cheng Bock in 2011 included 
the abolishment of ethnic self-help groups within his presiden-
tial platform. He suggested that, if elected, he would promote 
greater unity among Singaporeans and a more racially unified 
Singapore.96 
All in all, ethnic self-help groups appear to bring mixed results. 
MENDAKI has clearly helped the Malay community consider-
ably. They have made great strides, economically and educa-
tionally, since the 1980 census, and a large part of this is likely 
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due to MENDAKI’s assistance. However, some have argued that 
while the various self-help groups may help their individual 
communities, they do not necessarily move society in the di-
rection of greater equality. As Kamaludeen Bin Mohamed Nasir 
has argued, “No matter how much time is given to those lagging 
behind, the same amount of time is also allocated to those lead-
ing the race to move along in their progression… Hence, those 
who have had a head start in history will usually be leading the 
way, save in the event of a major upheaval.”97  (See Part I of this 
paper, for a detailed discussion of inequality in Singapore.) 
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Part IV 
Existing Policies 
This section cites the same authors repeatedly, as each sub-
topic features debates that are often discussed by a limited 
number of researchers. We do not claim to have exhausted 
all commentators on these subjects, but have attempted to 
highlight the key ongoing discussions, debates, and policy 
suggestions. Wherever possible, we have used publicly avail-
able government sources, consisting of websites, studies and 
papers to present recent information on current policies and 
policy discussions.  As also noted by many of the authors we 
cite, we have been limited by the inability to quote many 
government papers and by difficulties in obtaining approved 
quotes for publication from civil servants.
8
Section A: Many 
Helping Hands
In line with the principle of meritocracy discussed in the earlier 
section, Singapore’s social structure is broadly designed in such 
a way as to encourage self-reliance, with various structures in 
place to help where support is needed.  
Lim Xiuhui, a former Social Assistance Policy Officer in the 
ComCare and Social Support Division of the then Ministry of 
Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS), explains 
the philosophical underpinnings of Singapore’s social policy 
“based on enabling self-reliance, supported by strong family 
and social networks.”1 Lim lists three principles at work in Sin-
gapore’s social policy:  self-reliance, family as first line of sup-
port, and Many Helping Hands.  She sums up these principles 
as an overarching philosophy that “government help must be 
the last resort.”
Lim explains some of the values inherent in the non-welfare 
state, including the belief that welfare diminishes incentives to 
work, a concern that high levels of childcare support could in-
centivize parents to have more children than they can reason-
ably afford, and a belief that strengthening social and family 
support benefits society by strengthening these ties. She empha-
sises that more support is given to children who are in greater 
need of help, particularly in the sphere of education, pointing 
out that Singapore’s budget includes high spending in order to 
provide quality education at low cost. Finally, she acknowledges 
that the changing landscape means that Singapore’s anti-welfare 
position is evolving to meet new social needs, a point which has 
been acknowledged in various government speeches in 2013 
and 2014.
PM Lee voiced his commitment to the Many Helping Hands 
system at his National Day Rally speech in 2013. After describ-
ing the ways in which the individual, the community and the 
state worked together, with the government providing “condi-
tions for a vibrant economy and good jobs,”2 PM Lee pointed out 
that such an approach had served Singapore quite well. He went 
on to acknowledge, however, that the situation had changed, 
and that the government was prepared to make changes to the 
system to meet the new economic realities facing Singaporeans. 
Today, the situation has changed. If we rely too heavily on 
the individual, their efforts alone will not be enough, espe-
cially among the vulnerable like the low-income families, 
like the elderly. And there are some things which indi-
viduals cannot do on their own and there are other things 
which we can do much better together. So we must shift the 
balance. The community and the Government will have to 
do more to support individuals. The community can and 
must take more initiative, organising and mobilising our-
selves, solving problems, getting things done.3
Amongst changes in the level of government support to which 
PM Lee referred in this speech were MediShield Life and, under 
it, the Pioneer Generation Package, which are discussed fur-
ther in this section. DPM Tharman also mentioned in his 2014 
Budget Speech that social spending was on the rise generally, 
not only for Singapore’s seniors. He pointed specifically to an 
increase in the government’s investment in Singapore’s youth. 
More is now being spent on students at every level, from pre-
school through tertiary education.4 It is clear that the Many 
Helping Hands approach to social welfare is not static, but 
provides a fluid approach to assistance that can, and does, shift 
with new economic situations.
Kuih Lapis
Besides the Many Helping Hands approach, which is under-
stood to involve levels of support including the individual, fam-
ily and government, the metaphor of kuih lapis is often used to 
describe the various levels of government assistance to disad-
vantaged Singaporeans.5 The bars in Figure 4.1  represent the 
various levels of support for Singaporeans based on needs. As 
Minister for Social and Family Development Chan Chun Sing 
commented when rejecting calls for Singapore to introduce 
a national poverty line, Singapore’s approach involves having 
“multiple lines of assistance across the entire spectrum rather 
than having one line.”6 
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Public Assistance
Medifund
ComCare
Workfare Income Supplement
MOE Financial Assistance Scheme
CDC/CCC bursary for post-secondary students
Kindergarten & student care subsidies
Additional CPF Housing Grant 
Assistive Technology Fund (for people with disabilities) 
Special CPF Housing Grant
MOE bursary for post-secondary students
Community Health Assist Scheme
Early intervention programme for children
Childcare subsidies
Day activity centres & homes for people with disabilities
 Intermediate & long-term care subsidies
GST Voucher
Subsidies for education, health care and housing
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Figure 4.1: Multiple lines of assistance7 (not drawn to scale)
Source: Ministry of Social and Family Development
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seph Stiglitz writes, “Singapore realised that an economy could 
not succeed if most of its citizens were not participating in its 
growth or if large segments lacked adequate housing, access 
to health care and retirement security. By insisting that indi-
viduals contribute significantly toward their own social welfare 
accounts, it avoided charges of being a nanny state.”13 In other 
words, the CPF system is recognised as not only seeking to meet 
an individual’s financial needs over a lifetime, but also allowing 
Singaporeans and PRs to take responsibility for their well-be-
ing, a key element of the Many Helping Hands approach.
Scholarly discussion of impact
Several commentators have pointed to the benefits of the cur-
rent structure of the CPF system. Low argues that combining 
the CPF and housing systems has benefited Singaporeans in a 
number of ways; for example, it has certainly increased levels of 
home ownership by providing another means by which families 
can purchase HDB flats.14 In addition, the integration of the two 
schemes provides greater retirement support through one’s flat; 
as Low points out, homes bought using CPF monies are often 
“the most visible expression of social security… for lower and 
middle income Singaporeans.”15 (See Section C on page 46 for 
a discussion of monetization of HDB flats for retirement secu-
rity.)
While there is no doubt that the CPF scheme has significantly 
improved the lives of Singaporeans, it has nonetheless been 
met with some criticism. (See the discussion briefly outlined 
in Part II regarding CPF qua tax, page 25) There have been 
various concerns raised about the operation of CPF as a savings 
scheme. Lee argues that, while CPF might help on a macro-
level by allowing government investments and mandating in-
dividual savings, at a micro-level, it might reduce cash on hand 
that could otherwise be used for day-to-day emergencies.16 In 
addition, once individuals have retired and are relying on the 
CPF contributions, they can no longer share directly in the on-
going benefits of Singapore’s economic successes.17
Many have commented that the CPF system excludes several 
categories of Singaporeans entirely as it only supports those 
who have been employed for a significant period of time. Lee 
provides a list of populations not automatically covered by 
CPF, including pensionable civil servants, the self-employed, 
those employed in low-paying jobs, and individuals who are 
employed part-time or irregularly.18 Many disadvantaged low-
er-income Singaporeans are captured in these categories. Lee 
points out that the percentage of the Singaporean workforce 
Section B: CPF
One of the pillars of social security in Singapore is the CPF. 
It is also a core example of the way that the social structure is 
designed to allow Singaporeans to be self-reliant. As discussed 
briefly in Part I, both individuals and their employers con-
tribute to these funds. Currently, the maximum rate for peo-
ple under the age of 50 is 36 per cent of total wages, with 16 
per cent coming from the employer, and 20 per cent from the 
employee.8 CPF contributions go into three accounts: the Ordi-
nary Account (OA), the Medisave Account (MA) and the Spe-
cial Account (SA).9 Funds from the OA can be used for housing 
purchases, education and certain approved investments and 
purchases; funds from the MA are to be used for hospital stays 
and certain approved outpatient treatments, subject to with-
drawal limits; and funds from the SA are reserved for suste-
nance for old age and/or disabilities.
Brief history of CPF
The CPF Scheme was first introduced in 1955 as a means to 
provide Singaporeans and PRs a mechanism to save for their 
retirement years.10 Over time, though, its purpose shifted from 
providing security for one’s retirement years, to providing secu-
rity for one’s life.11 
In 1968, the Singapore government began to allow individuals 
to withdraw CPF funds to use for mortgages. At the present 
time, it is not only permitted, but standard practice for Singa-
poreans and PRs to use funds from their OAs for this purpose. 
Over time, the government approved the withdrawal of CPF 
funds for an increasing number of purposes:  
1978: for certain approved government investment schemes 
1982: home insurance 
1984  health care (compulsory Medisave Scheme) 
1989: tertiary education.12
As the Singapore government expanded the permissible uses of 
CPF accounts, it also took steps to ensure that CPF could con-
tinue to provide for retirement in spite of these withdrawals. For 
this reason, in 1987 the “Minimum Sum” was introduced—this 
was the minimum amount that must remain in CPF accounts 
to fund retirement. As a significant portion of CPF funds are 
typically used for mortgages, the government has allowed 50 
per cent of the Minimum Sum to come from pledged proper-
ty—that is, if CPF funds are used to finance housing, then the 
property will automatically count towards the Minimum Sum.
This trajectory of the CPF system—evolving to meet the needs 
of a changing state—has earned international admiration. Jo-
44
A Handbook on Inequality, Poverty and Unmet Social Needs in Singapore  
not contributing to CPF accounts was 33 per cent by 1995. The 
numbers from December, 2014, indicate that there are 3.57 mil-
lion people who have some savings in their CPF accounts, but 
only 1.92 million active members (i.e., people who have had at 
least one contribution made for them in the last month or any 
of the previous three).19 These numbers should be compared to 
an employed population of 3.58 million as of September, 2014.20
Retirement adequacy
Several scholars have also suggested that CPF savings are in 
many cases inadequate to provide for retirement, even for those 
with active CPF accounts.21 The Income Replacement Rate 
(IRR) is usually used to measure retirement adequacy: the IRR 
is defined as “the percentage of pre-retirement working income 
earnings that an individual can obtain in retirement to main-
tain his/her pre-retirement consumption in retirement.”22 That 
is, the IRR is the percentage of an individual’s income that could 
theoretically provide the same standard of living in retirement 
that was enjoyed pre-retirement.  
Hui explains that most experts place the necessary IRR between 
60 and 80 per cent; Asher and Nandy place it between 66 and 75 
per cent.23  Hui ran a simulation in 2012 to assess how well CPF 
savings can cover expenses in retirement, in which he targets 
the IRR at 66 per cent.24  He argues that the ability of CPF sav-
ings to provide for retirement is questionable for large groups of 
Singaporeans when factors such as wage stagnation, structural 
unemployment, housing purchases and rising housing costs are 
taken into account.25 According to Hui’s calculations, CPF sav-
ings can sustain those in lower income groups through their 
retirement, but not if they have withdrawn from their accounts 
for major purchases such as housing or other significant invest-
ments.26
These conclusions are disputed by another study that offers a 
more optimistic estimate of the retirement adequacy of CPF 
savings. In a 2013 study commissioned by the MOM, Chia and 
Tsui developed a simulation model that demonstrated that the 
CPF system is capable of providing retirement adequacy to 
those entering the workforce today, “as long as members work 
consistently and choose a housing type that is within the finan-
cial means.”27 Their model includes certain assumptions such 
as a household having fewer expenditures in retirement than 
during working life, a typical couple purchasing their first flat 
around age 30 and not upgrading to a larger property, and CPF 
member(s) having typical earning paths or salary increments 
over a lifetime.28  
Debates concerning CPF savings and retirement adequacy of-
ten touch on the many pre-retirement withdrawals made from 
CPF accounts for housing, education and other common 
needs through a working lifetime. In the years 2001 to 2006, it 
is estimated by Asher and Nandy that the average amount of 
CPF withdrawn pre-retirement was 82.7 per cent, leaving the 
balance to provide for retirement years.29 The high percentage 
of money withdrawn can be largely attributed to the direction 
in which the CPF system has evolved since its inception, from 
a targeted retirement scheme to a savings scheme for retire-
ment and large purchases, as discussed in the introduction to 
this section.  
Beyond the question of how individuals use their CPF savings, 
Asher and Nandy have argued that the government’s manage-
ment of the fund is another significant factor in determining 
its adequacy. In poor macroeconomic cycles, the government 
has occasionally reduced CPF contributions to correct the 
economy.30 Though this strategy can provide a quick cor-
rection, it has a long-term effect on CPF savings and, conse-
quently, the ability of these savings to sustain people through 
retirement years.
Retirement adequacy debates are complex because arguments 
depend upon myriad assumptions made by those involved, 
such as what sort of retirement expenditures are to be ex-
pected, what choices are made with respect to housing over 
one’s lifetime, how macroeconomic cycles might impact one’s 
employment opportunities, among several others. The debate 
about retirement adequacy, while inconclusive in one direc-
tion or the other, sheds light on important questions ranging 
from the role of CPF in retirement planning, to ideas about 
individual responsibility versus the responsibility of the state.
Several commentators have 
pointed to the benefits of the 
current structure of the CPF 
system. Low argues that combining 
the CPF and housing systems 
has benefited Singaporeans in a 
number of ways; for example, it 
has certainly increased levels of 
home ownership by providing 
another means by which families 
can purchase HDB flats.
‘
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CPF discussions in 2014
suggestions as to how to improve the system to attain those 
goals.32
Among other topics, panelists spent a significant amount of 
time discussing retirement adequacy. Hui argued that the 
MOM’s estimates of retirement adequacy were misleading, in 
that they do not take into account housing aspirations and 
income growth over the course of an individual’s career.33 
Consequently, according to Hui, there was significant risk of in-
adequate income replacement for a “large majority” of middle-
income earners.34  
Regardless of the position that various authors and commenta-
tors have taken in the debate about income replacement rates 
and retirement adequacy, they all agree that the revived conver-
sation about directions that the CPF system might take is wel-
come and needed.  With the combined threats of Singapore’s 
rapidly ageing population, wage stagnation, increased housing 
prices, heightened levels of inequality, and longer life expectancy, 
most agree that some changes to the system will prove neces-
sary. What these changes might be is discussed further in Part V.
In the middle of 2014, there was a series of conversations re-
garding the CPF system, and the issues included retirement 
adequacy, populations that are excluded based on unemploy-
ment, the minimum sum, transparency of CPF investments and 
other issues.  
In different occasions, DPM Tharman has explained in greater 
detail than in the past how CPF monies were managed and 
invested.31 CPF, unlike most pay-as-you-go social security 
schemes, minimises risk for its contributors: the Singapore gov-
ernment guarantees the rate of return on CPF contributions, so 
CPF members are not exposed to risk. Further, in the interest 
of increasing transparency regarding CPF monies, these mon-
ies have been given to Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund, GIC 
Pte Ltd, to invest, and not to support other projects in Singa-
pore.
As part of the recent discussions about CPF, the Institute for 
Policy Studies (IPS) held a CPF Forum in July 2014. This forum 
was broadly organised into two discussions: goals of the CPF 
system against the backdrop of a rapidly ageing population, and 
Section C: Housing and 
Development Board (HDB)
It is widely agreed that the HDB plays an important role in Sin-
gapore’s social policy.	 	Chia Ngee Choon has argued that part 
of the goal in Singapore’s approach to assistance is to create an 
asset-rich population, and the HDB is central to achieving that 
goal.35 The HDB was created in 1960, initially to provide “emer-
gency” public housing and address the housing shortage at that 
time. Over time, public housing became linked to CPF savings, 
and the HDB made the purchase of public housing increasingly 
accessible, at the same time as making the option of renting 
more unattractive.36  
Today, Singapore’s public housing system is quite unique.37 
Over 80 per cent of Singapore’s resident population live in 
public housing, which is a percentage unseen elsewhere in the 
world.38 One of the aims of emphasising home ownership is to 
foster a sense of belonging by giving every citizen a stake in the 
nation.  Because such a high percentage of Singaporeans live in 
public housing, it is not stigmatised in the way that it is in many 
other areas of the world. Indeed, HDB buildings tend to be 
more attractive than the public housing in other countries, and 
the ones here are meticulously maintained.39  Singapore’s hous-
ing policy also assists in social cohesion, as people from various 
ethnic and income groups live close to one another and interact 
frequently.40 HDB also provides heavily subsidised rental hous-
ing for those who cannot afford to buy their own homes, start-
ing from as low as SGD 26 per month for a one-room flat, for 
households whose monthly income is below SGD 800. This is 
intended to ensure that no Singaporean goes without shelter.
HDB home ownership provides not only shelter, but also a form 
of social security.  An individual is encouraged to purchase a 
home early, live in it throughout his or her adult years, and re-
tire having accumulated significant capital through his or her 
home.41 Once retired, there are several ways to monetize one’s 
flat if the need should arise. First, the Enhanced Lease Buyback 
Scheme (LBS) allows some flat owners to sell back the end of 
their lease to the HDB, unlocking some equity.42  Secondly, the 
elderly may sublet rooms in their flats.  Thirdly, the elderly can 
downsize by selling their existing flat and moving into a small-
er one. Fourthly, the Ministry of National Development, as of 
2014, has been considering ways to make the reverse mortgage 
a practical monetization option for the elderly.43 All of these op-
tions are limited to certain types of HDB flats, with the general 
rule that the larger one’s HDB flat, the more options are avail-
able for monetizing. 
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Scholarly discussion of impact
Some authors have argued that the HDB’s encouragement of 
social cohesion, by housing people of various ethnicities and 
income levels in the same developments, has potentially re-
sulted in some unfortunate externalities. For example, because 
almost every HDB estate includes residents at all levels on the 
economic ladder, some have suggested that the incidence of 
poverty in Singapore often goes unnoticed because the less ad-
vantaged are mingled with others in HDB developments.
In Hard Choices, Low questions the goal of the HDB system 
with respect to financing retirement. He states that if Singapo-
reans are intended to use their HDB flats to finance their re-
tirements, then this entails their flats appreciating significantly 
over time. When the time comes to monetize the flats, either 
entirely or partially, this automatically means higher prices for 
those entering the housing market. Ultimately, then, the next 
generation of buyers has to pay higher prices for their first 
homes, which then also have to appreciate significantly, further 
pushing the burden onto the following generations. Since this 
means that the young are financing the retirements of the el-
derly, albeit in a roundabout way through housing appreciation, 
Low argues that there should be a policy discussion regarding 
whether this could be accomplished through the more direct 
means of taxation.44 
The rising cost of HDB units has been noted and addressed by 
the government. The Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy re-
ported in 2012 that there are policies in place that have encour-
aged “more-than-a tenfold increase in the prices of HDB flats 
over the past 30 years.”45  This has made it much more difficult 
for lower- and middle-income groups to afford housing. 
The government has made efforts to cool the housing market 
since 2012, largely by increasing the supply of HDB flats to meet 
the high demand for them. In his 2013 National Day speech, 
PM Lee acknowledged that the prices of HDB flats have in-
deed risen, and assured Singaporeans that the government will 
“monitor closely how well people can afford housing in Singa-
pore.” He added that an HDB flat will always be “within reach.”46
In addition to issues of affordability, Low also points out that it 
is not always easy for people to rent or sell their HDB units at 
the right time. Given that the housing market fluctuates, it is far 
from certain that at the time it is necessary for one to monetize 
his or her flat, the market will be in the appropriate place to do 
so.  Further, using housing as retirement security is highly re-
gressive and inequitable since it is, afterall, the wealthier people 
who can buy more property and therefore have more in place 
for their retirement. According to Low, “[it] seems quite unfair 
that a citizen’s retirement security should be so dependent on 
whether the individual had the resources and risk appetite to 
invest in housing at an earlier age.”47
Finally, the fact that people can use their CPF accounts to fi-
nance their HDB flats has come under criticism. Clearly, the 
more one uses CPF funds to finance housing, the less he or she 
will have available for retirement support. The type and size of 
the HDB unit that one finances through CPF savings has seri-
ous repercussions for retirement adequacy. The Lee Kuan Yew 
School of Public Policy offers the example: “for a new entrant 
into the workforce in the 30th income percentile, buying a 
4-room flat rather than a 3-room flat would decrease his net 
Income Replacement Ratio from 88 per cent to 56 per cent.”48 
This relates to Chia and Tsui’s argument, discussed earlier, that 
retirement adequacy depends very much upon the housing 
choices that Singaporeans make.
Low suggests that the government should change its goals 
where HDB is concerned.  Rather than using public housing 
to secure retirement adequacy, he argues that the government 
should focus on housing affordability. He refers to the Housing 
Affordability Index (HAI), which is the ratio of the price of a 
buyer’s house to his or her annual income.  Low argues that the 
government should strive for an HAI of below four.  
Similarly, IPS economist Yeoh Lam Keong argues that the cost 
of one’s home would preferably be closer to two to three times 
household annual income, and repayable out of CPF contribu-
tions over 10-15 years.49 This would enable lifetime savings to 
be channeled into other big ticket needs like retirement ade-
quacy, health care, education, and so on.50 Instead of placing the 
Because almost every HDB estate 
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focus on housing appreciation, these authors suggest that the 
government should instead focus on housing being affordable 
for a larger group of people, and look to other means to ensure 
retirement adequacy.  
The reality is that HDB flats have become increasingly more 
expensive over the last several years, although the market has 
begun to cool since 2013. The Department of Statistics found 
that the median cost of HDB flats nearly doubled over the ten-
year-period between 2004 and 2014, with the cost beginning 
to decrease again in 2013 and 2014.51 It was reported in No-
vember 2014 that various policies have managed to cool the 
housing market somewhat, with the price ratio of all new flats 
being below 5.5 times median annual salary of the households 
applying for them.52  Most flats are still above the price ratio of 
four times annual salary of the households applying for them, 
though, which is National Development Minister Khaw Boon 
Wan’s target ratio.  Even with the positive changes over previous 
two years, it has become increasingly difficult for Singapore’s 
high degree of home ownership to be sustained. 
It is in this vein that Low argues it should not be assumed that 
everyone needs to own a home. The government, he proposes, 
should promote a stronger and wider low-cost public rental 
market. Given increased cyclical volatility in the economy, this 
could become most important for low-income families that of-
ten do not have the job security or savings to finance a long-
term housing loan.53
Other considerations 
related to HDB policies 
Recently, there has been some debate as to whether HDB flats 
should have a presence in two new eco-friendly housing devel-
opments in prime downtown areas: Marina South and Kam-pong Bugis. Between the two areas, there are plans for 
13,000 new homes, none of which are HDB flats. Many have 
argued that these areas will still be inclusive, as they will 
not be gated communities, but will be open for all to visit.54 
Some view the land as too expensive to justify the build-
ing of public housing, and, IPS’s Tan M. W. has suggested, “It would be better if prices can be lowered in general for 
the new 500,000 upcoming public housing (flats) so that all 
new homeowners can benefit.”55
Yeoh has pointed out that without public housing, these two 
areas run the risk of becoming very “rich ghetto[es].”  He adds 
that this is “unhealthy in terms of national identity; people will 
feel that the best areas are not accessible to them.”56 Low (also 
Senior Fellow at IPS) is also in favour of an HDB presence in 
the central area, pointing to the Holland Village as a successful 
example of a neighborhood that has people of all ages and in-
come brackets living side by side.  In sum, some IPS economists 
argue that the social costs of this decision should be considered 
alongside the economic ramifications.57
In addition to the increased segregation of types of housing in 
Singapore, it has been noted that some segments of the popula-
tion are excluded from the government’s assistance in buying 
public housing.  Single Singaporeans under the age of 35 are not 
given the same access to HDB flats as married Singaporeans. 
Not only does this mean that they must live with their parents 
or buy more expensive housing, it also means that they do not 
begin reaping gains from their investment until much later in 
life, compared to their married counterparts.58
Section D: Health financing
Singapore has set up its healthcare system based on a similar 
ethos to other social policies: with an emphasis on personal and 
family responsibility, supplemented by additional support from 
government funding.  In practice, this translates to the pairing 
of government subsidies for public healthcare institutions and 
patient co-payment. 
On top of government subsidies, the healthcare system has 
various tiers of government support depending upon need, 
with most citizens required to pay for a significant portion of 
their own health care. The healthcare system has three levels, 
commonly referred to as the 3Ms: Medisave, MediShield, and 
Medifund. Medisave is a compulsory saving programme, which 
is designed to allow people to pay for their own medical needs; 
MediShield is a mandatory insurance scheme intended to cover 
expensive treatments and/or hospital stays; Medifund is a gov-
ernment-funded means-tested scheme that is intended as a last 
resort for those who cannot pay for their health emergencies 
through the first two schemes.  
Beyond these, Eldershield is a disability insurance scheme that 
is in place to provide coverage for disabled older Singapore-
ans,59 and the Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS) offers 
lower- and middle-income households, whose members are 
all Singaporean citizens, subsidies for medical and dental care. 
MSF also offers two schemes to low-income families that as-
sist with or cover medical expenses: the Medical Fee Assistance 
Card (MFAC) and the Medical Fee Exemption Card (MFEC). 
The former subsidises medical treatment at government and 
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restructured hospitals and polyclinics, and the latter covers 
standard treatments at the same.60  Both are means-tested, and 
MFEC is available only to those who are residents at VWO shel-
tered homes or disability homes.
Scholarly discussion of impact 
Most commentators applaud this multi-tiered system, noting 
that it offers flexibility while steering clear of the hazard of 
citizens undergoing more treatments than necessary.61 Ac-
cording to Asher and Nandy, since the government owns pub-
lic hospitals and acts as regulator and volume-purchaser, this 
helps to keep up good standards and to maintain low costs.62	
Others have argued that, given Singapore’s budget surpluses, 
the state could be paying a greater portion of the healthcare 
needs of its citizens.63  The government increasing health 
spending would be particularly helpful given that, as Ramesh 
argues, Medisave is often inadequate to pay for medical needs 
because it is a part of CPF, and many Singaporeans and PRs 
have no account.64
Low points out that most economists are in favour of risk-pool-
ing or social insurance when it comes to health care. This is be-
cause many medical emergencies are both low-frequency and 
high-cost, so hedging these risks through individual savings 
makes little sense. Low argues that, since there is at present no 
universal health insurance in Singapore, and since most health-
care spending is made out-of-pocket, it would be relatively easy 
to create a fairer system without becoming less efficient.65 
Recent changes: National Day 2013 
and “Pioneer Generation” Package 
In his National Day Speech in 2013, PM Lee addressed some 
of the issues noted above. Firstly, he announced an intention 
to shift MediShield to MediShield Life, and explained that this 
change entailed universal coverage for life. He added that the 
government was seeking to lower out-of-pocket expenses.66
Soon after, in February of 2014, the Singapore government an-
nounced the “Pioneer Generation” package, which provides 
extra benefits to many elderly Singaporeans. This package, ac-
cording to the government, is intended to recognise the con-
tribution of this generation in “the early years of [our] nation-
building.” In order to qualify, an individual must have been 16 
years old by 1965, the year of Singapore’s independence, and 
must have become a citizen by the end of 1986.67 The Pioneer 
Generation package includes a subsidy for MediShield Life 
premiums, various types of assistance with outpatient care, 
and Medisave top-ups, with amounts varying positively with 
age.68 This package goes far to address many of the concerns 
regarding the limitations of current assistance schemes for 
meeting the needs of Singapore’s rapidly ageing population. 
Section E: Workfare
In the spirit of encouraging self-reliance and participation in 
the workforce, Singapore has emphasised “workfare” rather 
than welfare.  “Workfare” refers to the myriad policies that en-
courage work by supplementing wages, developing skills, en-
couraging social mobility through education, and providing 
social support to low-income Singaporeans who are partici-
pating in the workforce.69 Besides the WIS, which is discussed 
here, the Singapore government offers the Workfare Skills 
Qualification (WSQ) and Employability Skills System (ESS), 
which are designed to improve skills and enhance employabil-
ity for low-wage Singaporeans.  
There are also several education schemes that are designed to 
break the cycle of poverty and encourage mobility: The Kin-
dergarten Financial Assistance Scheme (KiFAS), for example, 
and Centre-based Financial Assistance Scheme for Child Care 
(CFAC) provide subsidies for preschool education and child-
care.  While KiFAS was originally intended to provide support 
to lower-income Singaporeans, it was announced in Budget 
2014 that the scheme would be extended to cover middle-
income Singaporeans as well.70 
Singapore’s primary workfare scheme, WIS, is designed in 
such a way that Singaporeans receive government benefits 
providing they are participating in the workforce. WIS was 
introduced in the 2007 Budget speech and was initially in-
tended to be in place for three years. It ultimately became a 
permanent scheme.71 Singaporean workers in the bottom 20 
per cent are the target population for WIS. This is a means-
tested scheme, and to be eligible one must have a monthly sal-
ary of not more than SGD 1,900; reside in a property of not 
more than SGD 13,000 in annual value; and he/she must be 
employed on a full-time basis for two out of three months. 
Individuals over the age of 60 can receive a maximum of SGD 
3,500 per year. 
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Scholarly discussion of impact
Firstly, Hui compares Singapore’s workfare scheme to similar 
schemes in other countries, specifically with respect to the pop-
ulations they target. Singapore’s WIS is designed to encourage 
unemployed individuals to seek work, as once employed, they 
will then receive additional payment from the government.72 
This is not quite the same as schemes in other countries, which 
target welfare recipients, of which there are very few in Singa-
pore, and require them to work or prove that they are seeking 
work in order to continue to receive welfare payments.  Besides, 
unlike similar schemes elsewhere, Singapore’s WIS is tied to 
wages rather than to household income. Hui argues that WIS 
might encourage employers to keep wages low, and might “per-
petuate… sub-standard employment terms and sub-optimal 
production methods.”73
Secondly, Ng argues that international evidence has shown that 
helping families out of poverty requires more “than merely dish-
ing out financial assistance and requiring that people work.”74 
Specifically, she cites analysts’ recommendation that workfare 
programmes do more to address the barriers to employment, 
which may include issues like health problems, a criminal re-
cord, lack of housing and so on.75  Overall, she contends that 
Singapore’s Workfare programme could benefit from greater 
engagement between case workers and recipients, and more 
intensive programmes.
Some of the criticisms noted above were broadly addressed in 
Singapore’s budget for 2013. The government plans to introduce 
20 new Social Service Offices (SSOs) that will act as “one stop 
shops.”76 These will be better coordinated and able to provide 
a more holistic approach to meeting the needs of vulnerable 
communities.  They will not take the place of Family Service 
Centres (FSCs), but will be able to refer citizens to FSCs and 
other centres that would be best suited to address their needs. 
This plan speaks to the government’s awareness of the com-
plexity of these issues and their interest in addressing potential 
shortcomings.
Section F: Tax incentives
Singapore also offers assistance in the form of tax benefits. 
These include, but are not limited to, the Qualified Child Relief, 
Working Mother’s Child Relief, Relief for Foreign Maid Levy,77 
various tax breaks for those supporting aged or disabled family 
members, and tax breaks for having children.78 These tax breaks 
are designed to influence major decisions taken in the family, 
on caregiving, members working, having more children etc.
Scholarly discussion of impact
Asher and Nandy illustrate that tax incentives only benefit 
those who pay income tax, and this is typically less than half 
of the population in Singapore. The authors cite the statistics 
from 2005, which show that 31 per cent of Singapore’s labour 
force paid income taxes in that year, and similar calculations for 
2012 demonstrate that 40 per cent of the labour force paid in-
come taxes in the reported year. Those who pay income tax are 
disproportionately from the higher income deciles, making tax 
incentives far more relevant to the more advantaged segments 
of the population.79
Section G: Public assistance
So far, the discussion in Part IV of this handbook has referred 
to schemes that serve as layers of support in the Singapore gov-
ernment’s kuih lapis approach to support. This combination 
of HDB subsidies, CPF contributions, healthcare assistance, 
Workfare support, and many other programmes provide vari-
ous depths of support depending upon the needs that are being 
addressed.
In cases where people are unable to participate in the work-
force for significant periods of time, or on a permanent basis, 
the Singapore government provides “public assistance.” This is 
intended to help very disadvantaged Singaporeans or PRs. As 
ComCare indicates on their website, long-term public assis-
tance is in place to help those who “are unable to work due to 
old age, illness or unfavourable family circumstances.”80 Pub-
lic assistance, also known as “longterm assistance,” makes up a 
small portion of the support that ComCare provides to less ad-
vantaged Singaporeans—in 2013, only 3,57181 families received 
this type of assistance.
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Section H: Non-profit 
organisations (NPOs)
In addition to forms of support supplied directly by the Singa-
pore government, NPOs manage much of the social assistance 
in Singapore. These agencies include VWOs, various religious 
charities, ethnic self-help groups and advocacy groups, among 
others.  Many of these receive part of their funding from the 
state, often in matched donations.82
Scholarly discussion of impact
Singapore is somewhat unusual in the close ties between the 
government and the non-profit welfare sector.  Many NPOs sup-
port the work of the government rather than work partially or 
wholly according to their own agenda, as is often the case inter-
nationally.83 In Singapore, the government provides a great deal 
of financial support to the sector and regulates it quite closely, 
especially through monitoring service delivery. This close re-
lationship between NPOs and the government means that the 
amount of social support offered by the Singapore government 
is often underestimated. A great deal of funding is funnelled 
through NPOs rather than offered as part of government social 
programmes. That is, government assistance is not limited to 
those schemes discussed above—those that are directly man-
aged by the government, such as CPF, ComCare schemes, and 
so on—it also includes significant funds from the government 
to Singapore’s disadvantaged communities via NPOs.
While this supports the ideology of community-based as-
sistance and “many helping hands,” some have argued that 
the dominance of the Singapore government in funding non-
profit activities has stifled innovation and reduced the ability 
of these organisations to keep up with changing needs.84 For 
example, funding for NPOs is largely output-based—FSCs are 
given strict key performance indicators (KPIs) to justify their 
funding from the government. These KPIs determine factors 
such as the amount of funding for administrative costs and the 
specific outputs of programmes that are implemented.85 While 
it is necessary for government funding to be carefully managed 
and for the funds to be spent in line with government policy, 
many have argued that these broad KPIs result in non-profits 
focusing too many resources on meeting KPIs in order to se-
cure future funding, with negative consequences for the quality 
and fit of programmes to the needs of the target community.86
With so much focus placed on KPIs, MP Mohamed Faisal Ab-
dul Manap has argued that few resources are left for broader 
management and strategy of these NPOs. Several have com-
mented that the high level of government involvement in the 
social sector has limited the space available for innovation and 
strategic thinking, and the sort of long-term planning neces-
sary for adapting to the changing needs of the population.87 As 
the social landscape is always changing, as with the current in-
crease in the elderly population in Singapore, it is important 
for NPOs to be able to assess community needs and respond by 
adapting their strategy and programmes. 
Finally, some have pointed out that administering funds 
through such a wide variety of community organisations, often 
highly specialised VWOs, creates a situation where it is difficult 
for the less advantaged to identify and access the specific type of 
assistance they need.88 This is exacerbated by gaps in commu-
nication among these organisations, so people in need of assis-
tance often fall through the cracks. Finally, having such a wide 
variety of organisations involved in service delivery naturally 
leads to higher administrative costs.89
Regarding this final point, the government has recently taken 
steps to simplify the procedure for the disadvantaged to find 
support. The new Social Service Net (SSNet) will be a national 
case-management system that will enable the sharing of infor-
mation among various service providers.90 SSNet is designed 
to increase coordination among the various organisations in 
the social sector so that services and assistance can be deliv-
ered more rapidly and efficiently. The current estimated date 
for implementation at FSCs and SSOs is in the third quarter 
of 2015.91
General scholarly discussions 
about social policies
As has been highlighted in discussions of individual schemes, 
many of the existing policies may not reach key segments of the 
population. Further, Mendes argues that anti-welfare views in 
Singapore largely stem from a dogmatic commitment to this 
philosophy, and admits that these views are not based on evi-
51
Existing Policies
52
dence. For example, international perspectives indicate that it 
is far from clear that the welfare state incentivizes unemploy-
ment.92 
New ways of thinking about poverty suggest that having a num-
ber of “opt-in” systems actually puts an unmanageable burden 
on the less advantaged. Recent studies in behavioural econom-
ics have suggested that poverty imposes a “bandwidth tax” on 
people trying to cope with the situation of living in poverty, 
and thereby makes it that much more difficult to climb out of 
poverty. (See “The Bandwidth Argument” below.) 
Low and Gill have applied the “bandwidth argument” to Singa-
pore’s situation, and have shown that the way the Singaporean 
system is designed imposes an unnecessary and overburdening 
bandwidth tax on those who need services. The kuih lapis ap-
proach to assistance, according to Low and Gill, places a great 
burden on the less advantaged to seek help. People experienc-
ing this sense of “scarcity,” however, are already taxed in such a 
way that it is all the more difficult to seek help.  
In addition to discussing the impact of this broad approach 
to welfare assistance in Singapore, Low and Gill also provide 
the specific example of public housing subsidies in Singapore. 
When middle- or high-income Singaporeans purchase flats, the 
subsidies that apply to them are provided automatically when 
they make their purchase.93 In contrast, when low-income Sin-
gaporeans apply for their subsidies, they must provide a signifi-
cant amount of paperwork proving their status, and they must 
meet a strict deadline. Low and Gill suggest, according to the 
bandwidth theory, that this places an unnecessary cognitive 
burden on the people who can least afford it.
Harvard economist Sendhil Mullainathan and Princeton psy-
chologist Eldar Shafir, in their book Scarcity: Why Having Too Lit-
tle Means So Much, challenge many of the common perceptions 
about people living in poverty. They designed and implemented 
a series of experiments to demonstrate the effects the feeling 
of “scarcity” has on decision-making and cognitive flexibility. The 
authors use the term “bandwidth” to capture the idea of “fluid 
intelligence, a key resource that affects how we process infor-
mation and make decisions.”94  
In one experiment, the researchers tested shoppers in an Amer-
ican mall, asking them to focus on paying different amounts for 
a car repair, and then administering an intelligence test imme-
diately afterward. When participants were asked to think about 
paying USD 150 for a car repair, the advantaged and the less 
advantaged participants scored about the same on the intel-
ligence test. When participants were asked to think about pay-
ing USD 1,500 on a car repair, however, less advantaged par-
ticipants scored far below their more advantaged counterparts: 
they averaged between 13 and 14 IQ points lower. 
The researchers argue that this difference indicates that the 
distraction of paying large amounts of money has a dramatic 
effect on people who are already in a position of scarcity. Com-
paring this study to similar sleep studies, the impact of poverty 
on bandwidth appears to be more significant than the impact of 
losing an entire night’s sleep.
Mullainathan and Shafir conducted a similar experiment on 
sugarcane farmers in India, testing their intelligence just before 
the harvest—the time of greatest scarcity—and immediately 
after the harvest. The same people scored between 9 and 10 
IQ points higher after the harvest than they had scored before. 
Again, this is a significant difference in processing ability. The 
direction of cause and effect here is important: the poor in this 
study are not by nature less capable than the advantaged, but 
are more significantly affected by financial concerns. As the 
authors put it, “scarcity directly reduces bandwidth—not a per-
son’s inherent capacity but how much of that capacity is cur-
rently available for use.” 
The Bandwidth Argument
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Part V
Suggested Avenues 
for Reform
In addition to the efforts that the government is already 
undertaking to address the issues raised in the previous 
sections, there have been several suggestions regarding ap-
proaches that Singapore may take to improve the situation 
of the less advantaged.  These suggestions range from tweak-
ing existing structures to vastly overhauling the system. 
While it would not be possible to include every proposal 
regarding changes in policy towards the less advantaged in 
Singapore, what follows is a representative sampling.
Section A: Tweaks 
to the system
1. Umbrella system / Opt-out
One of the more frequent suggestions is that Singapore com-
bine the many and various assistance schemes under one um-
brella system, or build closer connections between the schemes. 
Yap suggests that combining the currently ad hoc systems into 
a more coherent system, and thereby adopting a holistic ap-
proach to assisting the less advantaged, would not only make it 
easier for people to get the services they need, but would save 
money for the state.1  
At present, the top-heavy approach to helping the less advan-
taged means that much time and money is directed to paper-
work, approvals, double-checking, and so on, whereas a holistic 
approach would greatly reduce the bureaucracy of the current 
system. The government’s plan for SSOs goes some way to ad-
dressing this concern, as SSOs will be able to direct people to 
the appropriate scheme(s).  Even with this added level of coor-
dination though, there are still several organisations involved 
and a fair amount of paperwork.
Low and Gill, in their piece on “bandwidth tax,” suggest that 
grouping assistance schemes together and making them auto-
matic would help reduce the currently heavy bandwidth tax on 
Singapore’s less advantaged citizens. Some schemes are already 
automatic, such as the permanent GST vouchers, rolled out 
with the 2012 Budget.2 The authors propose that other non-
automatic assistance schemes could be linked to WIS, such that 
“an individual who currently qualifies for the WIS would au-
tomatically qualify for the full range of assistance—additional 
housing, childcare and student care, education, healthcare and 
eldercare subsidies—that someone with similar income and 
family circumstances would qualify for today.”3 Low and Gill 
suggest that payouts could be given in vouchers, so that the gov-
ernment could ensure that they were being used appropriately. 
Further, they point out that “moral hazard” is not a risk in this 
case, as all assistance is linked to WIS, which sends the message 
that remaining employed is the key to improving one’s circum-
stances. Since WIS is automatic and involves little bureaucratic 
effort, the less advantaged would not be overburdened by pa-
perwork and means-testing. In this way, the government would 
be able to “track more meaningful indicators of the well-being 
of the poor—both those requiring long-term aid as well as the 
temporary and working poor.”4
Recent policy changes
The Singapore government announced plans in 2014 to pilot a 
programme that would assign vulnerable families an individual 
social worker who would stay with them as they navigate the 
various agencies and potentially a multi-year process.5 This will 
go some distance in preserving the “bandwidth” of vulnerable 
families as they seek social assistance.  In addition, the govern-
ment plans to pilot a database that will share the data of aid-
recipients across agencies to eliminate some of the bureaucracy 
involved in the process.6 These measures will ease the burden 
on Singapore’s most vulnerable families as they seek social as-
sistance.
2. Supplementing the CPF
Hui suggests that CPF might be expanded to include unem-
ployment insurance for those who are suddenly and invol-
untarily rendered unemployed. His proposal includes a pro-
gressive funding structure (with the government matching 
contributions), the ability of individuals to withdraw 50 per 
cent of their salary for three months (or longer, in the case of a 
recession), the amount to be paid back when the individual is 
once again employed, and the account balance being repaid to 
the individual upon retirement.7 Hui argues that such a scheme 
allows an optimal amount of time to search for new employ-
ment, while not incentivizing unemployment.
Furthermore, Hui suggests a “wage insurance scheme” that 
would help people adjust to a new job with a lower salary.8  Such 
a scheme would last for up to 12 months, pay 50 per cent of the 
wage difference, and involve a contribution of about 1 per cent 
of monthly income of greater than SGD 1,500 to a maximum 
of SGD 6,000.9 He argues that this type of scheme would enable 
people to accept a job with lower wages rather than engage in 
a lengthy search for employment; this would help to “increase 
labour mobility [and] help to reduce the public cost of provid-
ing assistance to the more vulnerable lower income groups.”10  
Chia suggests that women serving as homemakers and care-
givers, who have not been able to build CPF savings, might be 
automatically given a share of their husbands’ CPF accounts 
to sustain their retirement as well.11 Similarly, Wee Ming Ting 
proposes further protection for another vulnerable group: sin-
gle women. He points to the inequities inherent to Singapore’s 
social investment strategy, such as exclusion of single women 
from HDB subsidies, and of single mothers from the “baby 
bonus,” and suggests that these might be corrected to provide 
equal access to benefits.12
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3. Specific changes 
to the tax system
Dhamini suggests that altering the tax structure may help to 
combat rising levels of inequality in Singapore. First, Singapore 
could reinstate a more progressive taxation system, including 
higher taxes than the current 20 per cent on the highest income 
earners, which would do more to battle inequality through re-
distribution than the current system. While the current rates of 
income taxation do not burden the lowest income earners, as 
discussed in Part II, they are also quite low for the wealthiest, 
which does not allow for a high level of redistribution.  
Secondly, she explores the possibility of adopting a scheme like 
that which is used in the US, whereby those whose incomes 
have risen the fastest are taxed at a higher rate, while lower in-
come groups might benefit from an earned income tax credit. 
She acknowledges that these options would require further re-
search as to how feasible they would be in Singapore, but ar-
gues that in general, Singapore ought to be looking at policies 
adopted by countries that have also experienced a high rate of 
growth, but have managed to combat income inequality along 
the way.13
Finally, Dhamani also suggests that the government consider a 
“means based tax” system, whereby people are taxed according 
to assets and expenses rather than incomes.14  Such a system 
would go further to tackle inequality, as it would tax capital 
rather than work, and therefore not interfere with the merito-
cratic system.  She explains that this system would be similar to 
a progressive GST, in which taxes vary according to products; 
expensive products and services would be taxed at a higher rate 
than “essentials.”  As the author points out, this concept is al-
ready familiar in Singapore, as there is a more than 100% tax 
rate on “vices” and cars.  She acknowledges that a means-based 
tax is complicated and would make tax collection more diffi-
cult, and recommends that the government study the merits 
and costs of such a system.15
4. Adjustments to wages
Several authors have suggested that the government might 
step in to correct the issue of low wages.  Perhaps most notably 
among the recent suggestions, Professor Lim Chong Yah gave 
a lecture in 2012 in which he proposed a second “shock thera-
py” to correct the vast difference in wages between the top and 
bottom earners, which would be, an immediate and dramatic 
change to policy rather than a gradual shift. He suggested less-
ening the number of low income earners in Singapore while at 
the same time putting a three-year moratorium on wages of top 
earners.16 He also proposed implementing a minimum wage in 
Singapore, and suggested that it be at  SGD 1,000 per month, 
unless rates of inflation render that number too low.  
Lim, in a chapter entitled “How Land and People Fit Together 
in Singapore’s Economy” in Hard Choices, proposes that there 
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be a significant wage increase for low-skilled occupations in the 
construction industry, the food and beverage industry, and the 
domestic service industry.17 These jobs are often shunned by 
Singaporeans and are consequently filled by low-skilled work-
ers from other countries. Lim points out that these same roles 
in other developed countries have higher wages, and perhaps 
because of this, the jobs do not carry the same stigma. By pay-
ing a higher salary for these positions, it is likely that a greater 
number of Singaporeans would be willing to work in these 
roles, and that they would be better able to support families.18 
Tan M. W. also supports increases in wages and makes the case 
that policies should allow workers to “reclaim the dignity and 
the full value of their labour” rather than merely reflecting their 
level of productivity.19  
Hui, who is also in favour of a minimum wage in Singapore, ar-
gues that such a policy might actually increase the productivity 
levels of workers in this segment of the population.20  He sug-
gests that while wages are low, employers have little incentive to 
upgrade the skills of their workers.  A minimum wage, however, 
“could provide the necessary impetus for the start of a positive, 
ongoing cycle of skills upgrading and wage increases, enabling 
workers to reach their full potential.”21  If such a minimum wage 
were also applied to foreign workers, it would attract higher 
skilled foreign workers to Singapore.  Hui’s suggestion for the 
level of such a minimum wage is similar to that of Lim’s: He 
places it in the range of SGD 1,020 to SGD 1,460 per month, or 
35 to 50 per cent of the median wage.22
Dhamani also proposes that Singapore adopts a minimum wage 
policy.  She argues that such a policy would bring about two 
benefits. It would combat the current levels of income inequal-
ity and, at the same time, allow this segment of the population 
to have savings in hand for retirement and any needs that may 
arise.23 She acknowledges the primary counterargument to the 
minimum wage, which is that such a policy may actually lead 
to greater unemployment because employers may not hire un-
skilled or low-skilled workers at those wages.  Dhamini argues, 
however, that the rate at which Singapore’s economy is growing, 
which clearly has increased the need for semi-skilled workers 
from overseas, and suggests that there is a need for labour in 
this segment in the workforce that a minimum wage is unlikely 
to offset.24 
Recent reforms in this direction
The minimum wage is another issue that the government has 
recently taken steps to address. In January of 2014 it was an-
nounced that, beginning in September of the same year, a 
mandatory wage ladder would be put in place for cleaners.25 
According to these new requirements set for employers who 
have until September to comply, all cleaners must be paid a 
minimum of SGD 1,000 per month, with higher-skilled work-
ers earning at least SGD 1,400, and supervisors earning at least 
SGD 1,600.26 
This Progressive Wage Model is also being put into effect for 
Singapore’s security industry.27 As of September 2016, security 
agencies must pay a minimum of SGD 1,100 per month and 
ensure that their security officers are appropriately trained.28 
While the Progressive Wage Model does not guarantee a mini-
mum wage for all low-income workers, it is an important step 
in the direction in combating poverty through wage increases, 
at least in two sectors.
5. Increases to WIS
Low suggests that substantially increasing the WIS would go a 
long way to ensure retirement adequacy.  Specifically, he pro-
poses increasing the WIS for the bottom three deciles across 
all age cohorts.  Low argues that such a programme avoids the 
moral hazard of a work disincentive while at the same time ad-
dressing concerns about people’s ability to sustain themselves 
through retirement.29
Yeoh has argued in favour of increasing WIS payouts so that all 
low-wage workers take home at least SGD 1,500 per month.30 
After this increase, Yeoh suggests that “gradually you can 
phase these out as productivity and real wages catch up in the 
longer run.  So you solve the poverty problem first by the gov-
ernment paying for it, and over time you let employers pay 
for it when they upgrade productivity and can afford to.”31 He 
estimates the total annual cost of this would be around 0.5 per 
cent of GDP; an affordable budget commitment given the large 
impact on poverty.
6. Limiting foreign workers
Tan M. W. argues that, alongside wage adjustments, low-
skilled foreign workers should be more limited.32 He suggests 
that their numbers be such that they are here merely to sup-
plement Singapore’s workforce, but not to take the place of 
Singaporean workers who can do the same job. Low makes 
the same recommendation, and argues that reducing the 
number of foreign workers in Singapore will not only allow 
more Singaporeans to fill these roles, and at higher wages, but 
will also reduce the pressure on Singapore’s infrastructure.33
56
A Handbook on Inequality, Poverty and Unmet Social Needs in Singapore  
Recent developments
Over the past few years, Singapore’s government has begun to 
reduce the inflow of foreign labour into Singapore. DPM Thar-
man underscored in his Budget Speech for 2013 that limiting 
the presence of foreign workers in Singapore was a priority, 
and he listed several strategies to do so: more levies on hiring 
low-skilled foreign workers, lower quotas on foreign workers, 
stricter guidelines for qualifications of foreign workers, and en-
couragement for companies “to proactively develop the talents 
and skills of our Singaporean workforce.”34 The government 
has remained firm on the plan to limit these quotas. In May of 
2014, under pressure from small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) that have been struggling to find enough workers, PM 
Lee stressed that he had no plans to ease the limits on foreign 
workers, saying, “We have to manage the inflow, we have to 
manage what we can accommodate in Singapore.”35
7. Education reform
Both Low and Ng have suggested that Singapore’s educational 
system at present does not do enough to promote intergenera-
tional income mobility, and have suggested that policy-makers 
should seriously reconsider the structure of the system. Both 
suggest that the system of streaming, as well as the increasing 
number of specialised schools, should be rethought with a view 
to promoting greater inclusivity and equality in the system.36 
Bhaskaran et al. have also proposed significantly higher teach-
er/pupil ratios in primary and secondary schools to benefit me-
dial and weaker students and to relieve the reliance on private 
tuition.37  
None of these analysts offers more specific reforms, but all sug-
gest that the Singapore government look closely at ways that 
the system reinforces existing hierarchies and diminishes a 
meritocracy, and find ways to counteract this. Ng argues that 
making minor adjustments to the existing system is unlikely to 
effect major change or correct for intergenerational immobility; 
as she writes, “Remedial interventions such as bursaries and pe-
ripheral interventions such as the regulation of early education 
or private tuition have limited effectiveness if the main system 
reinforces immobility.”38
Recent developments
As noted above in Part II, in the discussion on meritocracy, 
the MOE has announced some changes to the system.  These 
changes include giving letter grades for the PSLE rather than 
a numerical grade, which might remove some of the pressure 
that students tend to feel before this examination.  Letter-grade 
results will place students into wider streams, where a wider 
range of courses will be available to them.39  
In addition, Education Minister Heng Swee Keat has pledged to 
make every school a “good” school by providing a greater level 
of support to primary schools.40 While these changes do not 
constitute the sweeping changes that Ng suggests are necessary 
to promote greater mobility, they are nonetheless moving in the 
direction she proposes.
Remedial interventions such as bursaries and 
peripheral interventions such as the regulation 
of early education or private tuition have limited 
effectiveness if the main system reinforces 
immobility.
‘
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Section B: Recommendations 
for broader changes
1. New social compact
Besides suggesting minor enhancements to the existing social 
structures in Singapore, others have suggested the over-arching 
strategy of developing a new social compact. Bhaskaran et al. 
make a case that the social compact that has moved Singapore 
forward so successfully over its first 40 years and more may 
have run its course, and that it is time to develop a new one. 
The authors suggest that this involve not merely changing some 
policies to accommodate the changing demographics of Singa-
pore, but also changing mindsets.41 
2. Greater welfare state  
Low suggests that Singapore’s anti-welfare policy is more a re-
sult of “path dependency” thinking and not based on a care-
ful study of the evidence.42 In fact, Low and Yeoh argue that 
the experience of many northern European countries actually 
demonstrates that strong welfare states can see high levels of 
inclusive growth.  The authors suggest that when considering 
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the question of social spending, the Singapore government shift 
its focus to “cost effectiveness” rather than “cost containment.” 
In other words, Low and Yeoh argue that some types of social 
spending might bring about benefits that would be well worth 
the cost.43
3. More public debate
Thum Ping Tjin in Hard Choices argue that much of the great-
ness of Singapore grew out of lively debate and discussion in 
the 60s. Indeed, the broad organisation of the structures in Sin-
gapore that are most praiseworthy, such as the HDB and CPF, 
were results of this debate. As Thum points out, much of the 
debate during this period was led by the PAP.  He suggests that 
a return to this tradition could develop relevant policies for the 
issues that face modern Singapore.44  
Importantly, laws and regulations giving the public access to 
data and information needed for empirically based policy re-
search by academia, think tanks, or citizens, are important in 
this regard.  Vadaketh also argues that a free mainstream me-
dia is critical in managing and developing a knowledge-based 
economy and an informed, responsible, and publicly active citi-
zenry.45
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This handbook, as indicated at the outset, is intended and de-
signed to be a compiled source of information on the various 
debates and discussions about the state of inequality, poverty 
and unmet needs in Singapore. As such, it does not include spe-
cific recommendations on individual policies, and the authors 
do not endorse a specific “side” in any debate. Indeed, the issues 
presented in this handbook are all complex; they often have 
long histories, and can be viewed from a variety of perspectives. 
As we hope we have demonstrated, the various suggestions for 
reform all come with their own arguments and counterargu-
ments.  Many of these suggestions also refer to broad changes in 
one policy area and clearly require further detailed analysis of 
their impact on other policies before implementation.  
That said, there is one conclusion that appears to be inescap-
able in the realm of addressing unmet needs in the population: 
There is a great need for more data on disadvantaged individuals 
and families and for much more sharing of the data that exists. 
Studies on poverty and unmet needs in Singapore are conduct-
ed both by governmental agencies and NPOs, which include 
VWOs, academic institutions, civil society organisations and 
think tanks. Research by NPOs are no less relevant than gov-
ernment studies, and are useful in answering specific questions, 
but rarely have the scope of government studies. Studies from 
MSF and other ministries are often Singapore-wide, yield much 
larger and more representative data sets, and therefore can pro-
vide a bigger picture of demographic realities. It is therefore the 
availability of government data that would make the biggest im-
pact on service design and delivery in Singapore.
Government studies and 
limitations of their data
Three of the major sources for government-collected data rele-
vant to poverty, inequality and unmet social needs are the HES, 
the ComCare Annual Report, and the Key Household Income 
Trends report. 
While all of these provide some insight into the occurrence 
of poverty, they are each designed to provide specific types of 
information, and so present a wealth of data only in the form 
of aggregated answers to specific questions.  We mention these 
three reports specifically because they are of particular rel-
evance to understanding the picture of inequality and poverty 
in Singapore. There are many other government studies whose 
data is presented in the same way. All such studies clearly yield-
ed vast amounts of data on the experience of poverty and in-
equality in Singapore, but much is lost to the public, and more 
importantly to VWOs, in the process of aggregation.
Take for example the HES, conducted every five years. The HES 
collects information on the consumption expenditure, demo-
graphic and socio-economic characteristics and ownership of 
consumer durables of resident households in Singapore.1 The 
results are typically organised and released according to eco-
nomic quintiles and household type (e.g. one-bedroom flat, 
three-bedroom flat, etc.). This provides information on the av-
erage spending, income, and so on, of each fifth of the popula-
tion, as well as the average income for each type of dwelling. 
From these categories, we can learn, for example, that each fifth 
of Singaporeans has a higher average income than in the pre-
vious survey, and that the bottom quintile continues to spend 
more than they earn, but by a smaller margin than before.  
On the one hand, the data is helpful to the discussion on pov-
erty, inequality and unmet social needs in Singapore, in that 
it demonstrates that people are, in general terms, doing better 
than they were doing five years ago. While this is good news, 
the data could be presented in other ways that would be more 
helpful to the organisations that provide services to particular 
groups. This could further enhance these broad improvements. 
The data released has been aggregated to make specific, and 
usually very broad, points such as those related to income and 
spending averages of quintiles. This is entirely suited to the spe-
cific issues that are the focus of the HES report. However, it 
is difficult to also use the data in a way that may be more rel-
evant to VWOs, which generally focuses on specific neighbor-
hoods in Singapore and on specific communities within those 
neighborhoods. For example, it would be helpful to understand 
how much government transfers have driven the economic im-
provement of the bottom quintile, and how much impact other 
factors have had. Looking at the bottom quintile on Chart 2.3, 
the HES shows that their income averages 61.2 per cent from 
employment, and 26.5 per cent from non-work sources.2  How-
ever, much of this quintile consists of retirees, who, according 
to Chart 2.6 of the HES, receive 26 per cent of their monthly 
income from family assistance.3 Based on the level to which re-
tirees are represented in the bottom income quintile, it is pos-
sible to make guesses about the income sources of the many 
and various groups that make up this quintile.  However, access 
to disaggregated data would turn these guesses into facts that 
could inform public debate and decisions made by VWOs in 
the implementation of service delivery programmes.
The Lien Centre is not the first organisation to comment on 
the lack of disaggregated data in the HES and other reports. 
Basu, a senior correspondent at The Sunday Times, cites a few 
scenarios in which access to disaggregated data would be help-
ful.  She points out that it is unclear what kind of accommoda-
tion the people from the bottom quintile are living in. The HES 
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provides ample aggregated data about people living in 1- to 
2-room HDB flats, often a proxy for the less advantaged, as 
well as data about the lowest economic quintile, but no expla-
nation of how significant the overlap is. As Basu argues, many 
in the bottom quintile might be living in larger flats that they 
could monetize, which would suggest that they are in a much 
better financial position than others who are living in rental 
flats with no assets.4 The data clearly exist in disaggregated 
form, and would add valuable detail to our understanding of 
the situation.
VWOs and other researchers have been quite forthcoming 
about their desire for disaggregated government data.  Basu’s 
article cites two examples of NPOs (Hua Mei Centre for Suc-
cessful Ageing and the Community Foundation of Singapore) 
whose staff have indicated that their specific questions cannot 
be answered by the aggregated statistics offered by the HES and 
the ComCare Annual Report.5 In writing this handbook, we 
were in contact with several people who work for VWOs, and 
the most frequent comment we heard from them was that they 
could use more information to improve their service delivery 
and strategise for the future.  
Many of the academics and policy analysts cited throughout 
this handbook have also expressed a desire in their own work 
for the government to share more data. For instance, the Abey-
singhe study on affordability in Singapore, referred to in Part I, 
acknowledges the paucity of available relevant data, as do most 
of the studies attempting to measure poverty in Singapore.  Ad-
ditionally, studies on topics ranging from intergenerational so-
cial mobility, to the retirement adequacy of CPF, to the extent 
of capital and income inequality in Singapore, frequently ac-
knowledge the lack of data, and discuss the ways in which the 
authors have attempted to make approximations to compensate 
for this absence.  Informed and accurate analysis of these topics, 
based on raw data, would greatly enhance the contributions of 
these authors, as well as community understanding of poverty 
alleviation.
A further reason to support this point is that Singapore’s ap-
proach to social assistance, whether understood with the kuih 
lapis metaphor or in terms of the Many Helping Hands ap-
proach, depends on matching families to the programmes that 
best meet their needs, and for which they meet the criteria. 
Such an approach necessitates the availability of relevant infor-
mation to make sure that the people who need specific types of 
help are getting it, and that the available funding is reaching the 
right people.  Because so much of Singapore’s approach to social 
assistance relies upon coordination between government agen-
cies and VWOs, it is important that all involved have access to 
the same data, and can use this data to have more informed 
conversations about policy design and implementation.
Our call for maximum transparency is framed in the context of 
the specific debates in this handbook, and the way in which ac-
cess would improve the work of civil society and those engaged 
in community-based solutions.  Others, such as Vadaketh, have 
framed this issue in terms of a “greater need for free informa-
tion flows given the increasing complexity of policy making 
and economic development.”6  His work, as well as others that 
include discussions of freedom of information in Singapore, is 
framed within a broader discussion of the type of democracy 
that Singapore enjoys. 
Changing philosophies 
and practices
In the past few years, the government has made several signifi-
cant shifts in its fundamental approach to poverty and welfare. 
This handbook includes myriad references to recent changes in 
government policy that are shifting Singapore in the direction 
of providing greater and more coordinated social assistance 
and support. The government has been quite open regard-
ing this shift in position; it is has been mentioned in various 
speeches, particularly those by DPM Tharman and Minister 
Chan Chun Sing, which are discussed earlier in the handbook. 
Further, when the HES was released, the Singapore government 
pointed out that an increase in government transfers is in part 
responsible for the increased well-being of the bottom quintile. 
That the government is pointing to the benefits of increasing 
transfers indicates that the anti-welfare position is not as strong 
as it once was. 
Secondly, there have also been moves to improve access to cer-
tain types of data. As discussed above, the Singapore govern-
ment is rolling out Social Service Net, which will enable greater 
collaboration among VWOs and between the non-profit sec-
tor and the government. While this is certainly a move towards 
better access to information for those providing services, it 
does not address the need for access to disaggregated statis-
tics from the reports and surveys mentioned in the publica-
tion.  Having greater access to individual case-histories is only 
part of the story; a greater understanding of the demographic 
landscape would enable stronger and more effective efforts to 
address poverty, inequality and unmet social needs.  Part V of 
this Handbook, particularly the section on “Suggested Avenues 
for Reform,” demonstrates that there are several policy options 
available to address various needs in Singapore, but it is difficult 
to assess reform options or to analyse the successes and failures 
of existing schemes when it is not clear how well programmes 
are working.
Finally, members of the Singapore government have talked 
more in recent years about their interest in feedback from the 
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public regarding solutions to address changing needs in mod-
ern Singapore. There has been greater acknowledgement that 
having a highly educated populace, and one that is politically 
engaged, will only benefit Singapore in the long run. Further, 
the free exchange of ideas, particularly about how the needs of 
Singaporeans can be addressed, will be of benefit to everyone 
involved. Minister Chan Chun Sing, in his Speech at Social Ser-
vice Partners Conference in May of 2014, said:
From MSF perspective, it’s not just about delivery of more 
services. We want to catalyse and enable the community 
and the partners to come forward to look for sustainable 
solutions and most importantly to develop local solutions 
to the local community challenges….
So all of you have diverse strengths and you will bring to us 
diverse perspectives. We want to tap on your capabilities to 
check on our blind spots and generate new ideas.7 
Through our research on this topic, we have learnt that Singa-
poreans, particularly those involved in social service delivery, 
are eager to participate in finding new solutions and in innovat-
ing existing systems to meet changing needs. To do so requires 
the partnership between the government and the community 
to be further facilitated by greater access to data on the social 
landscape and combined efforts to gather and analyse informa-
tion from existing, as well as new, sources.  
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ERRATUM
Paragraph	3	on	Page	6	currently	reads:
“As explained (see page 5), the Gini coefficient is a ratio of the highest to the lowest incomes in a given society and is expressed as 
a number between zero and one…”
It should read:
“As explained (see page 5), the Gini coefficient is the	ratio	of	 the	statistical	dispersions	between	actual	and	perfectly	equal	
distributions	of	income	in	a	society	and is expressed as a number between zero and one…”
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Policy in Singapore is always evolving as the government at-
tempts to meet changing needs.  The last few years have seen 
significant shifts in social policy, and Budget 2015 includes 
some of the biggest changes in the government’s approach to 
date.  This insert does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
overview of Budget 2015; rather, it seeks to acknowledge a few 
recent shifts in policy that have occurred subsequent to the 
printing of the handbook, and which have bearing on some of 
the debates discussed within it.
First, as DPM Tharman noted in the Budget speech delivered 
on February 23, 2015, the government has strengthened its “re-
distributive role.”1  In an effort to promote “collective respon-
sibility” for Singapore’s future, the government will raise taxes 
on the highest income earners, which will, in part, be used to 
fund new social spending.2  While DPM Tharman cautioned 
that this should not be understood as a “Robin Hood Budget,” 
it nonetheless demonstrates a greater level of redistribution 
through taxation.  
Of the new social schemes introduced in Budget 2015, the Silver 
Support Scheme perhaps represents the biggest shift in policy. 
This scheme represents a new approach to retirement support 
in Singapore, as it takes into account more than an individual’s 
contributions in the formal workforce.  The government will 
instead look at three factors to determine who qualifies for 
this scheme: lifetime wages, existing household support, and 
the type of housing the applicant lives in.  The Silver Support 
Scheme is a permanent scheme, so it will cover both today’s 
elderly and future elderly.    
The Silver Support Scheme represents not only a shift in poli-
cy, but “a new compact.”  The DPM acknowledged that “Many 
1 Transcript of Budget 2015 Speech by Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister for Finance Minister Tharman Shanmuga-
ratnam on February 23, 2015, Budget 2015, http://www.
singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2015/home.aspx
2 Fiona Chan, “Singapore Budget 2015: Govt not going for 
‘Robin Hood’ strategy, says Tharman,” The Straits Times,  
24 February, 2015. 
would have contributed in their own way during their prime 
years, whether at work or at home raising the family.”3  The 
Silver Support Scheme, and DPM Tharman’s comments, repre-
sent an important departure from traditional Singapore social 
policy.  Whereas retirement support has largely been tied to 
employment, through CPF savings, this scheme acknowledges 
the value of contributions made by Singaporeans who have had 
little or no participation in the workforce.
The government has made the CPF system more progressive 
in other ways as well.  Based on recommendations from both 
the NTUC and the CPF advisory board - a group tasked by 
the government in September of 2014 with reviewing the CPF 
system - the government has raised both the CPF salary ceil-
ing and the contribution cap within the Supplementary Retire-
ment Scheme.  Contribution rates for workers aged 50 to 65 are 
also to be increased from 0.5 percentage points to 2 percentage 
points, varying inversely with age.  These changes will take ef-
fect in January of 2016. 
Beyond changes to retirement support, the Budget 2015 in-
cludes several initiatives to support Singapore’s families.  First, 
more will be done to offset the costs of childcare, as well as the 
costs associated with education at all levels.4  Further, greater 
support will be given for training throughout Singaporeans’ 
careers.  The SkillsFuture Credit is the most notable of these 
schemes, and perhaps the most frequently lauded since the 
Budget speech.  This scheme will involve every Singaporean 
aged 25 and above receiving SGD 500 at the beginning of 2016, 
with top-ups expected to come at regular intervals.5  These cred-
its can be used only for education and training, and will never 
expire.  Importantly, this is a universal provision, which is not 
dependent upon one’s career history or current employment 
3 Transcript of Budget 2015 Speech
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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written on 10 March 2015
situation.  As such, the SkillsFuture Credit scheme represents 
another significant shift in government philosophy; another 
move away from support that is tied to employment history. 
As of the writing of this insert, budget debates continue.  DPM 
Tharman’s Budget 2015 speech has been met with both praise 
for its greater level of social support, and criticism for moving 
too far to the left in social spending.6  The broad spectrum of 
responses to these policy changes demonstrates the appetite for 
robust debate in Singapore, as well as the challenges that face 
the government in designing social policy against Singapore’s 
traditionally conservative backdrop. 
It is clearly not possible for a publication to stay on top of an 
ever-shifting landscape, but the recent changes and discussions 
represent what this handbook has sought to capture: the inter-
est in vibrant discussion of policy in Singapore, and the evolv-
ing philosophical positions informing those policies.  
6 For some discussion of the range of responses, see especially 
Donald Low, “Budget 2015: In deficit, yet very prudent at 
heart,” The Straits Times, 7 March, 2015.
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